United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN JUDGE
se Petitioner Ronald Carman requests leave from this
Court to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (Doc. 1), which he attaches (Doc.
1-2) to his request, and moves this Court to stay the
proceedings of a criminal case pending in the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas, No. CR-16-604846) (“Criminal
Case”) (Doc. 4).
reasons that follow, Carnan's request for leave to file a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2242 is granted. The petition and motion to stay are
denied, and this action is dismissed. Carman has filed a
motion to proceed with this matter in forma pauperis
(Doc. 3), and that motion is granted.
states that in February 2016, he was serving a sentence at
the Belmont state prison on a matter unrelated to the
Criminal Case and was to be released April 20, 2016. Before
he was released, he became a person of interest in two cases
being investigated by Pamela Bradek. (Doc. 1-2 at 4). On
February 26, 2016, a grand jury summons was issued for Carman
to be conveyed to the Cuyahoga County Jail where he was held
pending the filing of charges in the Criminal Case. An
indictment was filed on March 30, 2016, charging Carman in
the Criminal Case with rape, kidnaping, and gross sexual
imposition against two victims. (Id.).
sought to proceed in the Criminal Case pro se, and
the trial court granted his request. During a pretrial
hearing on February 26, 2019, Carman submitted a written
motion to quash the indictment due to a procedural defect and
asked the trial court to dismiss the Criminal Case. In the
motion, Carman argued that he was jailed on February 26,
2016, in connection with charges in the Criminal Case but not
indicted until March 30, 2016, in violation of his right
“provided by the statute” to be charged within
thirty (30) days from the date an individual is arrested,
detained, or served with a summons in connection with such
charges. (Doc. 1-1). The statute to which Carman refers is
the Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). (Doc.
1-2 at 2, 6-8).
April 30, 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing on
Carman's motion. The State argued that the speedy trial
provision did not apply because Carman was already serving a
sentence. (Id. at 6-7). The trial court denied the
motion. (Id.; see also Doc. 4). On June 3,
2019, Carman's appeal of that ruling to the Ohio Eighth
District Court of Appeals was denied for lack of a final
appealable order. He filed a writ of habeas corpus with the
Ohio Supreme Court, which was dismissed sua sponte.
(Doc. 1-2 at 4; Doc. 4).
that he has exhausted his available state remedies, Carman
seeks habeas relief from this Court and a stay of the
Criminal Case. (Id.). Carman asserts two grounds for
relief: (1) the indictment in the Criminal Case is
procedurally defective and void because it was not filed
within the time period required by § 3161(b); and (2)
the trial court erred by not dismissing the indictment. (Doc.
1-2 at 6-8). Carman argues that these errors in the pending
Criminal Case violate the statute and his constitutional
rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and asks
this Court to dismiss the indictment or reverse the trial
court's denial of his motion to quash the indictment.
(Id. at 3, 6-8).
se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and must be
liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.
364, 365 (1982) (per curiam) (citing Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)); see also Franklin v.
Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985) (pro se
complaints are entitled to liberal construction) (citations
omitted). This principle of liberal construction applies to
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. Urbina v.
Thoms, 270 F.3d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 2001).
Notwithstanding, the Court is not required to conjure
unpleaded facts or construct claims on Plaintiff's
behalf. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577
(6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985).
seeks to bring his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2242. Section 2242 is a procedural statute governing the
application for a writ of habeas corpus and does not provide
a basis for habeas relief. Carman recognizes that it is not
appropriate to seek habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 because he is not challenging a judgment of
conviction in the Criminal Case. (Doc. 1 at 2). But a state
pretrial detainee may file a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 and, in the spirit of liberal construction, the
Court will construe Carman's petition under § 2241.
See Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton
Cty., Ohio, 668 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“[H]e is in custody pursuant to an indictment. Section
2254, therefore, by its own terms, does not apply to
Phillip's petition, and it would be error to apply §
2254 here. We have long recognized that pretrial detainees
pursue habeas relief instead under § 2241.”)
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), federal courts have authority to
grant habeas relief to a state pretrial detainee in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States. Id. That said, it is well-settled
that a federal court should not interfere in pending state
criminal proceedings absent the threat of an
“irreparable injury” that is “both great
and immediate.”Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
46 (1971). “Courts have generally recognized that
Younger applies to ...