United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
D. Morrison Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Demarco Armstead's Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order (Doc. 6) is before the Undersigned. For the reasons
that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the
Motion be DENIED. Defendants are
DIRECTED to submit under seal
Plaintiff's antiviral drug administration history
records, similar to those submitted by the County Defendants,
(see Doc. 40), from December 12, 2019, to the date
of this Report and Recommendation by January 28, 2020.
who is proceeding pro se, and is currently being
detained at Franklin County Correctional Center, has brought
this suit against 24 Defendants. Plaintiff's 35-page
handwritten Complaint asserts numerous claims, including
religious discrimination, excessive use of force,
retaliation, conspiracy, and deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. (See generally Doc. 1-2).
Since bringing this action, Plaintiff has filed 28 separate
motions along with numerous letters and exhibits. (See,
e.g., Docs. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19,
29, 38, 39, 48, 49, 51, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67,
68, 70, 74, 75). Currently before the Undersigned is
Plaintiff's Motion for Restraining Order. (Doc. 6). In
his Motion, Plaintiff does not describe the injunctive relief
he seeks but rather asserts broadly that Defendants have
failed to administer nearly 20 doses of his prescribed
antiviral medication to treat his HIV. (See generally
id.). More specifically, he alleges:
[t]his facility and medical staff contracted to provide
medical care to me has maintained a practice of providing
inefficient and questionable medical services resulting in
almost 20 missed doses of my mandatory life sustaining
medication treatment regime, failure to respond to my urgent
and emergency symptoms and chronic ailments. A custom of not
addressing my health care needs [ ] physically devastating my
already compromised condition. The substandard care has
caused me to become fearful of my own survival and quality of
life I will be able to enjoy. As a pretrial detainee, I am
forced to endure torture because of poverty.
Baldwin, Blade, Blake, Bryant, Carmen, Chambers, Fargus,
Farnsworth, Holt, Jane Doe, Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane
Doe #3, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Obrien, Probst, See, and
Shroder (the “County Defendants”) filed a timely
response asserting that Plaintiff failed to identify his
medical condition or prescribed medication and therefore
failed to meet his burden for a restraining order. (Doc. 31).
The Undersigned directed the County Defendants to do more
work. (Doc. 33). Specifically, the Undersigned directed them
to address Plaintiff's factual allegations. (Id.
at 2). The County Defendants did so. On December 16, 2019,
they filed a supplemental response along with relevant
medical records, which were filed under seal. (See
Docs. 35, 40, 41). Defendants NaphCare, Inc., Lyons,
Stefanko, and Jones (the “NaphCare Defendants”)
also filed a response to Plaintiff's Motion.
(See Doc. 55). Plaintiff has filed two reply briefs
in support of his Motion. (See Doc. 58 at 48; Doc.
73). Thus, this matter is now ripe for resolution.
standard for addressing a motion for a temporary restraining
order is the same as the standard applied to a motion for a
preliminary injunction.” Ferron v. Search Cactus,
L.L.C., No. 2:06-CV-327, 2007 WL 2110497, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio July 13, 2007) (citation omitted). Both are
extraordinary measures, and the movant must meet a high
burden to show that such a measure is justified. See ACLU
v. McCreary Cty., 354 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 2003);
Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v. Eden Cryogenics LLC, 630
F.Supp.2d 853, 860 (S.D. Ohio 2008). Indeed, the proof
required to obtain this relief “is much more stringent
than the proof required to survive a summary judgment
motion.” Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739
(6th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the movant must show more than
factual issues-he “must affirmatively demonstrate [his]
entitlement to injunctive relief.” Davis v.
Caruso, No. 07-11740, 2008 WL 878878, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 28, 2008).
considering whether to grant this extraordinary relief, a
district court must balance four factors:
(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable
injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the
injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4)
whether the public interest would be served by issuance of
City of Pontiac Retired Employees Ass'n v.
Schimmel, 751 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
the first factor, to establish a strong likelihood of success
on the merits, the movant must demonstrate “more than a
mere possibility” of success. Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). This means that the movant must
“show, at a minimum serious questions going to the
merits” of his claims. Dodds v. United States
Dep't of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 221 ...