Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Brown v. Public Storage

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District

December 31, 2019

Mabel Brown, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Public Storage et al., Defendants-Appellees.

          APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (C.P.C. No. 18CV-6655)

         On brief:

          Mabel Brown, pro se.

          Collins & Slagle Co., LPA, and Ehren W. Slagle, for appellee Garry Brown.

         Argued:

          Mabel Brown.

          Ehren W. Slagle.

          DECISION

          KLATT, P.J.

         {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Mabel Brown, appeals a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas ("trial court") that dismissed her action against defendant-appellee, Garry Brown. For the following reasons, we affirm that judgment.

         {¶ 2} Mabel and Garry Brown married on September 21, 1994. During the marriage, Garry rented a storage unit from Cardinal Self Storage Worthington LLC ("Cardinal"). Garry stored his firearm collection, along with other items, in the unit. In 2013, Mabel filed for divorce from Garry in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations ("domestic court"). Immediately after filing for divorce, Mabel secured from the domestic court a temporary restraining order against Cardinal. That order enjoined Cardinal "[f]rom permitting access to any storage units rented in the name of Defendant, Garry Brown[, ] * * * until further Order of the Court." (Dec. 9, 2013 Restraining Order Against Def. Cardinal Self Storage.)

         {¶ 3} In a judgment dated April 7, 2015, the domestic court granted the Browns a divorce. In relevant part, the judgment ordered the parties to jointly inventory the items in the storage unit. The judgment further specified that "[t]he restraining order[ ] on the storage unit * * * shall remain in place until the parties have inventoried the items contained within. Parties shall be joint[ly] granted access to said restrained items for purposes of inventory at which time the TRO[ ] shall be lifted thereafter." (Apr. 7, 2015 Agreed Judgment Entry/Decree of Divorce at Section 3.2.2.) After completing the inventory, the parties were to obtain an appraisal of the firearms and divide the firearms between them according to the formula the court devised.

         {¶ 4} In a motion filed February 1, 2017, Mabel asked the domestic court to find Garry guilty of contempt because he had violated the temporary restraining order by removing the firearms and other items from the storage unit. Mabel filed a second motion for contempt on November 29, 2017, and she again asserted that Garry had violated the restraining order by emptying the storage unit. In the second motion, Mabel also alleged that the inventory Garry had given to her listing the firearms he owned omitted certain firearms and undervalued others.

         {¶ 5} On August 2, 2018, while the motions for contempt were pending in the domestic court, Mabel filed an action in the trial court against Garry, Cardinal, and Public Storage.[1] Before any defendant answered or otherwise responded, Mabel filed an amended complaint. In the amended complaint, Mabel alleged that Cardinal and/or Public Storage had allowed Garry to access the storage unit and remove its contents, which deprived her of the ability to inventory those contents. Mabel also stated that she did not believe Garry had fully disclosed to her all the firearms that he owned. Mabel sought recovery because: (1) "Defendant Cardinal Storage and/or Defendant Public Storage violated its duties under the [storage unit rental agreement] and the Restraining Order" (Compl. at ¶ 11), and (2) "Defendant Cardinal Storage and/or Public Storage failed to hire and retain employees, contractors or agents capable of operating the facility and following the Restraining Order and failed to provide adequate supervision and training to such employees, contractors or agents." Id. at ¶ 16.

         {¶ 6} Garry moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and failure to state a claim pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Mabel opposed Garry's motion. In a decision and entry issued October 16, 2018, the trial found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over any purported claims against Garry, concluding, "[i]t is clear from reading Plaintiffs Complaint that her claims against Mr. Brown arise from his alleged failure to comply with orders issued by the Domestic Court. It is the Domestic Court's job to enforce its own orders and they cannot be enforced via a separate ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.