United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
CORI L. WOODEN, Plaintiff,
ARMOND BUDISH, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AARON POLSTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
se Plaintiff Cori Wooden is incarcerated at the Cuyahoga
County Jail and brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against defendants County Executive Armond
Budish, Sheriff Clifford Pinkney and Warden Eric Ivey
regarding conditions at the Cuyahoga County Jail. (Doc. #:
alleges that at the Jail he is exposed to mold in the
showers, asbestos from the HVAC system, lead in the water,
dirty food trays, lack of recreation, no law library, leaky
ceilings, thin mattresses, and limitations with respect to
medical care, religious services, and contact with family and
legal counsel. Plaintiff asks this Court for immediate
release and fair compensation for the cruel and unusual
punishment endured as a result of the above-described Jail
conditions. (Id. at 3-5).
reasons that follow, this case is dismissed.
Standard of Review
se pleadings are held to a less stringent standards than
pleadings drafted by lawyers, and must be liberally
construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972) (per curiam). That said, federal district courts are
expressly required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to
screen all in forma pauperis actions and to dismiss
before service any such action that is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. The standard for dismissal
articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007) with respect to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) also governs
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a
claim. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th
Cir. 2010). In order to survive scrutiny under §
1915(e)(2)(B), a pro se complaint “‘must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
complaint must be dismissed under § 1915(e) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff
does not set forth allegations specifically connecting any
Defendant to the claimed unconstitutional conditions, and it
is well-established that supervisory officials cannot be
liable under § 1983 solely on the basis of respondeat
superior. Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 903 (6th
Cir. 2003); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421
(6th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff cannot establish liability on the
part of any Defendant for claimed constitutional violations
absent allegations showing that each Defendant was personally
involved in the conduct which forms the basis of the claims.
“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable
to...§ 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Where, as here, individuals
are merely named as defendants in a civil rights action
without supporting allegations of specific conduct in the
body of the Complaint, the Complaint is subject to dismissal
even under the liberal construction afforded to pro
se plaintiffs. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of
Am., 92 Fed.Appx. 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“Merely listing names in the caption of the complaint
and alleging constitutional violations in the body of the
complaint is not enough to sustain recovery under §
1983.”); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 Fed.Appx.
762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of complaint
that did not allege with any degree of specificity which of
the named defendants were personally involved in or
responsible for each alleged violation of federal rights).
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim
against any of the Defendants, and this action is dismissed
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).
of the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.
IS SO ORDERED.