FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF
SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CR-2018-08-2660-A
MEDVICK, ATTORNEY AT LAW, FOR APPELLANT.
BEVAN WALSH, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, AND HEAVEN DIMARTINO
GUEST, ASSISTANT PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, FOR APPELLEE.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
J. CARR JUDGE.
Defendant-Appellant Joshua Hill appeals from the judgment of
the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
Hill was arrested on August 2, 2018 and remained in jail
until he entered a plea of no contest on January 29, 2019. An
indictment was filed August 22, 2018, charging Hill with one
count of aggravated robbery, along with an accompanying
firearm specification, one count of felonious assault, along
with an accompanying firearm specification, and two counts of
having weapons while under disability. All of the charges
were felonies. The record reflects that multiple pretrials
were continued at the request of Hill encompassing the period
from September 10, 2018 through November 14, 2018. In
addition, Hill made two separate discovery requests; one in
early September which Hill's counsel received by the end
of September, and one at the end of October. It is unclear
from the record when the State responded to the October
request for discovery, but it is clear that as of November
14, 2018, Hill's counsel had yet to receive the
additional discovery that was requested.
On December 27, 2018, despite being represented by counsel,
Hill filed a pro se motion to dismiss based upon an alleged
violation of his right to a speedy trial. At a pretrial on
January 14, 2019, Hill's counsel moved to strike
Hill's pro se motion. Hill's counsel asserted that
she would be filing her own motion to dismiss. On January 18,
2019, Hill's counsel filed a motion to dismiss based upon
speedy trial and a renewed motion to strike Hill's pro se
filing. Hill's counsel argued that Hill's pro se
motion could not be considered by the trial court as he filed
it while he was represented by counsel. Hill's counsel
also maintained that Hill's pro se motion could not toll
the speedy trial clock and requested that the trial court
strike it from the record.
The trial court held a hearing on the pending motions on
January 22, 2019. At the hearing, the parties agreed that, at
the time Hill filed his pro se motion to dismiss, the
speedy-trial time had not expired. Thus, Hill's counsel
argued that it was appropriate for her to seek to strike
Hill's pro se motion as, not only was it improper, it was
also without merit. Thereafter, the debate centered on
whether the filing of Hill's pro se motion was a tolling
event for purposes of calculating speedy trial. Both sides
appeared to agree that, if it was a tolling event, Hill's
speedy trial rights would not be violated. On January 28,
2019, the trial court issued an entry stating: "On
January 28, 2019, this matter comes before the Court on both
the Defendant's pro se Motion to Dismiss and Defense
Counsel's Motion to Dismiss Based On Speedy Trial Rights.
Said motions were heard in a hearing held on January 22, 2019
and taken under advisement. Upon due consideration, the Court
finds said Motions not well-taken and are hereby
denied." (Emphasis omitted.)
Hill then entered a plea of no contest to amended charges and
was sentenced thereafter. Hill has appealed, raising a single
assignment of error for our review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THIS MATTER
BASED UPON THE FAILURE TO BRING THE CASE TO TRIAL WITHIN THE
TIME PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY R.C. 2945.71.
Hill argues in his sole assignment of error that the trial
court erred in failing to grant his counsel's motion to
dismiss. In so doing, Hill contends that his pro se motion to
dismiss did not constitute a tolling event. Further, he
asserts that, because it was not a tolling event, when
Hill's counsel filed her own motion to dismiss, ...