from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas No. 98CR-4601
ON REMAND from the Supreme Court of Ohio
O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, for
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Kathryn L. Sandford;
Steven M. Brown, for appellant.
Kathryn L. Sandford.
1} This case is before the court on remand from the
Supreme Court of Ohio pursuant to State v. Braden,
___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-4204 ("Braden
III "). After this court decided State
v. Braden, 17AP-48, 2017-Ohio-7903 ("Braden
I "), the Supreme Court of Ohio initially
affirmed our decision in State v. Braden, ___ Ohio
St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-5079 ("Braden II
"). In Braden III, the Supreme Court
then granted the motion for reconsideration of
defendant-appellant, David L. Braden, thereby reversing our
judgment in Braden I, and remanded the case for
application of its holding that "R.C. 2947.23(C)
authorizes trial courts to waive, suspend or modify the
payment of court costs imposed both before and after its
effective date." Braden III at ¶ 31.
2} In Braden I, Braden appealed from a
December 21, 2016 entry of the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas denying his motion to waive fines and court
costs. We concluded res judicata operated to bar Braden's
arguments related to both fines and court costs. Braden
I at ¶ 7-8. Additionally, we concluded Braden's
motion was an improper means to challenge the collection
process by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction or the prison warden. Braden I at ¶
9. The sole issue in Braden III was whether R.C.
2947.23(C) provided jurisdiction to a trial court to waive
court costs even when the conviction was finalized before the
effective date of the statute. Thus, based on the authority
of Braden III, we now reverse in part the December
21, 2016 decision of the trial court denying Braden's
motion to waive court costs, and we remand the matter to that
court to consider, in the first instance, whether to exercise
its discretion to waive Braden's court costs pursuant to
3} Additionally, both parties filed motions in this
court in response to the Supreme Court's remand order.
The state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a
final appealable order. However, we find the order of the
trial court to be a final appealable order. State v.
Thompson, 147 Ohio St.3d 29, 2016-Ohio-2769, ¶ 13
(holding "[a] trial court's determination of a
motion for jail-time credit pursuant to R.C.
2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) constitutes a special proceeding and
affects a substantial right," so the denial of a motion
for jail-time credit pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii)
is a final, appealable order); Braden III at ¶
11-14 (relying on the similarities between a post-conviction
motion to waive court costs and a post-conviction motion for
jail time credit, noting "[t]here are no material
differences between R.C. 2947.23(C) and former R.C.
2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) regarding the trial court's
continuing jurisdiction to act"). Accordingly, we deny
the state's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of
final appealable order.
4} Finally, Braden filed a motion to stay
proceedings pending the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio
in State v. Taylor, Supreme Court Docket No.
Ohio-0797, scheduled for oral argument on January 7, 2020.
However, having determined the appropriate remedy is to
reverse in part the decision of the trial court and to remand
the matter to that court for further proceedings, we deny
Braden's motion to stay as moot.
5} Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part
and reverse in part the judgment of the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas, and we remand the matter to that court to
consider, in the first instance, whether to exercise its
discretion to waive Braden's court costs pursuant to R.C.
2947.23(C). Additionally, we deny the ...