United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
HONORABLE SARA LIOI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is the motion of defendant Christopher R. Jones
(“Jones”) styled, “Petition for Permission
to File for Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255[, ]”
which the Court construes as a motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct his sentence. (Doc. No. 107 [“2255
Mot.”].) Plaintiff United States of America (the
“government”) opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 109
[“Opp'n”].) Jones also moves the Court for
the appointment of counsel. (Doc. No. 110 [“Mot.
Counsel”.) For the reasons set forth below, Jones'
motions are DENIED.
October 28, 2016, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Jones
pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to interfere with
commerce by robbery (conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery),
two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, and one count of using or
carrying and brandishing a firearm in the course of
committing Hobbs Act robbery. (Minutes 10/28/2016; Doc. No. 52
(Plea Agreement); Doc. No. 12 (Indictment).) The plea
agreement contained a broad waiver provision restricting
Jones' appeal rights including his right to take a direct
appeal and a collateral attack of his sentence. With respect
to the latter, the waiver provision generally precluded the
filing of a “proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §
2255.” (Plea Agreement at 324.)
January 31, 2017, in accordance with the plea agreement, the
Court sentenced Jones to 84 months for the using and
brandishing charge to be served consecutively to 51 months on
the remaining charges, for an aggregate term of imprisonment
of 135 months. In consideration for his plea, the government
agreed to dismiss another using and brandishing charge (Count
11) that carried a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years.
(Doc. No. 71 (Judgment); see Plea Agreement at 320;
did not take a direct appeal. Instead, on October 22, 2018,
more than 20 months after the Court entered final judgment,
Jones filed the present § 2255 motion. In his motion,
Jones maintains that recent authority from the United States
Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit requires the Court to
find that the predicate offense supporting his using and
brandishing conviction under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(ii)-Hobbs Act robbery-does not constitute a
“crime of violence.” (Mot. at 887.) The
government argues that his motion lacks merit, that it is
time-barred, and that any argument Jones makes therein was
knowingly and voluntarily waived by the express terms of the
should hold an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion
“[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the
case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Thus, “no
hearing is required if the petitioner's allegations
‘cannot be accepted as true because they are
contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or
conclusions rather than statements of fact.'”
Arredondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Engelen v. United States, 68
F.3d 238, 240 (8th Cir. 1995)); see also Napier v. United
States, No. 93-5412, 1993 WL 406795, at *2 (6th Cir.
Oct. 8, 1993) (“To be entitled to a hearing, the
prisoner must set forth detailed factual allegations which,
if true, would entitle him to relief under §
2255.”) (citing, among authorities, Machibroda v.
United States, 368 U.S. 487, 496, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7
L.Ed.2d 473 (1962)); cf. Valentine v. United States,
488 F.3d 325, 334 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that the burden is
met where the petitioner “offers more than a mere
assertion . . . he presents a factual narrative of the events
that is neither contradicted by the record nor
‘inherently incredible'”). Where (as here)
the judge considering the § 2255 motion also presided
over the guilty plea and sentencing hearings, the judge may
rely on his or her recollections of those proceedings.
See Blanton v. United States, 94 F.3d 227, 235 (6th
Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted in
the present case. The undisputed facts in the record
demonstrate that Jones' § 2255 motion-filed more
than one year after his sentence became final-is time-barred
under the governing statute.
Jones' § 2255 Motion is Time-Barred
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (ADEPA)
“provides a one-year statute of limitations for filing
a federal habeas petition.” Cleveland v.
Bradshaw, 693 F.3d 626, 631 (6th Cir. 2012).
Specifically, a prisoner must file his § 2255 motion
within one year of the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively