Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton
CHANEL M. HOLLOMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
PERMANENT GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, d.b.a. THE GENERAL, and TRUSTGARD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas TRIAL NO.
Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and
O'Connor, Acciani & Levy and Robert B. Acciani, for
Reminger Co., LPA, and Chad E. Willits, for
Defendant-Appellee Permanent General Assurance Corporation,
d.b.a. The General, John P. Carlson, for Defendant-Appellee
Trustgard Insurance Company.
Plaintiff-appellant Chanel Holloman appeals the judgment of
the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of
defendants-appellees Permanent General Assurance Corporation,
d.b.a. The General ("The General"), and Trustgard
Insurance Company ("Trustgard"). For the reasons
that follow, we reverse the trial court's judgment
entered in favor of Trustgard, and we affirm the judgment
entered in favor of The General.
Background and Procedural Posture
Holloman was injured in a car crash by a car driven by
Christopher Hay. Hay was driving a Chrysler Sebring owned by
his then-girlfriend Bethany Mathis. Mathis had an insurance
policy with The General in which she had insured the Sebring.
At the time of the crash, Hay had an auto liability policy
with Trustgard. Hay's Trustgard policy listed a 1998
Cadillac Deville as a covered automobile. Hay had sold the
Cadillac approximately four months prior to the collision.
Holloman received a default judgment against Hay for $25,
000. Holloman filed the instant supplemental complaint under
R.C. 3929.06 seeking to recover her judgment against
Trustgard and The General.
Trustgard moved for summary judgment. Trustgard argued that
Hay's liability insurance policy was void because he had
no insurable interest once he sold the Cadillac. Trustgard
also argued that Mathis's car had been available for
Hay's regular use, so the regular-use exception in the
policy applied, and Trustgard was not obligated to provide
The General also moved for summary judgment. The General
argued that the policy it had issued to Mathis contained a
"Restricted Policy Endorsement," which limited
coverage to the named insured, which was Mathis. Thus, The
General argued that its policy did not extend coverage to Hay
as a permissive driver.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both
Trustgard and The General. This appeal by Holloman ensued.
Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper when the
moving party establishes that "(1) no genuine issue of
any material fact remains, (2) the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the
evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion, and construing the evidence most strongly in
favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to
the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is
made." State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor City
Council,105 Ohio St.3d 372, 2005-Ohio-2163, 826 N.E.2d
832, ¶ 9, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). However,
"a trial court is required to overrule a motion for
summary judgment where ...