United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
C. NUGENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court upon the Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint and Compel Arbitration. (ECF #10).
For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is
and Factual Background
September 26, 2017, Plaintiff Michael Pollak submitted a
KeyBank NA Credit Application ("Application") and
provided Defendant KeyBank, N.A. ("KeyBank") with
his cell phone number. (ECF #10, Exhibit A). The Application
expressly stated that when providing a telephone number, the
applicant gave consent to receive communications via that
number from KeyBank (Id., Exhibit 1). Further,
Plaintiff also signed a Preferred Credit Line Agreement and
Disclosure Agreement ("Agreement"). (Id.
Exhibit 2). By executing the Agreement, Plaintiff
(1) agreed to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA") onset Provision and (2) agreed that any
dispute arising from or relating to the Agreement or his
account was subject to binding arbitration. (Id.).
August 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that
Defendant violated the TCP A by placing calls to Mr.
Pollak's cellular phone using an automatic telephone
dialing system ("ATDS") or an artificial or
prerecorded voice after Mr. Pollak revoked consent for such
calls. At issue is whether the Agreement encases the dispute
alleged in this case.
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides that a
written agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
(9 U.S.C. § 2). When such an agreement exists, a court
"shall on application of one of the parties stay the
trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement." (9 U.S.C.
Plaintiff agreed to the Arbitration Provision contained
within the Agreement. Further, when interpreting the FAA,
courts have recognized a national policy in favor of
arbitration; in turn, courts tend to resolve any doubts about
arbitrability in favor of arbitration. (Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983); Glazer v. Lehman Bros. Inc. 394 F.3d 444,
450 (6th Cir. 2005); Stout v. J.D. Byrider 228 F.3d
709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000)).
determine whether to dismiss or stay proceedings in favor of
arbitration, The Sixth Circuit applies a four-part test:
[F]irst, it must determine whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate; second, it must determine the scope of that
agreement; third, if federal statutory claims are asserted,
it must consider whether Congress intended those claims to be
nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court concludes that some,
but not all, of the claims in the action are subject to
arbitration, it must determine whether to stay the remainder
of the proceedings pending arbitration.
Stout 228 F.3d at 714.
the Court determined whether the parties agreed to arbitrate.
It is clear that Plaintiff did agree to the arbitration
provision when he executed the Agreement. Under general
contract principles, a party is bound by the provisions of a
contract he signs, unless he can show special circumstances
that would relieve him of such an obligation. (Stout
228 F.3d at 715; Hughes v. Cardinal Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 566 F.Supp. 834, 844 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
there is no dispute that the Arbitration Provision is a valid
and enforceable agreement. The Arbitration Provision states
that all claims arising from or relating to the Agreement or
Plaintiffs account are subject to binding arbitration. (ECF
#10, Exhibit 2). By signing the Agreement, Plaintiff
"agree[d] to be bound by all of the  terms and
conditions" of the Agreement and "acknowledge[d]
receipt of a completed copy" of the Agreement.
because the parties agreed to arbitrate and the Agreement is
valid, the scope of the arbitration agreement must be
considered. A provision in which the parties agree to
arbitrate all disputes "arising out of or related
to" the agreement is the paradigm of a broad clause.