United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Stephanie K. Bowman United States Magistrate Judge.
a resident of Cincinnati, Ohio brings this action against
thirteen identified Defendants. By separate Order issued this
date, Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This
matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review
of Plaintiff's complaint to determine whether the
complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because
it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
enacting the original in forma pauperis statute,
Congress recognized that a “litigant whose filing fees
and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying
litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing
frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To
prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized
federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis
complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous
or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as
frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a
rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also
Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990).
An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is
immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a
legal interest which clearly does not exist.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable
factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to
the level of the irrational or “wholly
incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32;
Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept
as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or
delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of
complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint
filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally
construed” and “held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the
same token, however, the complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71
(“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and
Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a
claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all
well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not
“accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations, ” it must provide “more than an
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers
“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders “naked
assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual
enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint must
“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
to filing this case, between March 29, 2017 and October 17,
2018, Plaintiff filed a dozen lawsuits in this
Court. Virtually all of those cases have been
dismissed as frivolous on initial screening, based upon
Plaintiff's failure to state any claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Repeatedly, the undersigned has found
Plaintiff's allegations to be “illogical and
incomprehensible.” (See, e.g., Doc. 6 at 3 in No.
1:18-cv-433; No. 1:17-cv-209, Doc. 4 at 3; No. 1:17-cv-211,
Doc. 7 at 3; No. 1:17-cv-505, Doc. 4 at 3). U.S. Magistrate
Judge LItkovitz has similarly found Plaintiff's
complaints to be “rambling, difficult to decipher, and
border on the delusional, ” with “no factual
content or context from which the Court may reasonably infer
that the defendants violated the plaintiff's
rights.” (No. 1:17-cv-710, Doc. 4 at 3; No.
1:17-cv-210, Doc. 7 at 3).
current complaint contains similar illogical,
incomprehensible, and apparently delusional allegations.
Plaintiff appears to believe that she has been illegally held
by the probate court against her will at the Summit
Behavioral Health and refers to being “declared
incompetent immediately and without cause by Judge Burch,
John Rengering and Michael Welsh….”). However,
she also includes multiple allegations that appear only
tangentially related to being declared incompetent, are
difficult to follow, and are devoid of descriptions of how
various defendants may be involved. (See, e.g., Doc.
1-1 at 5, alleging that the Plaintiff “was not allowed
to go to AA meetings. I've been sober 26 years and in
Al-Anon 36 years….”), . Plaintiff does not
identify a jurisdictional basis for her claim(s), but
indicates that she is seeking “financial recompense of
$15000, 000, 000 from each organization state listed,
” as well as “all the protection orders that
Judge Bachman through out the windows in 2016-2019…
before he was fired, ” and for “all Judges
lawyers listed to be disbarred* immediately and
permanently.” (Doc. 1-1 at 4).
current complaint once again fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted and should be dismissed under 28
U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). To the extent that Plaintiff
seeks to proceed against a state court judge or a prosecutor,
those individuals are entitled to absolute immunity.
Likewise, this Court has repeatedly explained to Plaintiff in
her prior cases that she cannot collect monetary damages from
a state official or from a state agency because such damages
generally are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Based on the
strain on judicial resources caused by Plaintiff's
persistence in filing legally frivolous cases that fail to
state any federal claim, in No. 1:18-cv-478, the undersigned
[C]onsidering that this is Plaintiff's seventh frivolous
case filed in this Court found to be subject to summary
dismissal on initial screening, it is appropriate to put
Plaintiff on notice and to warn her that she will be subject
to sanctions if she continues to file such frivolous lawsuits
with this Court, which sanctions will include, but not be
limited to, a pre-filing restriction that would prohibit her
from filing any additional complaints without leave of Court.
See Baldwin v. KeyCorp Bd. of Directors, 2014 WL
2695502, at *1 (S.D.Ohio 2014).
(Doc. 4, Report and Recommendation filed July 20, 2018). U.S.
District Judge Black adopted that recommendation, and on
November 21, 2018, explicitly warned Plaintiff “that
she will be subject to sanctions if she continues to file
frivolous lawsuits with this Court. Sanctions may include,
but are not limited to, a pre-filing restriction that would
prohibit her from filing any additional complaints without
leave of Court.” (Doc. 6).
above-captioned case represents Plaintiff's
thirteenth lawsuit filed in this Court. Ten prior
lawsuits were dismissed on initial screening for failure to
state any claim, while two others were dismissed on initial
review prior to screening. Consistent with the warning
provided to Plaintiff in No. 1:18-cv-478, a pre-filing
restriction is appropriate at this time.
instant case, and in multiple other cases filed by Plaintiff
on a pro se basis, Plaintiff provides a return address that
reads: “c/o Attorney William D. Bell.” It remains
unclear whether Plaintiff has any regular contact with
Attorney Bell or with any other attorney. However, a