United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
HONORABLE SARA LIOI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter is before the Court upon defendants' objection
(Doc. No. 34 [“Obj.”][1]) to Magistrate Judge
Kathleen B. Burke's Report and Recommendation, (Doc. No.
32 [“R&R”]) recommending that defendants'
motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 31
[“Mot.”]) be granted in part and denied in part.
Upon de novo review and for the reasons set forth
below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in full,
with some clarification.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
facts surrounding this action have been set forth in the
R&R.[2] Familiarity therewith is assumed.
(See R&R at 747-49[3].) Briefly, plaintiff, Rammie
Manley (“Manley”) alleges that defendants
violated his constitutional right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. No. 1
[“Compl.”] at 6-8.) Manley, who is an inmate at
the Ohio State Penitentiary (“OSP”), alleges
that, while he was being escorted within the prison, an
unknown OSP correctional officer (or officers) grabbed and
dislocated[4] his left index finger while he was
handcuffed behind his back. (Compl. at 7.) Manley brought
suit against numerous OSP employees who were involved in, or
present during, the incident but Manley admits that he does
not know which defendant(s) actually caused his
injury.[5] The record shows that only three
officers-Williams, Shannon, and Filipowicz (sometimes
referred to as the “Escort
Officers”[6])- had physical contact with Manley during
the escort. (Doc. No. 31-9 at ¶ 26; Doc. No. 3111 at
¶¶ 17-18; Doc. No. 31-17 at ¶¶ 14-15.)
The
undisputed facts are as follows: On December 21, 2017, Manley
refused to allow OSP officers to handcuff him
(“cuff-up”) to search his cell for razors. (Doc.
No. 31-2 [“Manley Depo.”] at 604-05; Doc. No.
31-6 [“Hughes Decl.”] at ¶¶ 11-14.)
Manley refused numerous requests to cuff-up. (Manley Depo. at
605; Hughes Decl. at ¶¶ 14-15.) OSP officers
attempted to gain compliance by deploying OC spray into
Manley's cell. (Manley Depo. at 605; Hughes Decl. at
¶ 16.) Manley still refused to cuff-up, so the OSP cell
extraction team forcibly removed Manley from his cell.
(Manley Depo. at 616; Hughes Decl. at ¶¶ 28-31.)
Once Manley was extracted and handcuffed behind his back, the
OSP extraction team escorted Manley to a decontamination cell
located in the prison basement. (Manley Depo. at 621-22;
Hughes Decl. at ¶ 33.) Manley's finger was
dislocated upon arriving at the decontamination cell. (Manley
Depo. at 622; Hughes Decl. at ¶¶ 35-37.)
The
parties disagree, however, about how and when the injury
occurred. Manley claims that during the escort, an OSP
officer “kept trying to grab [his] finger” and
shortly before arriving to the decontamination cell, the
“officer[] finally got ahold of [Manley's] finger
and dislocated it.” (Manley Depo. at 623.) For their
part, defendants assert that no OSP officer purposely
dislocate Manley's finger and assume the injury must have
been caused during the struggle in Manley's cell. (Mot.
at 505-06.)
The
magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment in
favor of all defendants for any alleged “constitutional
violation for the officers' conduct leading up to and
including extracting [Manley] from his cell … because
the force they used was necessary to maintain or restore
discipline.” (R&R at 746.) The magistrate judge
also recommended granting summary judgment in favor of all
officers, except Williams, Shannon, and Filipowicz, as to
Manley's allegation that an officer intentionally
dislocated his finger during escort. (R&R at 764.) As to
this allegation, the magistrate judge determined that there
was a question of material fact regarding whether one or more
of the Escorting Officers intentionally dislocated
Manley's finger while escorting him. The Escort
Officers-Williams, Shannon, and Filipowicz-object to this
portion of the magistrate judge's recommendation
II.
DISCUSSION
This
Court's review of the magistrate judge's R&R is
governed by Rule 72(b), which requires a de novo
decision as to the portions of the R&R to which
objections are made. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). Williams,
Shannon, and Filipowicz assert that the magistrate judge
erred in denying them summary judgment because: (1) there is
no record evidence indicating that the officers
“intentionally, maliciously, and/or sadistically broke
[Manley's] finger[, ]” (Obj. at 787) and (2) the
Escort Officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
(Id. at 775.) The Court has reviewed de
novo those portions of the R&R to which objections
have been made.
a.
Sufficiency of the Record Evidence
There
is sufficient record evidence for a reasonable jury to find
in favor of Manley. Under Rule 56(a), “[t]he court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial burden
of establishing there is no genuine issue of material fact
and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). But all inferences to be drawn from the
underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348,
89 L.ED.2d 538 (1986). Once the moving party meets this
burden, to survive summary judgment, the party opposing the
motion must produce admissible evidence-not mere
allegations-demonstrating that there is a genuine triable
issue. Id. at 586 n.11. Summary judgment is
appropriate when the “nonmoving party has failed to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case
with respect to which she has the burden of proof.”
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
The
Eighth Amendment protects prison inmates from excessive force
by prison officials. See Perkins v. Alexander, No.
5:08-CV-2034, 2009 WL 3489908, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22,
2009). But Eighth Amendment protection does not apply to
de minimis uses of physical force; it is reserved
for the sort of force that is “repugnant to the
conscience of mankind.” Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 9-10, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992)
(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19,
106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). When prison officials are accused of using
excessive force, the court must determine whether the force
used was applied in good-faith to restore order or whether
the force was applied “maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Williams,
Shannon, and Filipowicz assert that “there is
absolutely no evidence that any officers acted maliciously
and sadistically when Manley alleges his finger was
broken.” (Obj. at 790.) The Court disagrees; there is
sufficient record evidence for a reasonable jury to find that
one or more of the Escort Officers acted maliciously and
sadistically.
As an
initial matter, the Williams, Shannon, and Filipowicz stress
that Manley did not file an opposition brief. (Obj. at 780,
784, 785.) That does not absolve defendants of meeting their
initial burden to show the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S.H Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142
(1970). Defendants argue that because their summary judgment
motion exhibited declarations in which the officers
(including the Escort Officers) deny injuring Manley during
the escort, “[p]laintiff was [then] obligated to
proffer evidence to rebut this evidence.” (Obj. at
784.) This argument misses the point. The burden never
shifted to Manley because defendants failed to meet
their initial burden of showing the absence of a
materially factual dispute.
Williams,
Shannon, and Filipowicz further assert, “[t]he
[m]agistrate [j]udge erred because she assumed that
[d]efendants acted maliciously and sadistically when no
evidence was proffered by [p]laintiff [to] support this
allegation.” (Obj. at 780.) While the Court agrees that
the magistrate judge may have overstated the strength of the
evidence, the fact remains that Williams, Shannon, and
Filipowicz did not “meet their burden to show that
there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Manley's finger was dislocated maliciously and
sadistically” during the escort. (R&R at 760.) In
so recommending, the magistrate judge considered only the
evidence proffered by defendants in support of their motion,
which included inter alia Manley's deposition
testimony and a video recording of the incident. (R&R at
752-53; 758-60.) Both the deposition testimony and the video
recording are record evidence that the Court must consider in
deciding a motion for summary judgment. See Meyer v.
AmeriSourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 3:04 CV 7301, 2006 WL
2164713, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 31, 2006) (when ...