Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-16-612202-A
Application for Reopening Motion No. 530307
Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Gregory J. Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Reginald D. Williams, pro se.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
A. JONES, SR., J.
1} Reginald D. Williams has filed an application for
reopening pursuant to App.R. 26(B). Williams is attempting to
reopen the appellate judgment rendered in State v.
Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106266, 2018-Ohio-3368,
which affirmed his conviction and the sentence of
incarceration imposed in State v. Williams, Cuyahoga
C.P. No. CR-16-612202, for the offenses of rape, aggravated
robbery, and kidnapping. We decline to reopen Williams's
2} App.R. 26(B)(2)(b) requires that Williams
establish a showing of good cause for untimely filing if the
application is filed more than 90 days after journalization
of the appellate judgment that is subject to reopening. The
Supreme Court of Ohio, with regard to the 90-day deadline
provided by App.R. 26(B)(2)(b), has established that:
[W]e now reject [the applicant's] claims that those
excuses gave good cause to miss the 90-day deadline in App.R.
26(B). * * * Consistent enforcement of the rule's
deadline by the appellate courts in Ohio protects on the one
hand the state's legitimate interest in the finality of
its judgments and ensures on the other hand that any claims
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are promptly
examined and resolved.
Ohio and other states Amay erect reasonable procedural
requirements for triggering the right to an adjudication, @
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. (1982), 455 U.S. 422,
437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265, and that is
what Ohio has done by creating a 90-day deadline for the
filing of applications to reopen. * * * The 90-day
requirement in the rule is Aapplicable to all appellants, @
State v. Winstead (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 277, 278, 658
N.E.2d 722, and [the applicant] offers no sound reason why he
C unlike so many other Ohio criminal defendants C could not
comply with that fundamental aspect of the rule.
added.) State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St.3d 162,
2004-Ohio-4755, 814 N.E.2d 861, & 7. See also State
v. Lamar, 102 Ohio St.3d 467, 2004-Ohio-3976, 812 N.E.2d
970; State v. Cooey, 73 Ohio St.3d 411, 653 N.E.2d
252 (1995); State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio St.3d 88, 647
N.E.2d 784 (1995).
3} Herein, Williams is attempting to reopen the
appellate judgment that was journalized on August 23, 2018.
The application for reopening was not filed until July 17,
2019, more than 90 days after journalization of the appellate
judgment in Williams, supra. Thus, the application
for reopening is untimely on its face.
4} In an attempt to argue good cause for the
untimely filing of the application for reopening, Williams
The prejudice and deficient performance goes beyond the
ability of the defendant to identity constitutional error
within the time allotted -counsel simply did not transmit
defendant's claims to the higher state court - in which
there exists a reasonable probability of a successful appeal.
5} Williams's argument as to good cause amounts
to the claims that he could not have discovered the issues
earlier because he was ignorant of the law and did not have
counsel who discovered the purported errors. However, this
court has previously found that such arguments do not
constitute good cause. State v. Orr, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 96377, 2014-Ohio-2384, ¶ 5 (ignorance of
the law does not constitute good cause); State v.
Russell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 69311, 1997 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2663 (Jan. 1, 1997), quoting State v. Miller,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 59987, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1083 (Mar.
23, 1992), reopening disallowed, motion No. 79261
(Mar. 18, 1997) (neither lack of counsel nor ignorance of the