Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton
Appeals From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court Trial Nos.
Appealed From Are: Affirmed
T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alex
Scott Havlin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee
State of Ohio,
McKinney & Namei Co., LPA, and David L. Dawson, for
P.R. appeals from the juvenile court's denial of his
motions to withdraw his admissions and vacate his
adjudications and his petition for declassification. P.R.
contends that his admissions to conduct that would have
constituted rape and gross sexual imposition, if committed by
an adult, should have been set aside because the juvenile
court did not advise him that his admissions could have
immigration consequences as required by R.C. 2943.031. He
further argues that the juvenile court erred in denying his
request to be reclassified as a Tier I juvenile offender
registrant. Finding his assignments of error without merit,
we affirm the juvenile court's judgments.
In 2008, when P.R. was 14 years old, he admitted that he
engaged in sexual conduct and sexual contact with a
seven-year-old girl. P.R. was given suspended commitments,
placed on probation, ordered to attend the residential
program at Hillcrest, and classified a Tier III sex offender.
At the end-of-disposition hearing, the juvenile court
reclassified him a Tier II sexual offender.
Hearing on the Motions
In 2016, P.R. filed motions to withdraw his admissions
pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 and R.C. 2943.031 alleging that P.R.
was not given the immigration warnings as mandated by R.C.
2943.031 before entering his admissions. Initially, P.R.
argued that his adjudications for aggravated felonies
rendered P.R. deportable. At the hearing, P.R.'s counsel
explained that P.R. had not been placed in deportation
proceedings, but, the adjudication could affect P.R.'s
eligibility for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
("DACA"). He further explained that juvenile
adjudications are frequently considered in evaluating an
individual's good moral character for DACA eligibility.
The state argued that R.C. 2943.031 does not apply to
juvenile adjudications, and that if the legislature had
intended to apply the statute to juveniles, it would have
included the term "adjudicated." The state further
argued that the withdrawal of the admissions would prejudice
the state because the juvenile court would no longer have
jurisdiction over P.R. because he is 25, the DACA pathway
occurred long after P.R.'s adjudication, and the
seven-year delay was problematic and prejudicial to the
The juvenile court found that R.C. 2943.031, the advisement
it requires, and the remedy for a failure to provide the
advisement do not apply to juvenile adjudications because the
statute refers to guilty pleas and convictions and does not
include admissions or adjudications. Further, Crim.R. 32.1,
which allows for the withdrawal of a plea in a criminal case,
does not apply to juvenile proceedings.
Instead, the juvenile court reviewed the record to determine
whether the magistrate complied with Juv.R. 29(D) when
accepting P.R.'s admissions. The court concluded that the
magistrate properly advised P.R. of the nature of the
allegations and consequences of the admissions.
Finally, the juvenile court found that the decision to
continue P.R.'s classification as a Tier II offender was
supported by sufficient evidence. The court reviewed all
relevant factors, including the nature of the offenses, the
age of the victim, subsequent treatment, the risk assessment,
and P.R.'s criminal history and determined that P.R. did
not present sufficient evidence to support a
On appeal, P.R. raises two assignments of error. In his first
assignment of error, P.R. argues that the court erred by
denying his motion to withdraw his admissions because P.R.
was not advised of any potential immigration consequences
pursuant to R.C. 2943.031, the juvenile court should have
allowed him to withdraw the admissions because he was not
advised of the potential immigration consequences of the
admissions, and his motion to vacate should be remanded to
consider whether P.R.'s trial counsel was ineffective for