FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF
SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CR-2018-05-1463
CHARLYN BOHLAND, Assistant State Public Defender, for
BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO
GUEST, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
A. TEODOSIO JUDGE.
Appellant, Emmanuel Grant, appeals from his conviction in the
Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court reverses and
Mr. Grant was 17 years old when he and another individual,
under the guise of selling an iPhone, met up with the victim
and robbed him at gunpoint of $280.00 cash. The juvenile
court was statutorily mandated to bind the case over to the
general division, and Mr. Grant was then indicted as an adult
for aggravated robbery with a firearm specification. He pled
guilty to an amended charge of robbery, while the firearm
specification was dismissed. The trial court sentenced him to
three years in prison.
Mr. Grant now appeals from his conviction and raises two
assignments of error for this Court's review.
OF ERROR ONE THE CRIMINAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
SENTENCE EMMANUEL GRANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH R.C. 2152.121 * *
In his first assignment of error, Mr. Grant argues that the
trial court committed plain error in failing to transfer his
case back to juvenile court after he was convicted of a
discretionary transfer offense, in accordance with R.C.
2152.121(B)(3). We agree that the matter must be remanded for
the trial court to consider and apply R.C. 2152.121(B).
Mr. Grant concedes that he never objected at the trial court
level and is therefore limited to arguing plain error on
appeal. "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the court." Crim.R. 52(B). To establish
plain error, one must show (1) an error occurred, i.e., a
deviation from a legal rule, (2) the error is plain, i.e., an
obvious defect in the proceedings, and (3) the error affected
a substantial right, i.e., affected the outcome of the
proceedings. State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196,
2017-Ohio-7565, ¶ 36. Courts should notice plain error
only with the utmost caution, under exceptional
circumstances, and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of
justice. Id. at ¶ 37.
Juvenile courts have "'exclusive jurisdiction over
children alleged to be delinquent for committing acts that
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.'"
State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956,
¶ 2, quoting In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445,
2010-Ohio-599, ¶ 11; R.C. 2151.23(A). Jurisdiction may
be transferred from juvenile court to adult court, however,
and the transfer will be either mandatory or discretionary.
See State v. Lewis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27887,
2017-Ohio-167, ¶ 9. R.C. 2152.10(A) sets forth which
juvenile cases are subject to mandatory bindover and includes
cases where the alleged delinquent child is at least 16 years
old and is charged with a "category two offense"
with a firearm, if there is probable cause to believe that
the child committed the act charged. Aalim at ¶
13. Contrarily, R.C. 2152.10(B) sets forth which cases the
juvenile court maintains discretion to transfer its
jurisdiction to the adult court. In those cases, the juvenile
court may only transfer jurisdiction if it makes certain
findings under R.C. 2152.12(B). Here, because Mr. Grant was
17 years old at the time he allegedly committed a
"category two offense" with a firearm to wit:
aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and the juvenile
court found probable cause to believe that he committed the
act as charged, the court was required by statute to
transfer its jurisdiction over the case to the general
division. See R.C. 2152.02(BB)(1), 2152.10(A)(2)(b),
and 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii). See also Aalim at ¶
Despite the initial mandatory bindover, Mr. Grant ultimately
pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the lesser offense of
robbery in common pleas court. Pursuant to R.C.
2152.121(B)(1), the trial court was therefore required to
determine if the initial bindover from the juvenile court
would have been mandatory or discretionary for acts which
would constitute the offense of robbery if committed as an
adult. See State v. D.B.,150 Ohio St.3d 452,
2017-Ohio-6952, ¶ 12. The trial court is presented with
three options under R.C. 2152.121(B)(2)-(4). First, if the
court determines that a mandatory bindover would have been
required, it must sentence the child under R.C. Chapter 2929
accordingly. See R.C. 2152.121(B)(4). However, if a
mandatory bindover would not have been required and a
discretionary bindover would not have been allowed, the trial
court must transfer jurisdiction back to the juvenile court.
See R.C. 2152.121(B)(2). Finally, if the court
determines that a mandatory bindover would not have been
required, but a discretionary bindover would have been
allowed, a "reverse-bindover" procedure shall
occur, in which the trial court shall: (1) determine an
appropriate sentence under R.C. Chapter 2929; (2) impose that
sentence; and (3) stay the sentence pending completion of the
procedures outlined in R.C. 2152.121. See R.C.
2152.121(B)(3); D.B. at ¶ 13. Furthermore, upon
the imposition and staying of that sentence under R.C.
2152.121(B)(3), the trial court shall then transfer
jurisdiction of the case back to the juvenile court for
further proceedings in accordance with R.C.
2152.121(B)(3)(a)-(b). Because our review of the record