United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
R. ADAMS, JUDGE.
se Plaintiff Keely Jones brings this action against
Defendant Summit County Job and Family Services alleging age
discrimination in employment and retaliation. Doc. 1
(“Complaint”). Also before the Court is
Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis,
which is granted. Doc. 2.
reasons that follow, this case is dismissed.
allegations are sparse. Her two claims are stated in their
entirety as follows:
Claim 1 for age discrimination: Summit County Job &
Family hired 23 year old with a BS in Political Science, 38
year old with BA in Accounting and and [sic] ¶ 44 year
old with a Certificate in Eschology [sic] with 15 years of
Case Management Specialist 2 experience. I was terminated May
17, 2013 and the Summit County Employees Handbook Policies
and Procedures book does not deny me for reapplying or being
rehire [sic]. Claim 2 for retaliation: I filed an age, race
discrimination and unfair labor charge on June 12, 2013 and
was dismiss [sic] December 12, 2013.
Complaint at 5.
to the Complaint is a charge Plaintiff filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on
November 20, 2017, alleging that on November 9, 2017, she was
not hired by Defendant as a Case Management Specialist II
because of her age (58) and in retaliation for previously
filing an EEOC charge of race and age discrimination and
retaliation. Doc. 1-1 at 1. On August 14, 2018, Plaintiff
filed another EEOC charge alleging that Defendant failed to
hire her for a temporary Case Management Specialist 1
position because of her age and in retaliation for having
filed the November 20, 2017 charge. Id. at 3. The
EEOC issued a right to sue letter on October 29, 2018.
Id. at 2. The Court will consider the attachments to
the Complaint in determining whether Plaintiff states a
plausible claim for relief. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c).
asks the Court “to restore to be hired with front and
back pay.” Complaint at 6.
Law and Analysis
Standard of Review
se pleadings are liberally construed by the Court.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (pro se
complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers); Boag v. MacDougall,
454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982). Nevertheless, federal district
courts are expressly required under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) to screen all in forma pauperis
actions and to dismiss before service any such action that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
standard for dismissal articulated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) with respect to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) also governs dismissal under §
1915(e)(2)(B). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). Therefore, in order to survive scrutiny
under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a pro se complaint must
set forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true and
with all reasonable inferences drawn in plaintiff's
favor, to state a plausible claim for relief. See Anson
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 529 Fed.Appx. 558, 559 (6th Cir.
2013) (“Section 1915(e)(2)(B) authorizes dismissal if
the action fails to state a plausible claim for relief or is
frivolous.”) (citations omitted).