United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division, Dayton
HERBINA R. EVANS, Plaintiff,
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.
H. Rice District Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
L. OVINGTON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Herbina R. Evans brings this case challenging the Social
Security Administration's denial of her application for
Supplemental Security Income. She applied for benefits on
February 2, 2015, asserting that she could no longer work a
substantial paid job. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Gregory
G. Kenyon concluded that she was not eligible for benefits
because she is not under a “disability” as
defined in the Social Security Act.
case is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Statement of
Errors (Doc. #5), the Commissioner's Memorandum in
Opposition (Doc. #7), and the administrative record (Doc.
seeks a remand of this case for payment of benefits or, at a
minimum, for further proceedings. The Commissioner asks the
Court to affirm ALJ Kenyon's non-disability decision.
asserts that she has been under a “disability”
since September 6, 2013. She was thirty-eight years old at
that time and was therefore considered a "younger
person" under Social Security Regulations. See
20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c). She has a high school education.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(4).
generally agrees with ALJ Kenyon's summary of the medical
facts. (Doc. #5, PageID #2392). Accordingly, those
facts are incorporated herein. (Doc. #3, PageID #s
Standard of Review
Social Security Administration provides Supplemental Security
Income to individuals who are under a “disability,
” among other eligibility requirements. Bowen v.
City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986); see
42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). The term
“disability”-as defined by the Social Security
Act-has specialized meaning of limited scope. It encompasses
“any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment” that precludes an applicant from performing
a significant paid job-i.e., “substantial gainful
activity, ” in Social Security lexicon. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A); see Bowen, 476 U.S. at
review of an ALJ's non-disability decision proceeds along
two lines: “whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported
by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009); see
Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46
(6th Cir. 2007). Review for substantial evidence is not
driven by whether the Court agrees or disagrees with the
ALJ's factual findings or by whether the administrative
record contains evidence contrary to those factual findings.
Gentry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722
(6th Cir. 2014); Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). Instead, the ALJ's
factual findings are upheld if the substantial-evidence
standard is met-that is, “if a ‘reasonable mind
might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a
conclusion.'” Blakley, 581 F.3d at 407
(quoting Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d
387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004)). Substantial evidence consists of
“more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance . . . .” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see
Gentry, 741 F.3d at 722.
other line of judicial inquiry-reviewing the correctness of
the ALJ's legal criteria-may result in reversal even when
the record contains substantial evidence supporting the
ALJ's factual findings. Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009); see
Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746. “[E]ven if supported by
substantial evidence, ‘a decision of the Commissioner
will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own
regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the
merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial
right.'” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting
in part Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746, and citing
Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
546-47 (6th Cir. 2004)).