United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division, Dayton
H. Rice District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 
(1) PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
AND (2) THIS CASE BE TERMINATED ON THE COURT'S DOCKET
MICHAEL J. NEWMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
civil case is before the Court for a sua sponte
review -- pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) -- of the
complaint filed by pro se Plaintiff Travis Lanier
Williams. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (doc. 1),
which the Court granted (doc. 2). The Court, however, held
service of the complaint pending a review under §
1915(e)(2). Id. It is appropriate for the Court to
conduct this review sua sponte prior to issuance of
process “so as to spare prospective defendants the
inconvenience and expense of answering such
complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 324 (1989).
accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2), this Court must
perform an initial review of the instant action. McGore
v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Upon review, the Court must dismiss any case it determines is
“frivolous or malicious, ” fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
complaint should be dismissed as frivolous if it lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact. Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. A
plaintiff sets forth no arguable factual basis where the
allegations asserted are “fantastic or
delusional”; and presents no arguable legal basis when
advancing “indisputably meritless” legal
theories, i.e., when the defendant is immune from
suit, or when the plaintiff claims a violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 327-28; Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866
(6th Cir. 2000). Courts may also dismiss a complaint sua
sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
conducting this initial review under § 1915, the Court
accepts pro se Plaintiff's allegations as true
and construes them liberally in his favor. See Donald v.
Marshall, No. 84-3231, 1985 WL 13183, at *1 (6th Cir.
Apr. 5, 1985) (stating that, “[w]hen considering a
pro se action for dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d), the complaint should be liberally construed
and the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true
and construed in favor of the plaintiff”). However,
while pro se pleadings are “to be liberally
construed” and are “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, ”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam), pro se plaintiffs must still satisfy
basic pleading requirements. Wells v. Brown, 891
F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
what the undersigned can understand and liberally construe
from Plaintiff's allegations, Plaintiff opened -- or
perhaps attempted to open -- a trust account with Wright-Patt
Credit Union on March 25, 2019. Doc. 1-4 at PageID 12.
Thereafter, Plaintiff was to meet with members of the Credit
Union's legal staff, but there was some difficulty in
that regard. Id. Although not clear, Plaintiff may
have, thereafter, sought to withdraw funds from the Credit
Union and his request was refused. Id. Plaintiff now
seeks an Order from the Court directing Wright-Patt Credit
Union to honor his request or pay him $200, 000, 000.00.
Id. at PageID 8.
bedrock principle of the federal judicial system is that
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”
EBI-Detroit, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 279 Fed.Appx.
340, 344 (6th Cir. 2008). Because federal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction, courts must presume “that a
cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden
of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction.” Farmer v. Fisher, 386 Fed.Appx.
554, 556 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Thus, “[a]
plaintiff in federal court has the burden of pleading
sufficient facts to support the existence of the court's
jurisdiction.” Vaughn v. Holiday Inn Cleveland
Coliseum, 56 Fed.Appx. 249, 250 (6th Cir. 2003).
speaking, the Constitution and Congress have given federal
courts authority to hear a case only when the case raises a
federal question or when diversity of citizenship exists
between the parties.” EBI-Detroit, Inc., 279
Fed.Appx. at 344 (citing Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”);
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (“The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75, 000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between -- citizens
of different States”).
Plaintiff sets forth no allegations to show that this Court
possesses diversity jurisdiction over this action under 28
U.S.C. 1332(a)(1) and, in fact, both Plaintiff and
Wright-Patt Credit Union are alleged to be Ohio citizens.
Doc. 1-2 at PageID 5-6. Instead, while Plaintiff's cause
of action likely arises under Ohio law, he apparently seeks
to invoke the Court's federal question jurisdiction by
citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1789, 1789a and 31 U.S.C.
§ 3327. However, none of those statutory provisions
appear to apply to this matter. Absent coherent factual
allegations as to how these federal statutory provisions
apply to give this Court ...