United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
TONYA M. ANDERSON, Plaintiff
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SOLOMON OLIVER, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter pertains to Plaintiff Tonya M. Anderson's prior
employment with Defendant U.S. Postal Service. (ECF No. 1).
The action was initially filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, then transferred to the
Northern District of Ohio. (ECF No. 3, 4). Plaintiff filed a
motion to proceed with the case in forma pauperis (ECF No.
2); that motion is granted.
reasons that follow, this action is dismissed.
Complaint is difficult to discern. She recounts her
employment with Defendant beginning in 1991. Plaintiff
alleges that she worked for Defendant on and off until she
injured her ankle in 1993 while performing her job as a
transitional employee carrier, and was told by her supervisor
in September 1994 not to return to work. Plaintiff alleges
that in July 1997, she was rehired by Defendant as a mail
processor “for career” with benefits. Plaintiff
claims she was written up, suspended, and escorted out of the
building while performing her assignment. Plaintiff states
that “you do not get laid off from a career.” She
alleges that she took a test for a postal service
“associate supervisor” which she passed, but as
of February 2000, she has not been called back to work by
Defendant. (Id. at 2-4). Attached to the Complaint
are two letters from the Postal Service related to the
associate supervisor test. (Id. at 10-11).
states in the Complaint that she filed a claim with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) for
discrimination and retaliation. Attached to the Complaint is
a letter from the EEOC dated October 31, 2018. (Id.
at 5-8). According to the letter, Anderson filed a charge
against the Postal Service on February 9, 2018, alleging that
the agency discriminated against her on the basis of race,
national origin, sex, color, disability, age, and in reprisal
for prior EEO activity when she took an associate supervisor
test on or about December 23, 1997, and was not promoted to
supervisor, and when she was terminated by the agency on or
about February 13, 2000. (Id. at 5). Her EEOC claim
was dismissed on the grounds that she failed to timely raise
her allegations with an EEO counselor and no equitable
tolling principles applied to extend the required 45-day EEO
counselor contact period. The Commission alternatively
dismissed her termination claim on the grounds that the same
claim was raised in a prior claim and dismissed.
(Id. at 6). Anderson asked the Commission to
reconsider its decision, but did not present any new argument
to establish that the 45-day period set by 29 C.F.R. §
1614.105(a)(1) should be extended. The Commission denied
Anderson's motion for reconsideration and advised
Anderson of her right to file a civil action in district
court within 90 days. (Id.).
Complaint, Plaintiff does not assert any legal claims
regarding the factual allegations set forth therein. Rather,
she concludes the Complaint by stating that she is
“appreciative of these opportunities and to explain
this situation as a postal employee.” (Id. at
Standard of Review
pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the
court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, lacks an arguable basis in
law or fact, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). While
the court must construe the pleading in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, Bibbo v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998), the
court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct
claims against a defendant on behalf of a pro se plaintiff.
See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir.
2008) (citation omitted); Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985).
lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised
upon an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the
factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S.
at 327. The dismissal standard for Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009) governs dismissal for failure to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,
470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). A cause of action fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
plausibility in the complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564. A
plausible pleading must contain a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief
on the assumption that all of the allegations in the
complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S.
the court is required to liberally construe the Complaint, it
is not required to construct legal claims on behalf of a pro
se plaintiff. Principles requiring generous construction of
pro se pleadings does not require district courts to conjure
questions never squarely presented or to construct claims
from sentence fragments. Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1277-78. To do
so would require the court “to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff ... and transform the
district court from its legitimate advisory role to the
improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest
argument and most successful strategies for a party.”
Id.; see also Erwin v. Edwards, 22
Fed.Appx. 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Although liberal