FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF
SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CR-2017-02-0564
APPEARANCES: MARK H. LUDWIG, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
TEODOSIO, PRESIDING JUDGE.
Defendant-Appellant, Nicholas Gedeon, appeals from the
judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This
Mr. Gedeon was a passenger in a vehicle that the police
stopped due to a traffic violation. The officer who executed
the stop and the officer who arrived as backup both detected
the odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Additionally,
Mr. Gedeon was observed making furtive movements during the
stop and nervously glancing at the vehicle's glovebox as
he was asked questions about the marijuana odor. As a result
of the odor and their observations, the officers removed the
driver and Mr. Gedeon from the vehicle and searched it. The
search uncovered, among other items, a sizeable amount of
marijuana in the glove box, a pill bottle containing 119
Oxycodone pills in the space behind the glove box, baggies,
and a scale. Upon searching Mr. Gedeon, the police also found
$2, 100 in his wallet. The cash was separated into two
rubber-banded bundles; one containing twenty $100 bills and
one containing $100 worth of smaller bills.
Following his arrest, Mr. Gedeon was taken to jail and held
without bond. He spoke with officers four times before his
preliminary hearing and admitted that he had purchased the
Oxycodone pills to sell them for profit. He consented to a
search of his cell phone, but the police also secured a
warrant to search the phone. The cell phone search uncovered
numerous text messages related to the purchase and sale of
the Oxycodone pills.
A grand jury indicted Mr. Gedeon on (1) two counts of
aggravated trafficking in Oxycodone, one of which included a
bulk amount enhancement and one of which did not; (2) two
counts of aggravated possession of Oxycodone, one of which
included a bulk amount enhancement and one of which did not;
(3) possession of Buprenorphine; (4) possession of marijuana;
(5) illegal use or possession of drug paraphernalia; and (6)
two criminal forfeiture specifications for the $2, 100.
Thereafter, a wealth of motion practice ensued. Mr. Gedeon
moved to dismiss his charges based on a violation of his
speedy trial rights, the fact that he was unable to obtain a
verbatim transcript of his preliminary hearing, misconduct
that allegedly occurred during the grand jury proceedings,
and several other grounds. He also moved to suppress the
evidence against him. The primary basis for his motion to
suppress was that the police never secured a warrant for his
arrest. Mr. Gedeon argued that his unlawful detainment
rendered all the evidence against him subject to the
The trial court held several hearings on Mr. Gedeon's
motions. It denied his motions to dismiss and denied, in
part, his motion to suppress. The court found that Mr.
Gedeon's fourth interrogation occurred during a period of
unlawful detainment. As such, it granted Mr. Gedeon's
motion to suppress insofar as it pertained to the
admissibility of the fourth interrogation.
Mr. Gedeon waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench
trial ensued. The trial court found him not guilty of
possessing Buprenorphine, but guilty of his remaining counts
and specifications. It then sentenced him to a total of two
years of community control and ordered the forfeiture of his
Mr. Gedeon now appeals and raises four assignments of error
for our review. For ease of analysis, we rearrange several of
his assignments of error.
OF ERROR ONE
DISCHARGE FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE SPEEDY TRIAL (Sic.)
In his first assignment of error, Mr. Gedeon argues that the
trial court erred when it refused to dismiss his indictment
on the basis of a speedy trial violation. We disagree.
"A trial court's determination of speedy trial
issues presents a mixed question of law and fact."
State v. Jaeger, 9th Dist. Medina No. 17CA0072-M,
2018-Ohio-2994, ¶ 5. "When reviewing an
appellant's claim that he was denied his right to a
speedy trial, this Court applies the de novo standard of
review to questions of law and the clearly erroneous standard
of review to questions of fact." State v.
Fields, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0045, 2013-Ohio-4970,
¶ 8, quoting State v. Downing, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 22012, 2004-Ohio-5952, ¶ 36. "A de novo review
requires an independent review of the trial court's
decision without any deference to the trial court's
determination." State v. Consilio, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 22761, 2006-Ohio-649, ¶ 4.
A person charged with a felony must be brought to trial
within 270 days of his arrest. R.C. 2945.71(C)(2). "Time
is calculated to run the day after the date of arrest,"
State v. Browand, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
06CA009053, 2007-Ohio-4342, ¶ 12, and "each day
during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on
the pending charge shall be counted as three days." R.C.
2945.71(E). An exception to the triple-count provision lies
if "the accused is also being held in jail on other
charges." State v. Stephens, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 26516, 2013-Ohio-2223, ¶ 12. "In those
instances, 'the 270-day time limit * * *
applies.'" State v. Phillips, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 27661, 2016-Ohio-4687, ¶ 7, quoting
Stephens at ¶ 12. Nevertheless, time may be
tolled due to various tolling events. See R.C.
Mr. Gedeon was arrested on February 2, 2017, and remained
incarcerated until May 16, 2017, when he posted bond. In his
motion to dismiss, he argued that each day he spent in jail
should be counted as three, see R.C. 2945.71, but
the trial court rejected his argument. The court found that,
between February 10th and April 5th, Mr. Gedeon was subject
to a holder in a different case. Mr. Gedeon argues that the
trial court erred when it found that he was subject to a
holder. According to Mr. Gedeon, the triple-count provision
applied to the entirety of his jail stay because the State
failed to set forth any record evidence of the holder.
Upon review, we need not determine whether the trial court
erred when it found that Mr. Gedeon was subject to a holder.
That is because, even if the court erred in that regard, Mr.
Gedeon's speedy trial rights were not violated.
See Crim.R. 52(A) (errors that do not affect
substantial rights "shall be disregarded").
Mr. Gedeon was arrested on February 2, 2017, so his speedy
trial time began to run the following day. See
Browand at ¶ 12. He was incarcerated until May 16,
2017, but requested a two-week continuance on April 6, 2017.
Thus, his continuance tolled time, see R.C.
2945.72(H), and, at most, 189 days elapsed between February
3, 2017, and April 20, 2017. See R.C. 2945.71(E).
On April 20, 2017, when Mr. Gedeon's continuance was set
to expire, the trial court continued the matter for another
three weeks due to pending issues with discovery. Mr. Gedeon
indicated that he had no objection to that continuance, and
he has not taken issue with its reasonableness on appeal.
Accordingly, the second continuance also constituted a
tolling event, and time was tolled between April 20, 2017,
and May 11, 2017. See R.C. 2945.72(H) (including, as
a tolling event, "the period of any reasonable
continuance granted other than upon the accused's own
From May 11, 2017, until May 16, 2017, 15 days elapsed for
purposes of Mr. Gedeon's speedy trial calculations,
bringing his total calculation to 204 days. See R.C.
2945.71(E). Mr. Gedeon posted bond on May 16th, so, at that
point, R.C. 2945.71(E)'s triple-count provision ceased to
apply to him. Moreover, on May 30, 2017, and June 1, 2017, he
filed more than ten pretrial motions. Those motions further
tolled his speedy trial time. See R.C. 2945.72(E).
As such, from May 16, 2017, to May 30, 2017, only 14 days
elapsed for purposes of his speedy trial time. Combined with
the 204 days that had already elapsed, the total amount of
speedy trial time that elapsed was 218 days.
The trial court disposed of Mr. Gedeon's speedy trial
motion on June 12, 2017, following a hearing on all of his
pending motions. Because the delay that occurred between May
30th and June 12th was attributable to Mr. Gedeon having
filed numerous motions, that time was chargeable to him.
See, e.g., State v. Burroughs, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
14CA010595, 2016-Ohio-1139, ¶ 8. Thus, for purposes of
his speedy trial calculation, a total of 218 days elapsed
between his arrest and the day the court denied his motion to
dismiss. Because that number fell far short of R.C.
2945.71(C)(2)'s 270-day time limit, the trial court did
not err when it denied his motion to dismiss. See State
v. Calise, 9th Dist. ...