United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division
Craig R. Myers, Plaintiff,
Wood County, Defendant.
G. CARR JUDGE
a civil rights case. Pro se plaintiff Craig Myers, a
state prisoner, raises constitutional claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law tort claims against
defendant Wood County, Ohio.
alleges that the County violated his constitutional rights in
connection with two criminal cases in the Wood County Court
of Common Pleas, where he was convicted. He also asserts
state claims for malicious prosecution and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
2013, a Wood County, Ohio, jury found Myers guilty of
abduction and felonious assault. (Doc. 1 at 5.) The trial
court sentenced him to three years' imprisonment for the
abduction charge and eight years' imprisonment for the
felonious assault charge, with the sentences to run
concurrently. (Id.) In February 2015, a Wood County
jury found Myers guilty of retaliation against one of his
trial attorneys in the abduction and assault case.
unsuccessfully appealed both judgments in state courts. He
then challenged the judgments in this Court through petitions
for writ of habeas corpus, which also were denied.
(See No. 3:16 CV 659, Doc. 56; No. 3:17 CV 1008,
Myers has filed this civil rights complaint, asserting that
prosecutors and the trial court violated his constitutional
rights in seeking and obtaining the convictions against him.
He alleges that Wood County: (1) violated his due process
rights by failing to disclose the assault victim's
medical records, which he claims would have been exculpatory;
(2) violated his due process rights by failing to meet
Ohio's statutory requirements for retaliation; and (3)
violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
appellate counsel by appointing trial counsel to represent
him in his direct appeal. (Doc. 1.) He also raises state
claims against the County for malicious prosecution and
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and must be
liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972) (per curiam). Nevertheless, district courts are
required to screen all in forma pauperis actions and
dismiss before service any action the court determines is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).
state a claim, a complaint must set forth “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Hill,
supra, 630 F.3d at 471 (applying the dismissal
standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007), to dismissals for failure to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)). The “allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .
.” Twombly, supra, 550 U.S. at 555.
And they must be sufficient to give defendants “fair
notice of what [the plaintiff's] claims are and the
grounds upon which they rest.” Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
The § 1983 Claims A. Myers's §
1983 Claims Are Untimely
is a two-year statute of limitations on claims raised under
§ 1983. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
275-276 (1985) (holding that federal courts must apply the
state statute of limitations for personal injury actions to
§ 1983 claims); Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d
989, 991 (6th Cir. 1989) (Ohio's two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury claims applies to § 1983
actions). Myers filed his complaint outside of the
limitations period and, therefore, his § 1983 claims are
state-court judgments that Myers challenges here occurred in
May 2013 and February 2015. His first and second appeals
concluded in August, 2014 and January, 2016, respectively.
Yet Myers did not file this complaint until December 27,
2018, after ...