United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division
DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS FOR VIOLATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS (DOC.
H. RICE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is currently before the Court on Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Speedy Trial Rights, Doc.
#47. For the reasons set forth below, that motion is
Background and Procedural History
Prigmore was indicted on November 14, 2017, and was arraigned
on December 20, 2017. Since the date of his indictment, three
of his attorneys have requested, and been granted, leave to
withdraw. Based on his tumultuous interactions with his
attorneys and his consistently erratic behavior during court
appearances, the Court has twice sua sponte ordered
competency evaluations and then held hearings on those
evaluations. The Court has also held an evidentiary hearing
on Defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
26, 2018, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Violation
of Speedy Trial Rights, Doc. #47. While that motion was still
pending, Defendant indicated his desire to plead guilty;
however, at the change-of-plea hearing, held on August 20,
2018, he continued to profess his innocence. The Court
therefore refused to accept his guilty plea. On January 2,
2019, the Government filed a 30-page memorandum in opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss, Doc. #54. Defendant did not file a
Superseding Indictment was filed on January 22, 2019, and a
Second Superseding Indictment was filed on July 9, 2019.
Trial is currently scheduled to begin on July 23, 2019.
Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution guarantees the
right of a criminal defendant to "a speedy and public
trial." U.S. Const, amend. VI. In Doggett v. United
States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), the Supreme Court noted
that factors to be considered in determining whether the
Speedy Trial Clause has been violated include: "whether
delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for
that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted
his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered
prejudice as the delay's result." Id. at
Sixth Circuit has held that:
The first factor is a threshold requirement, and if the delay
is not uncommonly long, judicial examination ceases.
United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 553 (6th
Cir. 2003). A delay approaching one year is presumptively
prejudicial. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, n. 1, 112
S.Ct. 2686. If the threshold is satisfied, the first factor
must be considered along with the remaining three factors in
the speedy trial analysis. Id.
United States v. Robinson, 455 F.3d 602, 607 (6th
Speedy Trial Act
the Speedy Trial Act, trial in a criminal case must commence
within seventy days of the filing of the indictment or the
date of the arraignment, whichever occurs later. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(c)(1). Nevertheless, periods of delay
"resulting from other proceedings concerning the
defendant" are excludable in computing that seventy-day
time limit. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1). Those periods
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(A) delay resulting from any proceeding, including any
examinations, to determine the mental competency or physical