Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Crawford
CARL J. DANISON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
MATTHEW BLINCO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
from Crawford County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No.
C. Aldridge for Appellant
Scott McBride for Appellee
Respondent-appellant, Matthew Blinco ("Blinco"),
appeals the November 14, 2018 judgment of the Crawford County
Court of Common Pleas granting a civil stalking protection
order ("CSPO") to petitioner-appellee, Carl J.
Danison ("Danison") on behalf of his minor child,
R.D. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On September 25, 2018, Danison filed a petition for an ex
parte CSPO under R.C. 2903.214. (Doc. No. 1). The trial court
granted Danison's ex parte petition on September 26,
2018. (Doc. No. 3). Both parties appeared with counsel at the
full hearing on November 6, 2018. (Doc. No. 10). On November
14, 2018, the magistrate granted a three-year CSPO against
Blinco. (Id.). The order was adopted by the trial
court on the same day. (Id.). Blinco did not file
objections to the trial court's adoption of the
magistrate's decision granting the CSPO.
On December 6, 2018, Blinco filed a notice of appeal. (Doc.
No. 11). He raises three assignments of error.
of Error No. I
trial court erred in considering hearsay evidence in granting
Petitioner's Petition for a Civil Stalking Protection
of Error No. II
trial court erred in granting Petitioner's Petition for a
Civil Stalking Order because the evidence offered did not
meet the requirements of Ohio Revised Code Section
of Error No. III
trial court erred in failing to make any findings of fact to
support its decision to issue the Civil Stalking Protection
In his assignments of error, Blinco argues that the trial
court erred by granting Danison's petition for a CSPO.
Specifically, Blinco argues that the trial court considered
inadmissible hearsay statements when granting Danison's
petition for a CSPO. (Appellant's Brief at 6-7). Blinco
also asserts that Danison failed to present sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that Blinco engaged in a
"pattern of conduct" which "knowingly"
caused R.D. to believe he would cause "physical
harm" or "mental distress" to her.
(Id. at 7-10). (See R.C. 2903.211(A)(1);
R.C. 2903.214). Blinco also contends that the trial court did