from Mercer County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No.
Matthew K. Fox and Joshua A. Muhlenkamp for Appellant
D. Searcy for Appellee
Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the October
12, 2018 judgment of the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas
dismissing the indictment against defendant-appellee, Shane
P. Irish ("Irish"). For the reasons that follow, we
On June 16, 2016, the Mercer County Grand Jury indicted Irish
on two counts: Count One of burglary in violation of R.C.
2911.12(A)(2), (D), a second-degree felony, and Count Two of
theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), (B)(2), a
fifth-degree felony. (Doc. No. 1). At the time, Irish was
incarcerated for unrelated offenses, having commenced a
44-month prison sentence in July 2015. (Doc. No. 91). On June
15, 2017, Irish sent the Mercer County Prosecutor's
Office a letter requesting final disposition of the
outstanding indictment. (Id.). After being retrieved
from the Belmont Correctional Institution, Irish was finally
served with a copy of the indictment on June 26, 2017.
(Id.). On July 7, 2017, Irish appeared for
arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the counts of the
indictment. (Doc. No. 20).
A change of plea hearing was held on August 18, 2017. (Doc.
No. 34); (Aug. 18, 2017 Tr. at 3). Pursuant to plea
negotiations, the State moved to amend Count One of the
indictment from second-degree felony burglary to trespass in
a habitation in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B), (E), a
fourth-degree felony. (Aug. 18, 2017 Tr. at 3-4). The trial
court granted the State's motion and amended Count One of
the indictment. (Id. at 5). The trial court
proceeded to conduct a Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, and Irish
executed a "Waiver of Constitutional Rights" form
which provided, among other things, that Irish understood
that he was waiving "[t]he right to a speedy public
trial by jury * * *." (Doc. No. 31). Thereafter, Irish
withdrew his not guilty pleas and entered no contest pleas to
amended Count One and Count Two of the indictment. (Doc. No.
34); (Aug. 18, 2017 Tr. at 6). The trial court accepted
Irish's no contest pleas, found him guilty, and ordered a
presentence investigation. (Doc. No. 34); (Aug. 18, 2017 Tr.
at 14-15). The trial court filed its judgment entry of
conviction on August 24, 2017. (Doc. No. 34).
On August 30, 2017, the trial court sentenced Irish to three
years of community control. (Doc. No. 41); (Aug. 30, 2017 Tr.
at 7). The trial court tolled Irish's community control
sanctions until he completed his 44-month prison sentence.
(Doc. No. 41). The trial court filed its judgment entry of
sentence on September 15, 2017. (Id.).
On September 25, 2017, Irish filed a notice of appeal from
the trial court's September 15, 2017 judgment of
sentence. (Doc. No. 48). On May 14, 2018, this court reversed
Irish's conviction and sentence. (Doc. No. 72). We
remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions for
the trial court to consider whether Irish's statutory and
constitutional speedy-trial rights had been violated.
On remand, Irish filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on
July 16, 2018 alleging that his statutory and constitutional
speedy-trial rights were violated. (Doc. No. 89). On July 31,
2018, Irish filed a memorandum in support of his motion to
dismiss. (Doc. No. 94). On August 14, 2018, the State filed a
memorandum in opposition to Irish's motion to dismiss.
(Doc. No. 95). On August 23, 2018, Irish filed his brief in
reply to the State's memorandum in opposition to his
motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 96).
Following a September 12, 2018 hearing, the trial court
granted Irish's motion to dismiss and dismissed the
indictment on October 12, 2018. (Doc. No. 100). Specifically,
the trial court concluded that Irish's statutory
speedy-trial rights under R.C. 2945.71 were violated because
he was not brought to trial within 270 days after indictment.
(Id.). The trial court also concluded that
Irish's constitutional speedy-trial rights were violated.
On November 7, 2018, the State filed a notice of appeal.
(Doc. No. 107). It raises one assignment of error.
trial court erred when it found that the speedy trial
statute, ORC §2945.71, had been violated and granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss, and in improperly
conflating the statutory and constitutional speedy trial
In its assignment of error, the State argues that the trial
court erred by granting Irish's motion to dismiss.
Specifically, the State argues that the trial court erred by
concluding that R.C. 2945.71 controlled the time within which
Irish should have been brought to trial. (Appellant's
Brief at 13). It contends that because Irish was imprisoned
in an Ohio correctional institution on unrelated charges when
the indictment was issued, the period of time within which it
was required to bring Irish to trial was governed exclusively
by R.C. 2941.401. (Id. at 17-18). According to the
State, Irish's statutory speedy-trial rights under R.C.
2941.401 were not violated because, as required by R.C.
2941.401, his case was initially resolved within 180 days
after he filed a request for final disposition. The State
further argues that the trial court erred by concluding that
Irish's constitutional rights to a speedy trial were also
violated. (Id. at 14-17).
"'A speedy trial claim involves a mixed question of
law and fact for purposes of appellate review.'"
State v. Gartrell, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-14-02,
2014-Ohio-5203, ¶ 104, quoting State v. Hansen,
3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-12-42, 2013-Ohio-1735, ¶ 20,
citing State v. Masters, 172 Ohio App.3d 666,
2007-Ohio-4229, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.). "'Accordingly,
a reviewing court must give due deference to the trial
court's findings of fact if they are supported by
competent, credible evidence but will independently review
whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the
facts of the case.'" Id., quoting
Hansen at ¶ 20, citing Masters at
"'An accused is guaranteed the constitutional right
to a speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Ohio
Constitution, Article I, Section 10.'" State v.
Dahms, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-16, 2017-Ohio-4221,
¶ 102, quoting State v. Ferguson, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 16AP-307, 2016-Ohio-8537, ¶ 12, citing
State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-7017,
¶ 32. "In Ohio, the right to a speedy trial is
implemented by statutes that impose a duty on the state to
bring the defendant to trial within a specified time."
State v. Melampy, 12th Dist. Brown No.
CA2007-04-008, 2008-Ohio-5838, ¶ 9, citing Cleveland
v. Sheldon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82319,
2003-Ohio-6331, ¶ 16. The interplay between two of these
statutes, R.C. 2945.71 and 2941.401, is at the heart of this
Ohio's "general" speedy-trial statutes are
contained in R.C. 2945.71 et seq. R.C. 2945.71 provides that
"[a] person against whom a charge of felony is pending *
* * [s]hall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy
days after the person's arrest." R.C. 2945.71(C)(2).
This 270-day period may be extended for one or more of the
reasons listed in R.C. 2945.72(A)-(I). Absent any such
extension, failure to bring a defendant to trial within the
270-day period subjects the case to dismissal upon motion of
the defendant. R.C. 2945.73(B). "When an accused is
discharged pursuant to [R.C. 2945.73(B)] * * *, such
discharge is a bar to any further criminal proceedings
against [the defendant] based on the same conduct." R.C.
2945.73(D). "The provisions of R.C. 2945.71 et seq. * *
* are mandatory and must be strictly complied with by the
trial court." State v. Smith, 140 Ohio App.3d
81, 86 (3d Dist.2000), citing State v. Cloud, 122
Ohio App.3d 626 (2d Dist.1997) and State v. Pudlock,
44 Ohio St.2d 104 (1975).
Conversely, R.C. 2941.401 is a "specific"
speedy-trial statute applicable only to defendants who are
imprisoned in correctional institutions in the State of Ohio
and facing charges for crimes separate from those for which
they are already imprisoned. Melampy at ¶ 9,
citing Sheldon at ¶ 16 and State v.