Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Lake
Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas,
Case No. 2017 CR 000785.
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Teri R.
Daniel, Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration
Building, (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Vanessa R. Clapp, Lake County Public Defender, and Melissa
Ann Blake, Assistant Public Defender, (For
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
Appellant, Paul Oudeman, Jr., appeals from the judgment of
the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him to a
term of 180 days imprisonment and four years community
control, after accepting his plea of guilty to violating a
condition of his community control. At issue is whether the
trial court is authorized to sentence appellant to both a
term of imprisonment and extend community control for a
violation of a condition of community control imposed as a
penalty for a prior criminal conviction. We affirm.
On July 4, 2017, appellant was involved in a series of car
accidents. Police were notified, and appellant failed to stop
when given a lawful order. As a result, appellant was charged
with failure to comply with the order or signal of a police
officer, a third-degree felony. Appellant ultimately pleaded
guilty to one count of attempted failure to comply with the
order or signal of a police officer, a fourth-degree felony.
The trial court sentenced appellant to community control
sanctions, including a three-year term of probation.
On July 3, 2018, the state filed a motion to terminate
community control accompanied by an affidavit of a probation
violation. The affidavit alleged appellant used alcohol in
violation of the conditions of his community control
sanctions. Appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to violating
the terms of community control. The trial court then
sentenced him to 180 days imprisonment and also extended his
community control sanctions by one year, for a total of four
years community control.
Appellant served his prison term after which he commenced
serving the extended community control. He now appeals
assigning the following as error:
"The trial court erred by sentencing the
defendant-appellant to a split sentence of 180 days in prison
and community control sanctions as part of one sentence for
the same charge, in violation of the legislative intent of
Ohio's felony sentencing law."
Appellant contends the trial court erred as a matter of law
when it imposed both prison time and additional community
control for his violation of a condition of his existing
community control. Where a trial court's judgment is
challenged on a purported misconstruction of the law, the
appropriate standard of review is de novo. State v.
Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶16.
In support of his position, appellant principally relies upon
State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173,
2015-Ohio-2089 and State v. Paige, 153 Ohio St.3d
214, 2018-Ohio-813. In Anderson, the defendant was
convicted of two felonies; the trial court sentenced him to a
term of imprisonment for each felony and also issued a
no-contact order, a community control sanction. On appeal,
the defendant challenged the trial court's authority to
impose the no-contact order in conjunction with a prison
term. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the trial
court's judgment. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio,
the Court examined the relevant felony-sentencing statutes
and concluded "the General Assembly intended prison
terms and community control sanctions to be alternative
sanctions." Anderson, supra, at ¶28. The
Court therefore held that, "as a general rule, when a
prison term and community control are possible sentences for
a particular felony offense, absent an express exception, the
court must impose either a prison term or a community-control
sanction or sanctions." Id. at ¶31.
Accordingly, the Court reversed and vacated the sentence.
In Paige, the defendant pleaded guilty to sexual
battery and domestic violence. The court imposed a
community-residential sanction for one offense and a prison
term for the other, and ordered them to be served
concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argued the sentence
was an impermissible "split sentence" not
authorized by statute. The appellate court agreed but the
Supreme Court, applying Anderson, reversed the
decision. The Court asserted the defendant's sentence was
not a "split sentence" because the trial court
imposed the community control and prison term for two
separate offenses. The Court explained that "pursuant to
the felony-sentencing statues, a court must impose either a
prison term or a community-control sanction as a sentence for
a particular felony offense - a court cannot impose both for
a single offense. The trial court complied with that rule
here by imposing a prison sentence on the sexual-battery
count and, separately, a five-year period of community
control on the domestic-violence count." Paige,
supra, at ¶6.
Anderson and Paige are both distinguishable
from the instant matter insofar as they each addressed
sentences relating to the underlying offenses with which the
respective defendant was charged. Appellant was sentenced for
violating a condition of community control, upon which he was
placed after pleading guilty to the underlying offense. R.C.
2929.15(B)(1) controls a sentencing court's authority
when imposing sanctions for a violation of a condition of
community control. It provides:
If the conditions of a community control sanction are
violated or if the offender violates a law or leaves the
state without the permission of the court or the
offender's probation officer, the sentencing court