United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
R. ADAMS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
se Plaintiff Chadwick Lynn Miller brings this action
against Defendant Akron Bar Association, Attorney Referral,
pursuant to pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 241,
242, and 2261A. Doc. 1 (“Complaint”) at 3. Also
before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to proceed in
forma pauperis, which is granted. Doc. 2. For the
reasons that follow, this case is dismissed.
Standard of Review
se pleadings are liberally construed by the Court.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (pro se
complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers); Boag v. MacDougall,
454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982). Nevertheless, federal district
courts are expressly required under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) to screen all in forma pauperis
actions and to dismiss before service any such action that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
standard for dismissal articulated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) with respect to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) also governs dismissal under §
1915(e)(2)(B). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). Therefore, in order to survive scrutiny
under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a pro se complaint must
set forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true and
with all reasonable inferences drawn in plaintiff's
favor, to state a plausible claim for relief. See Anson
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 529 Fed.Appx. 558, 559 (6th Cir.
2013) (“Section 1915(e)(2)(B) authorizes dismissal if
the action fails to state a plausible claim for relief or is
frivolous.”) (citations omitted).
complaint, Plaintiff claims to be a victim of thought-reading
technology installed by terrorists to harm him. Miller
alleges that Defendant deliberately aided the terrorists by
using mind-altering tactics, including impersonating people
from Plaintiff's past, lying, and misleading Plaintiff
about attorney referral services in an attempt to ensure that
Plaintiff's rights as an American were not upheld.
Plaintiff seeks $150 Million Dollars in damages. Complaint at
the statutes under which Plaintiff seeks relief are federal
criminal statutes. A private citizen “has no authority
to initiate a federal criminal prosecution [against]
defendants for their alleged unlawful acts.”
Williams v. Luttrell, 99 Fed.Appx. 705, 707 (6th
Cir. 2004) (citing among authority Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986)); Saro v.
Brown, 11 Fed.Appx. 387, 388 (6th Cir. 2001) (“A
private citizen has no authority to initiate a federal
criminal prosecution; that power is vested exclusively in the
executive branch.”) (citing United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)).
claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 2261A are
private citizens lack authority to initiate a federal
criminal prosecution, Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a
claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 (conspiracy) and 242
(deprivation of rights). U.S. v. Oguaju, 76
Fed.Appx. 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff has no private
right of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242).
does 18 U.S.C. § 2261A provide Plaintiff with a private
right of action. Murray v. Williams, No.
3:15-CV-284-TAV-HBG, 2016 WL 1122050, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. Mar.
22, 2016) (18 U.S.C. § 2261A (stalking) does not contain
a private right of action) (citation omitted); see also
Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:16-CV-14124, 2018 WL
7018200, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2018) (same) (collecting
cases), report and recommendation adopted, No.
16-CV-14124, 2018 WL 6321919 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 4, 2018).
Miller lacks standing to bring a civil claim pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and § 2261A, Plaintiff
fails to state a plausible claim for relief and those claims
are dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e).
claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A is dismissed
18 U.S.C. § 2339A, it is a crime to provide material
support to terrorists. The Anti-Terrorism Act
(“ATA”) affords a civil remedy to persons injured
“by reason of an act of international terrorism.”
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a); Crosby v. Twitter, Inc.,
921 F.3d 617, 622 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
2333(a) and collecting cases); see also Fields v.
Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 739, 743 (9th Cir. 2018) (the
ATA authorizes a private right of action for damages caused
by an act of international terrorism). “A violation of
[§§ 2339A, 2339B, and 2339C] ‘can provide the
basis for a [civil] cause of action under §
2333(a).'” Taamneh v. Twitter, Inc., 343
F.Supp.3d 904, 910 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting Fields,
881 F.3d at 743). But Miller fails to state a plausible civil
claim for violation of § 2339A because, as a threshold
matter, Plaintiff does not claim that the terrorist activity
alleged in the complaint is an “act of international
terrorism.” Even if Plaintiff had alleged an
international act of terrorism, the claim would nevertheless
be dismissed because an action has no arguable basis in fact
“if it describes fantastic or delusional
scenarios.” Abner v. SBC (Ameritech), 86
Fed.Appx. 958, 958-59 (6th Cir. 2004). Here, Miller's
claim that terrorists installed mind-reading technology and
have been assisted by Defendant lacks an arguable basis in
fact and dismissed pursuant to § 1915 for this
additional reason. See Burnes v. Clinton, 238 F.3d
419 (Table) (6th ...