United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
HONORABLE SARA LIOI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court are motions to dismiss filed by defendants Mahoning
County Child Support Agency, Mahoning County Juvenile Court,
and Mark Latas (Doc. No. 7 [“Cty. Mot.”]) and by
defendant Theresa Dellick (Doc. No. 10 [“Dellick
Mot.”]). Plaintiff filed “objections, ”
which the Court construes collectively as plaintiff's
brief in opposition to the two motions. (Doc. Nos. 9, 11/13.)
Defendant Dellick also filed a reply brief. (Doc. No. 12.)
For the reasons set forth herein, both motions are granted
and this case is closed.
December 6, 2018, pro se plaintiff Kendrail Banks,
identifying himself as “Kendrail of the Family Banks,
Injured, Aggrieved Party, ” filed a complaint against
the four defendants. (Doc. No. 1
[“Compl.”].) Although the complaint is nearly
indecipherable, by virtue of its reference to “Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act” (Compl. at
42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669, it appears to be an attempt
to challenge state court orders requiring plaintiff to pay
child support for a child deemed to be his through a
declaration of paternity.
cites both 42 U.S.C. §§ 651, 666 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 as the jurisdictional grounds for his complaint.
(Id.) He sets forth thirteen claims for relief under
§ 1983: (1) fraudulent inducement (id. at 9);
(2) fraud (id. at 9-10); (3) false advertisement
(id. at 11); (4) forced and compelled association
(id. at 11-12); (5) deprivation of rights under
color of law (id. at 12); (6) compelled disclosure
and use of social security number (id. at 12-13);
(7) intentional infliction of a bill of attainder
(id. at 13); (8) first amendment violations and
deprivations (id. at 13-14); (9) fourth amendment
violations and deprivations (id. at 14-15); (10)
fifth amendment violations and deprivations (id. at
15-16); (11) denial of right to counsel and a trial by jury
(id. at 16); (12) thirteenth amendment deprivations
and violations (id. at 16-17); and, (13) fourteenth
amendment deprivations and violations (id. at
Standard on a Motion to Dismiss
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although this pleading
standard does not require great detail, the factual
allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.
1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citing authorities). In other
words, “Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a
‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of
entitlement to relief.” Id. at 555, n.3
(criticizing the Twombly dissent's assertion
that the pleading standard of Rule 8 “does not require,
or even invite, the pleading of facts”) (internal
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). Rule 8 does not “unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions.” Id. at 678-79. “While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,
they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.
“The court need not, however, accept unwarranted
factual inferences.” Total Benefits Planning
Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552
F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Morgan v.
Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.
analyzing defendants' motions, the Court recognizes that
plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and that pro
se complaints, which are held to less stringent
standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, must be
liberally construed. Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220,
1223 (6th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). That said, the
Court “is not required to conjure up unpled
allegations” on behalf of a pro se plaintiff.
Dietz v. Sanders, 100 Fed.Appx. 334, 338 (6th Cir.
2004) (citation omitted).
threshold matter, 42 U.S.C. § 666 offers no basis for
jurisdiction. Section 666 provides for jurisdiction in the
district courts “to hear and determine any civil action
certified by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services under section 652(a)(8) of this title.”
(emphasis added). There is no such certification shown here
and the Secretary is not a party to this action.
prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove:
“(1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that he
was subjected to or caused to be subjected to this
deprivation by a person acting under color of state
law.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282,
286 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978)).
“[a] [governmental entity] may be held liable under
§ 1983 if the [entity] itself caused the constitutional
deprivation[, ]” id. (citing Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct.
2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)), the entity that is sued must be
sui juris. Vaughn v. Common Pleas Court of
Montgomery Cty., Oh., No. 3:16CV00248, 2016 WL 4264345,
at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2016) (holding that Court of Common
Pleas is not a “person” under ...