United States District Court, N.D. Ohio
OPINION & ORDER [RESOLVING DOC. NOS. 4, 5, 9,
10]
JAMES
S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Pro
se Plaintiff Emmanuel Wiggins challenges judgments of
the El Paso, Texas Domestic Relations Court regarding child
support and child custody, claiming compulsory payment of
child support violates his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He asks this
Court to vacate the state court judgments, enter judgment in
his favor and order the Defendants to refund all money taken
from him for child support. Defendants each move for
dismissal of the Complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim. For the reasons stated below, the Motions to
Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 4, 5, 9, and 10) are granted and this
action is dismissed.
I.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows dismissal for
“lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter” of
claims asserted in the Complaint.[1] Generally, Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(1) Motions fall into two categories: facial attacks and
factual attacks.[2] A facial attack challenges the sufficiency
of the pleading itself.[3] In contrast, a factual attack
challenges the factual existence of subject matter
jurisdiction.[4] When a Defendant facially attacks subject
matter jurisdiction, this Court must accept the
Plaintiff's material allegations in the Complaint as
true.[5]If the Motion presents a factual attack,
the Court is free to consider other evidence and may weigh
the evidence of its own jurisdiction without affording the
Plaintiff the presumption of truthfulness.[6] The Plaintiff has
the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction in order to
survive a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1).[7] Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a
non-waivable, fatal defect.[8]
United
States District Courts do not have jurisdiction to overturn
state court decisions even if the request to reverse the
state court judgment is based on an allegation that the state
court's action was unconstitutional.[9] Federal appellate
review of state court judgments can only occur in the United
States Supreme Court, by appeal or by writ of
certiorari.[10] Under this principle, generally referred
to as the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, a party losing his case in
state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be
appellate review of the state judgment in a United States
District Court based on the party's claim that the state
judgment itself violates his or her federal
rights.[11]
The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on two United States Supreme
Court decisions interpreting 28 U.S.C. §
1257(a).[12] This statute was enacted to prevent
“end-runs around state court judgments” by
requiring litigants seeking review of that judgment to file a
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on the negative inference
that, if appellate court review of state judgments is vested
in the United States Supreme Court, then such review may not
occur in the lower federal courts.[13]
Rooker-Feldman
is a doctrine with narrow application. It does not bar
federal jurisdiction “simply because a party attempts
to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in
state court.”[14] It also does not address potential
conflicts between federal and state court orders, which fall
within the parameters of the doctrines of comity, abstention,
and preclusion.[15] Instead, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
applies only where a party losing his or her case in state
court initiates an action in federal district court
complaining of injury caused by a state court judgment
itself, and seeks review and rejection of that
judgment.[16] To determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars
a claim, the Court must look to the “source of the
injury the Plaintiff alleges in the federal
complaint.”[17] If the source of the Plaintiff's
injury is the state court judgment itself, then the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the federal claim.[18] “If
there is some other source of injury, such as a third
party's actions, then the Plaintiff asserts an
independent claim.”[19] In conducting this inquiry,
the Court should also consider the Plaintiff's requested
relief.[20]
Here,
Plaintiff is clearly asking for review of the state court
child support judgment. He contends the judgment is
unconstitutional and asks this Court to vacate it. This Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the state court
decision or grant the requested relief.
II.
Personal Jurisdiction
Rule
12(b)(2) provides that a Defendant may seek dismissal if the
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over that Defendant.
Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the Court's
personal jurisdiction.[21] The Court has the discretion to
decide the Motion on the materials submitted, permit
discovery in order to aid in deciding the Motion, and/or to
conduct an evidentiary hearing.[22] Neither party has
requested discovery and the Court concludes that a hearing is
not necessary in order to rule on Defendants' Motions.
The Court must construe the pleadings in a light most
favorable to Plaintiff.[23] Dismissal based on the material
submitted is proper if all of the specific facts alleged by
Plaintiff collectively fail to state a prima facie case for
jurisdiction.[24] Pleadings and documents filed by pro
se litigants are “liberally construed” by
the Court.[25]
Whether
federal subject matter jurisdiction is premised on diversity
of citizenship or a federal question, Plaintiff must satisfy
the requirements for personal jurisdiction under Ohio's
long arm statute, Ohio Revised Code §
2307.382(A)(1)-(9), and must demonstrate that the Court's
exercise of jurisdiction over the Defendant meets due process
requirements.[26] If either factor of these factors is not
met, the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over
Defendants.
In
order to satisfy the due process component, Plaintiff must
show that the Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with
Ohio so that the Court's exercise of jurisdiction
comports with “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”[27] Sufficient “minimum
contacts” that satisfy the due process requirement may
be general or specific. General jurisdiction exists when a
Defendant's contacts with the forum state are
“continuous and systematic” and render the
Defendant amenable to any lawsuit brought against it in the
state.[28] Specific jurisdiction over a Defendant
is permissible only if the Defendant purposefully availed
himself of the privilege of acting in Ohio, the cause of
action arose from the Defendant's activities in Ohio; or
the actions of the Defendant had a substantial enough
connection with Ohio to make the exercise of jurisdiction
over the Defendant reasonable.[29]
In this
case, Plaintiff has not established that the Defendants have
minimum contacts with the state of Ohio. The Defendants are a
Texas municipality, a Texas Domestic Relations Court, a Texas
state agency, the Texas Attorney General and a Texas
Associate Judge. The case centers on a Texas child support
proceeding and resulting judgment. Plaintiff gives no
indication that any of these Defendants has any connection
with the state of Ohio. He fails to establish this
Court's personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.
Aside
from lacking personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, this
Court is not the proper venue for this action. A civil action
may be brought only in: (1) a judicial district where any
Defendant resides, if all Defendants reside in the state in
which the Court is located, (2) a judicial district in which
a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred, or (3) if there is no district in which
an action may otherwise be brought as provided by this
section, any judicial district in which any Defendant is
subject to the Court's personal jurisdiction with respect
to the action brought.[30] As stated above, this Court does not
have personal jurisdiction over the Defendants and none of
the Defendants reside in Ohio. The events giving rise to this
Complaint took place in El Paso, which is located within the
Western District of Texas. The Western District of Texas
would be the proper venue for this action.
III.
Failure to State a Claim
Finally,
even if this Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims asserted in this action, and personal jurisdiction
over the Defendants, and were the proper venue for this case,
it would still be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To
survive a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, a Complaint “must
present ‘enough facts to state claim to relief that is
plausible on its face'” when its factual
allegations are presumed true and all reasonable inferences
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.[31]Although
pleadings and documents filed by pro se litigants
are “liberally construed” and held to a less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,
pro se Plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading
requirements.[32]
Defendants
indicate that the Child Support Division is a department of
the Texas Office of the Attorney General making it a state
agency. The Eleventh Amendment is an absolute bar to the
imposition of liability upon states and their
agencies.[33]
The
Eleventh Amendment also extends immunity to state officials
sued in their official capacities. As there are no
allegations in the Complaint suggesting Texas Attorney
General Kenneth Paxton, Jr. was personally involved in the
court proceedings leading to Plaintiff's child support
obligation, the claims against him are construed as asserted
against him in his official capacity. He is also entitled to
absolute immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
The El
Paso Domestic Relations Office is not sui juris,
meaning it lacks the capacity to sue or be sued. It is merely
a subdivision of the municipality is serves, in this case El
Paso County.[34] The claims against this Defendants are
construed against El Paso County.
As a
rule, local governments may not be sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 under a respondeat superior theory of
liability for an injury inflicted solely by employees or
agents.[35]“Instead, it is when execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under §
1983.”[36] A municipality can therefore be held
liable when it unconstitutionally “implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted by that body's
officers.”[37]Child support is determined pursuant to
Texas state statutes and is regulated by Title IV-D of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651. It is not
determined by a local ordinance, custom or policy. Plaintiff
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
against El Paso County.
Plaintiff
does not include any allegations against Judge Antonio
Rodriguez. Plaintiff cannot establish the liability of any
Defendant absent a clear showing that the Defendant was
personally involved in the activities which form the basis of
the alleged unconstitutional behavior.[38] Plaintiff
does not ...