United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
ROBERT E. MOON, Plaintiff,
RICHLAND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE STATE OF OHIO, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AARON POLSTER, JUDGE
se Plaintiff Robert Moon brings this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Richland Correctional
Institute (“RCI”) where he is confined. (Doc. #:
1). Moon claims that there are birds in the “chow
hall” that fly around during mealtime and drop bird
feces on the table. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff asks this
Court to require RCI to make the dining hall safe and healthy
and to award him three million dollars in damages.
(Id. at 5).
reasons that follow, this case is dismissed.
Standard of Review
se pleadings are held to a less stringent standards than
pleadings drafted by lawyers, and must be liberally
construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972) (per curiam). That said, federal district courts are
expressly required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to
screen all in forma pauperis actions and to dismiss
before service any such action that is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. The standard for dismissal
articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007) with respect to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) also governs
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a
claim. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th
Cir. 2010). Therefore, in order to survive scrutiny under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), a pro se complaint
“‘must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Defendant is not subject to suit under § 1983
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a
violation of a right secured by the constitution by a person
acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). As an initial matter,
RCI is not a legal entity capable of being sued under §
1983. Miles v. Richland Corr. Inst., No.
1:14-CV-01648, 2015 WL 366898, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 27,
2015) (RCI is not a legal entity capable of being sued under
§ 1983) (citing Brown v. Imboden, 2011 WL
3704952 at * 2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2011) (finding that
Mansfield Correctional Institution is not sui juris
and, therefore, not capable of being sued under §
RCI is part of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction (“ODRC”). ODRC is an agency of the
State of Ohio and immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment, unless the State of Ohio has waived its sovereign
immunity or consented to be sued in federal court. See
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). Congress did not intend that § 1983 abrogate the
State of Ohio's Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the
State of Ohio has not waived that immunity to suit in federal
court. See Id. at 66-67; Mixon v. State of
Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999).
Defendant is not sui juris and the ODRC is immune
from suit, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible § 1983
claim upon which relief can be granted, and this action is
dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e).
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible § 1983
action is subject to dismissal for the additional reason that
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim. Moon
does not specifically identify the right secured by the
Constitution of which he was allegedly deprived. Although not
specifically stated, it appears that Plaintiff is attempting
to assert an Eighth Amendment claim. Therefore, reading the
Complaint liberally, the Court construes his claim as
alleging an Eighth Amendment violation.
Eighth Amendment protects inmates by requiring that
“prison officials ... ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and ...
‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
the inmates.'” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526-27 (1984)). Unconstitutional
conditions-of-confinement claims are analyzed under the
Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifferent standard for cruel
and unusual punishment. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 298-99 (1991). Deliberate indifference has two
components: (1) objectively, the constitutional deprivation
must be sufficiently serious, and (2) subjectively, the
government official must disregard a known or obvious risk.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy the objective
component, Plaintiff must allege that the deprivation was
“sufficiently serious, ” that is, a denial of the
“minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities.” Id. (citations omitted). To
satisfy the subjective component, Plaintiff must show that
the prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state
of mind.” Id. In a prison conditions case,
that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate
indifference' to an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety. Id. at 837.
Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts regarding birds in
the dining hall to establish the objective component.
“Conditions-of-confinement cases are highly
fact-specific, but one guiding principle is that the length
of exposure to the conditions is often paramount.”
Lamb v. Howe, 677 Fed.Appx. 204, 209 (6th Cir. 2017)
(citing DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th
Cir. 2001) (“In general, the severity and duration of
deprivations are inversely proportional[.]”)).
Plaintiff provides no facts from which this Court may infer
that his allegation of birds in ...