United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Stephanie K. Bowman United States Magistrate Judge.
a prisoner at the Southern Correctional Facility (SOCF) and
frequent litigant in this Court,  filed this civil rights
action in November 2016. This matter is now before the Court
on cross-motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 34, 43).
Background and Facts
is currently in the custody of the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) and is
serving his prison sentence at Southern Ohio Correction
Facility (“SOCF”), Lucasville, Ohio.
November 23, 2016, McDougald filed his complaint alleging
various violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights
relating to pepper spray (“use of force”)
deployed against him on October 7, 2016 while incarcerated at
SOCF. (Doc. 1). Following the Court's initial screening
Order (Doc. 6), McDougald's allegations include:
Deliberate Medical Indifference (Sgt. Dillow, Osborne, Nurse
Reiter, Bauer, Rogers); Excessive Force (Sgt. Dillow,
Osborne); and Retaliation (Sgt. Dillow, Osborne). McDougald
names various Defendants including Bauer, Lt., Dillow,
Rogers, Lt., Osborne, and Nurse Reiter and sues each in
their individual capacity for $50, 000 punitive damages.
Id. Defendants answered McDougald's complaint on
January 17, 2107, which included several affirmative
defenses. (Doc. 9).
alleges that Osborne bent McDougald's wrist back
“for no reason” during a cuffing incident on
October 7, 2016. McDougald alleges Sgt. Dillow came up to the
cell door and pepper sprayed him followed by both Dillow and
Osborne stating “this is for filing lawsuits.”
McDougald alleges that Dillow and Osborne applied excessive
force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. McDougald
also alleges he was left in a cell with difficulty breathing
and that his requests for help were ignored. (Doc. 1 at 2).
McDougald claims that he requested help when Nurse Reiter and
Osborne looked into his cell during the time that he was
suffering the effects of pepper spray but that both Reiter
and Osborne ignored McDougald's request for help.
McDougald believes that Nurse Reiter violated his
Constitutional rights (8th and 14th Amendments) by being
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Id.
McDougald claims that when Bauer and Rogers returned to his
cell post-application of pepper spray both Bauer and Rogers
ignored his requests for medical attention and
decontamination. McDougald claims that his Eight Amendment
rights were violated as such alleged conduct was cruel and
unusual punishment (Doc. 1 at 2).
however, set forth a different version of facts relating to
this incident. Defendants contend that McDougald, on October
7, 2016, in process of cuffing him at his cell entrance,
began to pull away from the officer and took hold of the
remaining cuff that was not fastened and refused to let go.
McDougald refused several direct orders to release the cuff
that he held in his hand. In light of McDougald's
behavior and the danger of the metal handcuff he maintained
in his hand McDougald received a short burst of OC
(“pepper spray”) from Officer Dillow. (Doc. 43,
Ex. A, Dillow Interrog. #4, 5, and 6; Ex. B, Osborne
Interrog. #1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7; Ex. E, Rules Infraction Board
(“RIB”) Pkt. p. 002; Ex. G, Use of Force
(“UoF”) Pkt. pp. 002, 004, 005, 006, 007, and
010); and Def. Ex. K, Institutional Camera Footage).
Officer Dillow asked Plaintiff if he wanted a decontamination
shower, to which Plaintiff replied “go fuck
yourself.” (Doc. 43, Ex. G at 2). Defendant Dillow then
contacted medical staff to have Plaintiff examined.
Id. RN Reiter provides in her medical examination
report that McDougald was not interested in decontamination
nor a medical check. Moreover, RN Reiter noted that McDougald
was in his cell laughing and clapping and stating words to
the effect “I have my lawsuit now.” (See
Doc. 43, Ex. G, UoF w/ MER, p. 010; Ex. C, RN Reiter Interrog
¶¶ 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10).
conduct was reviewed by the Rules Infraction Board
(“RIB”). The RIB found (and the Warden's
designee concurred) that McDougald violated a number of
inmate rules. (Doc. 43, Ex. F, Ohio Adm. Code; rules 6, 60;
Ex. E, RIB, pp. 003-008, 010-0011). McDougald refused to
attend the RIB hearings and offer his testimony.
(Id, RIB packet, p. 003). The Use of Force Packet
provides pertinent information as to findings of guilt
against McDougald regarding the acts complained of in this
case. (Doc. 43, Ex. E, RIB, pp. 003-008, 010-0011; Ex. F,
Ohio Adm. Code; rules 6, 60; Ex. G).
on the foregoing, Defendants assert that they acted
reasonable under the circumstance and are therefore entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. The undersigned agrees.
Defendants motion for Summary Judgment is well-taken
Standard of Review
motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence
submitted to the court demonstrates that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 24748, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The moving party must demonstrate the absence of genuine
disputes over facts which, under the substantive law
governing the issue, could affect the outcome of the action.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
response to a properly supported summary judgment motion, the
non-moving party “‘is required to present some
significant probative evidence which makes it necessary to
resolve the parties' differing versions of the dispute at
trial.'” Harris v. Adams, 873 F.2d 929,
931 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Sixty Ivy Street Corp. v.
Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987)). The
Court must evaluate the evidence, and all inferences drawn
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538
(1986); Satterfield v. Tennessee, 295 F.3d 611, 615
(6th Cir.2002); Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. v. OPPC,
LLC, 219 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir.2000).
after an appropriate time for discovery, the opposing party
is unable to demonstrate a prima facie case, summary judgment
is warranted. St. v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886
F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Celotex and
Anderson). A principal purpose of summary judgment
is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or
defenses. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The moving
party need not support its motion with evidence disproving
the opposing party's claims. Rather, the moving party
need only point out there is an absence of evidence
supporting such claims. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d
795, 799 (6th Cir.1996) (citing Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 325). Nor must the Court search the entire record for
material issues of fact. Street, 886 F.2d at
1479-80. The court need only determine “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. “Where the