United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM H. BAUGHMAN, JR. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
is an action by Marilyn Marie Robinson under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for
disability insurance benefits. The Commissioner has
answered and filed the transcript of the
administrative record. Under my initial and procedural orders, the
parties have briefed their positions and filed supplemental
charts and the fact sheet.
reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner
will be affirmed as supported by substantial evidence.
Background facts and decision of the Administrative Law Judge
who was 53 years old at the time of the administrative
hearing,  has a high school
education. Her past relevant employment history
includes work as an assembler and inspector for manufacturing
and logistics businesses.
ALJ, whose decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner, found that Robinson had the following severe
impairments: degenerative disc disease of the spine and
carpal tunnel syndrome.
concluding that the relevant impairments did not meet or
equal a listing, the ALJ made the following finding regarding
Robinson's residual functional capacity
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(b) except: she can frequently climb ramps and
stairs. She can never climb ladders, ropes[, ] or scaffolds.
She can frequently stoop, kneel[, ] and crouch. She can
on that residual functional capacity, the ALJ found Robinson
capable of her past relevant work as a general inspector and
electronics assembler and, therefore, not under a
Issues on judicial review
asks for reversal of the Commissioner's decision on the
ground that it does not have the support of substantial
evidence in the administrative record. Specifically, Robinson
presents the following issues for judicial review:
• Whether the ALJ erred in omitting limitations
resulting from Ms. Robinson's severe impairments in the
residual functional capacity finding.
• Whether remand is warranted for consideration of new
and material evidence.
reasons that follow, I will conclude that the ALJ's
finding of no disability is supported by substantial evidence
and, therefore, must be affirmed.
Standards of review
Sixth Circuit in Buxton v. Halter reemphasized the
standard of review applicable to decisions of the ALJs in
Congress has provided for federal court review of Social
Security administrative decisions. However, the scope of
review is limited under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g): “The
findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” In
other words, on review of the Commissioner's decision
that claimant is not totally disabled within the meaning of
the Social Security Act, the only issue reviewable by this
court is whether the decision is supported by substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence is “‘more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal
merely because there exists in the record substantial
evidence to support a different conclusion. This is so
because there is a “zone of choice” within which
the Commissioner can act, without the fear of court
in the context of a jury trial, all that is necessary to
affirm is that reasonable minds could reach different
conclusions on the evidence. If such is the case, the
Commissioner survives “a directed verdict” and
wins. The court may not disturb the
Commissioner's findings, even if the preponderance of the
evidence favors the claimant.
review the findings of the ALJ at issue here consistent with
that deferential standard.
Sentence six remand
six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) permits a court to order a
case remanded for consideration of additional evidence under
certain circumstances. The Sixth Circuit has interpreted this
statute as creating the following requirements for a remand
to consider new evidence: that the evidence be
“new”- that is, “not in existence or
available to the claimant at the time of the administrative
proceeding”; that the evidence be “material,
” which requires showing a “reasonable
probability” that the Commissioner would have reached a
different disposition of the claim if presented with the new
evidence; and that “good cause” exists for not
producing the ...