United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
L. Graham Judge
OPINION AND ORDER
CHELSEY M. VASCURA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendant
Edward Grimm's Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 227), in which Mr. Grimm seeks
leave to file a motion for summary judgment after the
expiration of the dispositive motions deadline;
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 229); and
Mr. Grimm's Reply (ECF No. 230). For the reasons that
follow, Mr. Grimm's Motion is DENIED
(ECF No. 227), and the Clerk is DIRECTED to
STRIKE Mr. Grimm's Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 228).
originally filed this action on September 9, 2013, in the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Defendants
subsequently removed the action to this Court on November 25,
2013. On January 30, 2014, this Court issued a Preliminary
Pretrial Order (“PPO”) (ECF No. 37), a scheduling
order that established the case schedule deadlines the
parties recommended in their Rule 26(f) Report (ECF No. 34).
The PPO set the deadline for filing dispositive motions as
April 10, 2015. Thereafter, at the request of the parties,
the Court extended the dispositive motions deadline
numerous times, with the most recently extended
deadline expiring on December 4, 2017, approximately two
years and nine months after initial agreed-upon deadline.
(See ECF Nos. 77, 97, 100, 108, 144, and 182.)
these numerous, lengthy extensions, Mr. Grimm neither timely
filed a dispositive motion nor moved for an extension of time
by which to do so. Rather, he filed the subject Motion
seeking leave to file his summary judgment motion on January
26, 2018, more than seven weeks after the December 4, 2017
expiration of the dispositive motions deadline.
Motion for Leave, Mr. Grimm points out that the Court granted
Defendant Dirección General De Fabricaciones Militares
an extension of the discovery deadline, until December 31,
2017, for the limited purpose of allowing the parties'
experts to examine two shell casings. Although Mr. Grimm
acknowledges that the agreed-upon deadline for filing
dispositive motions was December 4, 2017, he appears to
suggest that the Court should grant the instant Motion
because the deadline by which to file dispositive motions
typically trails the deadline for completing discovery by 30
days. Mr. Grimm further submits that he should be granted
leave to file his motion for summary judgment because
“this matter presents a classic situation” for
such a motion. (ECF No. 227 at p. 2.) In support of this
contention, Mr. Grimm offers his views on why the Court would
grant the motion for summary judgment he seeks leave to file.
Finally, Mr. Grimm asserts that no party would suffer
prejudice should the Court grant his motion and that the
interests of judicial economy also weigh in his favor.
oppose Mr. Grimm's Motion, pointing out that Mr. Grimm
has not advanced any explanation for failing to timely file
his motion and that all of the evidence he cites in the
motion for summary judgment he proffered was obtained months
before the December 4, 2017 dispositive motions deadline. In
addition, Plaintiffs posit that they would, in fact, suffer
prejudice should the Court grant Mr. Grimm's motion, and
they also contest Mr. Grimm's declaration that he would
succeed on a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs further
assert that Mr. Grimm's apparent reliance upon the
typical timing of motions for summary judgment is
unpersuasive in light of language in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(b), which provides that “[u]nless a
different time is set by local rule or the court orders
otherwise, a party may file a motion for summary judgment at
any time until 30 days after the close of discovery.”
Finally, Plaintiffs point out that in addition to the
Court's Order setting December 4, 2017, as the expiration
of the dispositive motions deadline, the Court also advised
in its Notice of Final Pretrial and Trial that dispositive
motions must be filed on or before the date specified in the
Court's scheduling order. (See Pls.' Mem. in
Opp. (citing ECF No. 147 at p. 4).)
district court is required to enter a scheduling order, which
limits the time “to join other parties, amend the
pleadings, complete discovery, and file motions.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(3)(A). When, as in the instant case, a
party misses a scheduling order's deadlines and seeks a
modification of those deadlines, the party must first
demonstrate good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(4); Andretti v. Borla Performance Indus.,
Inc., 426 F.3d 824, 830 (6th Cir. 2005). “The
primary measure of Rule 16's ‘good cause'
standard is the moving party's diligence in attempting to
meet the case management order's requirements.”
Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 625 (6th Cir.
2002) (quotation omitted); accord Leary v.
Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 906 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A]
court choosing to modify the schedule upon a showing of good
cause, may do so only if it cannot reasonably be met despite
the diligence of the party seeking the extension.”
(quotation omitted)). “Another important consideration
. . . is whether the opposing party will suffer prejudice by
virtue of the amendment.” Leary, 349 F.3d at
906 (citing Inge, 281 F.3d at 625).
Grim has failed to establish that good cause exists to modify
the case schedule. Mr. Grimm has not offered any
explanation for why, despite his diligence, he was unable to
meet the significantly extended, court-ordered dispositive
motions deadline. See Pittman ex rel. Sykes v.
Franklin, 282 Fed.Appx. 418, 425 n.5 (6th Cir. 2008)
(noting that the movant's “total failure to offer
any real justification for the delay . . . fell . . . well
below her obligation to demonstrate ‘good cause'
for failing to comply with the district court's
scheduling order as required by Rule 16.”). Moreover,
nothing in the record suggests that despite his diligence, he
was unable to meet the deadline.
Grimm's proffered justifications are not well taken. To
begin, none of his proffered justifications speak to his
diligence in meeting case deadlines. His reliance on the
“typical” timing of a motion for summary
judgement lacks merit because, as Plaintiffs point out, the
default deadline set forth in Rule 56(b) applies only when a
different time has not been established by a local rule or
court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). Mr.
Grimm's contention that this case “presents a
classic situation” for filing a motion for summary
judgment and that he will prevail is equally unpersuasive
because it improperly requires this Court to presume the
success of his motion.
Mr. Grimm's failure to show diligence leads the Court to
determine that he has failed to demonstrate good cause as
required under Rule 16. ...