Calvin L. Taylor Defendant-Appellant,
Nancy D. Taylor Plaintiff-Appellee.
from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas C.P.C. No.
14DR-1977, Division of Domestic Relations
and Associates, LLC, and Beverly J. Farlow, for appellant.
Lewis Co., LPA, and Gregg R. Lewis, for appellee.
1} Defendant-appellant, Calvin L. Taylor ("Mr.
Taylor"), appeals from a October 2, 2017 "Military
Retired Pay Division Order" of the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations. We affirm
the trial court's order.
2} Mr. Taylor and appellee, Nancy D. Taylor
("Ms. Taylor"), were married on March 29, 1969 in
Worthington, Ohio. There were two children born as issue of
the marriage, both now emancipated. The parties were granted
a divorce decree on June 29, 2016, and the trial court
retained jurisdiction to sign any division of property order
("DOPO") or qualified domestic relation order
("QDRO") in accordance with the retirement
3} On October 2, 2017, the trial court issued a DOPO
stating: "The Court hereby orders that the Former Spouse
shall be treated as the Member's irrevocable beneficiary
under the Survivor Benefit Plan ("SBP"), in
accordance with the election made by the Member on his date
of retirement." (Oct. 2, 2017 Military Retired Pay
Division Order at ¶ 8.) Mr. Taylor filed a notice of
appeal on October 30, 2017, arguing that the trial court
erred in awarding the survivor benefits to Ms. Taylor.
4} Mr. Taylor lists one assignment of error for our
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ITS ISSUANCE OF
THE DOPO ON OCTOBER 2, 2017, MODIFYING THE DECISION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY DECREE OF DIVORCE.
5} When reviewing the propriety of a trial
court's determination in a domestic relations case, an
abuse of discretion standard is used. Booth v.
Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989). This is the
standard in cases reviewing an order relating to alimony,
see Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983);
a division of martial property, see Martin v.
Martin, 18 Ohio St.3d 292 (1985); a custody proceeding,
see Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71 (1988); or
child support, see Booth. "Since it is
axiomatic that a trial court must have discretion to do what
is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each case,
see Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348, 355,
it necessarily follows that a trial court's decision in
domestic relations matters should not be disturbed on appeal
unless the decision involves more than an error of
judgment." Booth at 144. "The term
'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of
law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable."
Blakemore at 219.
6} Ms. Taylor argues that Mr. Taylor did not timely
file his appeal, arguing that the final appealable order was
the decree of divorce filed on June 29, 2016 and not the DOPO
filed on October 2, 2017. We must initially determine whether
we have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of
this appeal. "Subject-matter jurisdiction may not be
waived or bestowed upon a court by the parties to the
case." Green v. Green, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-61,
2005-Ohio-851, ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. White v.
Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 79 Ohio St.3d 543, 544
(1997). R.C 2505.03 limits the ...