United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
KIMBERLY L. BONDS, Plaintiff,
PAMELA A. BARKER, et. al, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on the Complaint of pro
se Plaintiff Kimberly Bonds (“Bonds” or
“Plaintiff”) (ECF DKT #1) and Plaintiff's
Motion for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order (ECF DKT
#10). Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Proceed
in Forma Paupersis (ECF DKT #2), and that Motion is
following reasons, this case is dismissed and Plaintiff's
Motion for an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order is
18, 2018, Bonds filed a Complaint against Cuyahoga County
Common Pleas Court Judge Pamela A. Barker
(“Barker”), Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Magistrate Judge Paul H. Lucas (“Lucas”),
Attorney Benjamin N. Hoen (“Hoen”) and Attorney
Roy J. Schechter (“Schechter”) (collectively,
“Defendants”). According to the Complaint, this
case originated in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
where Third Federal Savings and Loan Bank (“Third
Federal”) filed a foreclosure action against Bonds on
March 20, 2017 - No. CV-17-877564 (“State Case”).
Barker was the presiding judge, Lucas was the magistrate
judge and Hoen was the attorney of record for Third Federal.
granted summary judgment to Third Federal in the State Case
and Bonds appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals -
CA-18-106746. According to the public docket, Schechter
and Hoen represented Third Federal in the appeal. On May 15,
2018, the Eighth District Court of Appeals granted Third
Federal's motion to dismiss the appeal as moot because
the property at issue in the State Case was sold and the
proceeds distributed and no stay was obtained in the trial
civil cover sheet Bonds filed with the Complaint identifies a
related case in the Northern District of Ohio - No. 1:17 CV
1932 (“Related Case”). Proceeding pro se
and in forma pauperis, Bonds brought the Related
Case on September 13, 2017 against Barker, Lucas, Hoen and
Third Federal. In that case, Bonds challenged those
defendants' actions and decisions in the State Case
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e. (see Related Case ECF DKT #8 at 1-2).
On February 21, 2018, the Related Case was dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) because: (1) res judicata barred
Bonds from relitigating the validity of her mortgage
(id. at 4-5); (2) Hoen and Third Federal are private
parties and Bonds did not allege any facts to suggest that
they were state actors and subject to suit under § 1983
(id. at 5-6); (3) Barker and Lucas are immune from
suit under § 1983 (id. at 6-7); and (4) no
relief is available under Title VII because employment
discrimination was not at issue (id. at 5).
brings the instant action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 472,
473 and 474, which relate to counterfeit obligations and
securities. Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegations
against any of the Defendants, nor specifies the relief
sought. But the crux of the Complaint is that when the State
Case was filed, Third Federal did not own the mortgage and
note and, therefore, lacked standing to bring a foreclosure
action (see ECF DKT # 1 at 6). Bonds' Motion
for a Temporary Restraining Order asks this Court to stop her
eviction from the Property on the grounds that Third Federal
lacks standing and “ownership, ” and “no
original wet inked Security Instrument was ever recovered
after being requested numerous times[.]” (ECF DKT #10
Standard of Review
pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag
v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982), federal
district courts are expressly required under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) to screen all in forma pauperis
actions and to dismiss before service any such action that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. The standard for
dismissal articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007) with respect to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) also
governs dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Therefore,
in order to survive scrutiny under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a
pro se complaint must set forth sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for
relief. Anson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 529 Fed.Appx.
558, 559 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Section 1915(e)(2)(B)
authorizes dismissal if the action fails to state a plausible
claim for relief or is frivolous.”).
initial matter, Barker and Lucas are the judicial officers
that were assigned to the State Case and must be dismissed
from this action because they are immune from suit.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam);
King v. McCree, 573 Fed.Appx. 430, 438 (6th Cir.
2014) (same) (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11). Bonds
alleges no plausible facts that suggest Baker's and
Lucas' actions in the State Case were undertaken outside
of their judicial capacity, or that they lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over Third Federal's foreclosure
action, both of which would operate as an exception to
immunity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12 (1991) (a judge
is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions and for
actions taken in the absence of jurisdiction); Kin ...