United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
R. ADAMS U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court are pro se Plaintiff Susan Lloyd's
Motions to Reconsider (Docs. #22, 27, 28 and 29) the
Court's May 14, 2018 Order (Docs. #20 and 21) granting
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, as well as her Motion to Dismiss defendants
(Doc. #26) and Motion to transfer/recuse judicial officer
(Doc. #29). Defendants have responded in opposition (Doc.
#24) to the initial motion and urge the Court to evaluate it
as a motion to amend judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
59(e) and deny it under that rule. No. response to the
additional motions appears in the record.
Court is enjoined to consider a pro se litigants pleadings
more liberally than pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 903 (6th Cir.
1992). The Court notes that the United States Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals has ruled that a pro se motion to reconsider
may be properly evaluated under either Rule 59 (e) as a
motion to amend judgment or under Rule 60(b) as a motion for
relief from judgment. See Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d
60, 62-63 (6th Cir. 1979) (evaluating a motion to reconsider
under Rule 59 (e) and Williams, 981 F.2d at 903
(evaluating a request to reconsider judgment under Rule
60(b)). Thus, in an abundance of caution, the Court will
construe the present motion liberally, in Plaintiff
Lloyd's favor, as either a Rule 59(e) motion to alter the
May 14, 2018 ruling or a Rule 60(b) request for relief from
may grant a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) and amend or alter
judgment (1) to correct a clear error of law; (2) to address
newly discovered evidence; (3) to address an interviewing
change in controlling law; or (4) to prevent manifest
injustice. Gencorp, Inc. v. Am. Int'l
Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999).
“It is not the function of a motion to reconsider
either to renew arguments already considered and rejected by
a court or ‘to proffer a new legal theory or new
evidence to support a prior argument when the legal theory or
argument could, with due diligence, have been discovered and
offered during the initial consideration of the
issue.'” McConocha v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Mut. of Ohio, 930 F.Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Ohio
1996) (citation omitted). When the “defendant views the
law in a light contrary to that of this Court, ” its
“proper recourse” is not by way of a motion for
reconsideration but by “appeal to the Sixth
Circuit.” Dana Corp. v. United States, 764
F.Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court
may relieve a party from a final judgment or order where the
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud ... misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged;
it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Civ. P. 60(b). “As a prerequisite to relief under Rule
60(b), a party must establish that the facts of its case are
within one of the enumerated reasons contained in Rule 60(b)
that warrant relief from judgment.” Johnson v.
Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 2004).
“[R]elief under Rule 60(b) is circumscribed by public
policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of
litigation.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited,
Inc., 487 F.3d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
Lloyd fails to raise any valid basis to amend or vacate the
Court's judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) in her
first, second, and fourth motions to reconsider.
Plaintiff's first, second, and fourth motions to
reconsider provide additional detail but in substance restate
the allegations made in her complaint and her extreme
dissatisfaction with the alleged inaction of Streetsboro law
enforcement and actions taken by this Court. Plaintiff's
fourth motion includes additional material concerning the
Court that is not relevant to her suit. None of the material
presented remedies, alters, or explains the deficiencies in
her Complaint that led to dismissal.
third motion to dismiss cites a 2016 consent decree entered
by the parties to a suit in the District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Quick v. City of Beech
Grove, 1:16cv1709 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 5, 2016) which she
argues stands for the proposition that a city has no right to
delete a citizen's face book comments. Plaintiff is
mistaken, the consent decree represents the consensus of the
parties, not a finding by the court, and, as an agreement
between two parties wholly unrelated to this suit, is
inapposite and has no precedential value. As the Court
explained, with reference to Davidson v. Plowman,
247 F.Supp.3d 767, 776 (E.D. Va. 2017), a simple allegation
that a municipal entity deleted a statement from a Facebook
page, does not, without more, state a cause of action under
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Nothing presented by Plaintiff in her third motion to
reconsider offers a legal basis to alter the Court's May
14, 2018 ruling pursuant to either Rule 59(e) ...