FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF
SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. 2015-ES-2539
O'HALLORAN, pro se, Appellant.
GREGORY T. PLESICH, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
MICHELE MORRIS, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
A. TEODOSIO JUDGE.
Daniel O'Halloran appeals the judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, overruling
his objections to the magistrate's decision. We affirm in
part and reverse and remand in part.
In September 2015, an application to probate the will of
Virginia Durkin was filed in the Probate Court of Summit
County, Ohio. John Durkin, the son of Virginia Durkin, was
the executor of the estate. Daniel O'Halloran, the
grandson of Virginia Durkin, was a beneficiary of the estate,
along with his two sisters. Mr. O'Halloran's mother
(the daughter of Virginia Durkin), Patricia O'Halloran,
had predeceased Virginia Durkin. Ms. Durkin's will
divided her estate one-half to Mr. Durkin and one-half to Ms.
O'Halloran's three children.
During the course of the matter, Mr. O'Halloran filed
various motions, including a motion to remove John Durkin as
the fiduciary for the estate, a motion to remove Gregory
Plesich as attorney for the estate, and a motion to compel.
Attorney Plesich filed a motion to require Mr. O'Halloran
to produce copies of documents received in response to
subpoenas issued to various banks and two motions for
contempt. In February 2017, a magistrate's decision
denied Mr. O'Halloran's motions, granted $500.00 for
contempt against Mr. O'Halloran, and addressed exceptions
to the inventory of the estate. Mr. O'Halloran filed
objections to the magistrate's decision, which were
overruled by the trial court's judgment entry of May 8,
Mr. O'Halloran now appeals, raising eight assignments of
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DANIEL O'HALLORAN'S  MOTION
FOR REMOVAL OF FIDUCIARY JOHN DURKIN  PER R.C 2019.50
("PROCEEDINGS WHEN ASSETS CONCEALED OR
EMBEZZLED"), R.C. 2109.52 (JUDGMENT ON THE
COMPLAINT"), R.C. 2109.53 (JUDGMENT AGAINST
FIDUCIARY-REMOVAL[)], [R.C] 2113.18 ("REMOVAL OF
EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR"), AND [R.C] 2109.24
("RESIGNATION OR REMOVAL OF FIDUCIARY").
In his first assignment of error, Mr. O'Halloran argues
the trial court erred by denying his motion for the removal
of the fiduciary, John Durkin. We disagree.
"This Court reviews a trial court's action with
respect to a magistrate's decision for an abuse of
discretion." Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 9th Dist.
Medina No. 08CA0049-M, 2009-Ohio-3139, ¶ 17. "In so
doing, we consider the trial court's action with
reference to the nature of the underlying matter."
Id. at ¶ 18. Here, "[r]emoval of an
executor rests within the sound discretion of the trial court
and a reviewing court will not reverse the decision absent a
clear showing of abuse of discretion." Pio v.
Ramsier, 88 Ohio App.3d 133, 136 (9th Dist.1993). An
abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it
means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). As a reviewing
court applying the abuse of discretion standard, we may not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Pons
v. Ohio State Med. Bd, 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993).
We note at the outset that the first assignment of error
references sections of the Revised Code not raised in his
arguments before the trial court. "Issues that were not
raised to the trial court may not be considered for the first
time on appeal." Rozhon v. Rozhon, 9th Dist.
Medina No. 05CA0075-M, 2006-Ohio-3118, ¶ 18. To the
extent these references make new arguments that were not
raised before the trial court, they are not properly before
this Court for consideration.
In December 2016, Mr. O'Halloran motioned the trial court
to remove Mr. Durkin as the fiduciary, arguing that Mr.
Durkin lied under oath and failed to communicate information
to Mr. O'Halloran. Mr. O'Halloran also presented
these arguments at a hearing before the magistrate in August
Other than reiterating his belief that Mr. Durkin acted
dishonestly, Mr. O'Halloran does not provide this Court
with a theory as to how the trial court abused its
discretion. "[A]n appellant's assignment of error
provides this Court with a roadmap to guide our review."
Taylor v. Hamlin-Scanlon, 9th Dist. Summit No.
23873, 2008-Ohio-1912, ¶ 12. This Court declines to
chart its own course when an appellant fails to provide
guidance. Young v. Slusser, 9th Dist. Wayne No.
08CA0019, 2008-Ohio-4650, ¶ 7. "It is not this
Court's duty to create an appellant's argument for
him." Thomas v. Bauschlinger, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 27240, 2015-Ohio-281, ¶ 8. It is an appellant's
duty to demonstrate his assigned error through an argument
that is supported by citations to legal authority and facts
in the record; it is not the function of this Court to
construct a foundation for his claims. Ohio Edison Co. v.
Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23530, 2007-Ohio-5028,
Mr. O'Halloran has failed to demonstrate an abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court. The first
assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING [DANIEL
O'HALLORAN'S] MOTION FOR REMOVAL OF GREGORY PLESICH
 AS ATTORNEY FOR THE ESTATE.
In his second assignment of error, Mr. O'Halloran argues
the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for the removal of Gregory Plesich as the attorney for the
estate. We disagree.
"[A] court has inherent authority to supervise members
of the bar appearing before it; this necessarily includes the
power to disqualify counsel in specific cases." Kala
v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., 81 Ohio St.3d
1, 4 (1998). Trial courts enjoy broad discretion when
considering motions to disqualify counsel. Phillips v.
Haidet,119 Ohio App.3d 322, 324 (3d Dist.1997).
"We review a trial court's determination regarding a
motion to disqualify counsel for an abuse of