United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
[RESOLVING ECF NO. 68-1]
Y. Pearson United States District Judge
is Defendants' Supplemental Brief to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 56] Regarding Counts 1,
2, and 8 of Plaintiffs' Intervening Complaint. ECF
No. 68-1. Plaintiffs have filed a response in
opposition. ECF No. 73. Defendants replied. ECF
No. 74. For the reasons that follow, the motion (ECF
No. 68-1) is granted.
requested leave to file, instanter, a supplemental
brief in support of their pending motion for summary
judgment. ECF No. 68. Defendants contend that the
two-year statute of limitations applicable in §
1983 cases Ohio Revised Code (“O.R.C.”)
§ 2305.10 bars: (1) Counts One and Two, in which
Plaintiffs allege that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Defendants deprived them of a hearing regarding
Defendants' October 2014 decision to terminate their
participation in the voucher program; and (2) Count Eight, in
which Plaintiffs allege that, Defendants violated the United
States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§1437d,
1437f, by terminating them from the Section 8 housing choice
voucher program [in October 2014] without providing them with
written notice of the opportunity to request an informal
hearing, of Plaintiffs' Intervening Complaint. ECF Nos.
68-1;16. For good cause shown, the Court granted
Defendants' motion for leave to file (ECF No.
68). See May 10, 2018 non-document Order.
opposition, Plaintiffs assert that Ohio's four-year
statute of limitations, O.R.C. § 2305.09(D), is the
proper statute of limitations in § 1983 cases.
ECF No. 73.
Law and Analysis
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85
L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the Supreme Court “directed federal
courts to apply the single most analogous state personal
injury statute of limitations to claims brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.” Ross v. Ross, 1997 WL
693081, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 1997). “In Owens
v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594
(1989), the Supreme Court further clarified that when a state
has multiple statutes of limitations for different categories
of personal injury actions, the residual personal injury
statute of limitations applies.” Kuhnle Bros., Inc.
v. Cty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 1997).
Following Wilson and Owens, the Sixth
Circuit, in Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th
Cir. 1989), held that the “limitations period for
§ 1983 actions arising in Ohio is the two-year period in
Ohio Revised Code (“O.R.C.”) §
2305.10.” Id. Accordingly, since
Browning, it is well-settled that, O.R.C. §
2305.10 is the appropriate statute of limitations in
§ 1983 cases. See Ross, 1997 WL
693081, at *1 (“Ohio's two year statute of
limitations contained in Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.10 .
. . is to be applied to civil rights claims arising in
v. Portage Metro Housing Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1105 (6th
Cir. 1995) (explaining that the Sixth Circuit “squarely
addressed this issue in Browning v. Pendleton, 869
F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc), and definitively held that
“the appropriate statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio ... requires
that actions ... be filed within two years after their
accrual.”); Fuller v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing
Auth., 2007 WL 987309, at * 3 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 2,
2007) (citing Browning for the proposition
that, “the statute of limitations for filing a federal
§ 1983 claim is determined by state law; in Ohio, the
period is two years”).
Court finds Defendants' motion (ECF No. 68-1) to be
well-taken. Plaintiffs filed their Intervening Complaint on
March 27, 2017. ECF No. 16. It is undisputed that Counts One,
Two, and Eight, of Plaintiffs' Intervening Complaint, are
based on Defendants' termination of Plaintiffs'
housing voucher in October 2014. See ECF Nos.
68-1 at PageID#: 2316; 73 at PageID#: 2474.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the
two-year statute of limitations applicable to §
1983 claims, and therefore, dismissed. Ohio Rev.
Code § 2305.10; Browning v. Pendleton, 869
F.2d at 992; Stevenson v. Willis, 579 F.Supp.2d 913,
921 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (explaining that the Supreme Court in
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing
Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781
(1987), addressed the use of § 1983 in conjunction with
the United States Housing Act, and found a private right of
action in the Housing Act); see also Hunter v.
Underwood, 362 F.3d 468, 477 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding
that “Section 1983 is the proper means by which a
public housing tenant may challenge the action of a state
public housing agency that violates the United States Housing
reasons stated above, Defendants' Supplemental Brief to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
68-1) is granted. The case is closed. A separate judgment
entry will issue.