Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Geauga
SANDRA L. DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
CHARLES W. DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
from the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 08 DC
1389. Judgment: Affirmed.
Pearce Leary, For Plaintiff-Appellee.
Clifford Thornton, Jr., For Defendant-Appellant.
R. WRIGHT, P.J.
Appellant, Charles W. Davis, appeals the trial court's
June 16, 2017 decision ordering him to pay appellee, Sandra
L. Davis, post-judgment interest following the parties'
divorce. He also appeals the trial court's decision
denying his request to refer Sandra for prosecution based on
her alleged perjury during the hearing on interest. We
The trial court issued its final divorce decree on May 5,
2011, and following Charles' first appeal, we modified
and affirmed the trial court's decision. Davis v.
Davis, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2011-G-3018, 2013-Ohio-211,
In October of 2013, Sandra moved the court for statutory
interest, under R.C. 1343.03, on her unpaid portion of the
marital property division. She sought interest on the unpaid
Smith Barney funds and the remaining balance owed to her on
the equalization payment. Both amounts were to be paid by
August 3, 2011.
The trial court granted Sandra's motion for interest on
May 12, 2014 and noted that the motion was unopposed. This
decision, however, did not determine the amount of interest
More than a year later, on August 24, 2015, Sandra moved to
show cause as to why Charles should not be held in contempt
based on his nonpayment of the interest pursuant to the
court's May 12, 2014 decision. She claimed that Charles
initially owed her $18, 812 in total interest and that she
received one interest payment in the amount of $7, 139.60.
Thus, Sandra sought the interest balance of $11, 672.
In a related entry, issued in November 2016, overruling
Charles' objections to a magistrate's decision, the
trial court limited the parties' arguments at the
upcoming hearing on statutory interest, explaining:
"This Court has already determined that Plaintiff is
entitled to statutory interest on the sums that Defendant was
to pay her. That being said, Defendant is not precluded or
prohibited from presenting evidence as to what he has already
paid Plaintiff, nor is he precluded from presenting evidence
regarding offers of payment that he has made to
Charles opposed Sandra's claimed interest and argued that
he offered Sandra the proceeds of two loans on the
parties' Kinsman property, and had she taken this money,
he would not owe her any additional statutory interest.
Following the December 30, 2016 evidentiary hearing on
interest, the trial court rejected Charles' claim that
his offers to pay Sandra a lump sum at two earlier dates
reduced the amount of statutory interest. Instead, it held he
owed $11, 670.40 in statutory interest.
Charles raises two assigned errors. His first assignment
"The trial court's finding that Appellant did not
make a proper 'tender' to the appellee/wife and
therefore the running of interest was not tolled is error as
it is an abuse of discretion and against the manifest weight
of the evidence."
Charles argues he should not be responsible for this $11,
670.40 interest award because he attempted to pay Sandra
$150, 000 in November of 2010, and had she accepted this
amount in 2010, he would owe no additional interest. He does
not challenge the fact that the trial court awarded interest
and does not otherwise dispute the ...