United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division
M. ROSE DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
L. OVINGTON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Obie Obie Masango brings this case pro se
challenging the actions of Defendant Sinclair Community
Court previously granted Plaintiff's Application to
Proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §
1915. The case is presently before the Court for a sua
sponte review to determine whether Plaintiff's
Complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because
it is frivolous, malicious, or otherwise subject to dismissal
at this early stage of the case. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). If the Complaint raises a claim with an
arguable or rational basis in fact or law, it is neither
frivolous nor malicious, and it may not be dismissed sua
sponte. Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 923-24
(6th Cir. 2008); see Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d
1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). A Complaint has no arguable
factual basis when its allegations are “fantastic or
delusional.” Brand, 526 F.3d at 923 (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989));
see Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. A Complaint has no
arguable legal basis when it presents “indisputably
meritless” legal theories-for example, when the
defendant is immune from suit or when the plaintiff claims a
violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.
See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; see also
Brand, 526 F.3d at 923. The main issue thus presented by
a sua sponte review at this early stage of the case
is “whether [the] complaint makes an arguable legal
claim and is based on rational facts.” Brand,
526 F.3d at 923-24 (citing Lawler, 898 F.2d at
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, ' and
should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams
v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir.
2004)). Nonetheless, pro se plaintiffs must satisfy
basic pleading requirements. Wells v. Brown, 891
F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Specifically, the complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127
S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127
present case, Plaintiff's allegations in his Complaint
Sinclair Community College, February 23[rd], 2018. Curtis
[T]aylor a psychology teacher, Scott Markland Vice president
of student affairs. Misinformation about [vio]lation of
protection order. I was simply waiting to go to my next class
and the person in question (Curtis Taylor) happened to be in
the vi[c]inity. I simply return[ed] a job application that I
simply filled out to a friend. I was unaware that my friend
… was in the person['s] class.
(Doc. #1, PageID #6). On the Civil Cover Sheet,
Plaintiff described his cause as
“Discrimination.” Id. And, although
Plaintiff did not request any relief in his Complaint, he
indicated on the Civil Cover Sheet that his demand was $100,
Plaintiff's allegations liberally in his favor, he seeks
to raise a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“There are two elements to a § 1983 claim. First,
a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acted under color of
state law. Second, a plaintiff must allege that the
defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights
secured under federal law.” Handy-Clay v. City of
Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012)
(citing Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d
718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Sinclair Community College “is a political subdivision
organized pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Chapter 3354 and is
governed by a Board of Trustees empowered by statute to
appoint administrative officers, faculty, and staff.”
Melendez v. Sinclair Cmty. Coll., No. 3:05 CV 338,
2007 WL 81846, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 8, 2007) (Merz, M.J.)
(citing Ohio Revised Code § 3354.09(D) and (J)); see
also Brown v. Strickler, 422 F.2d 1000, 1001 (6th Cir.
1970) (“An institution such as this, serving an
important public function and financed by public funds, is
sufficiently linked with the state for its acts to be subject
to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment.”)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). As a political
subdivision, Defendant Sinclair is a
“‘person' within the meaning of § 1983
and may therefore be sued directly if [it] alleged to have
caused a constitutional tort through a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers.”
Melendez, 2007 WL 81846, at *5 (citing Monell v.
New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690,
98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)).
did not allege that Defendants' policy or custom caused
his injury. Thus, he failed to allege the first element of a
§ 1983 claim.
Plaintiff did not allege that Defendant's conduct
deprived him of a right secured by federal law-the second
element of a § 1983 claim. Indeed, he does not plausibly
allege that any of his rights were violated.
Instead, he claims that Defendant reported
“misinformation” about his accidental violation
of a protective order. This does not implicate any federal
Plaintiff's Complaint has no arguable legal basis and is
subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
IS THEREFORE ...