United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
Y. PEARSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
se Plaintiff Leroy Walton appears to have filed this
action against myriad officials in the state of Georgia.
ECF No. 1. His true intent is unintelligible. The
Complaint is a collage of other documents. While Plaintiff
has also filed two supplements to his complaint, ECF Nos.
2 and 3, none of Plaintiff's pleadings make
coherent allegations or identifiable legal claims. His only
discernible allegation is that the judges named in this
action are corrupt. Plaintiff does not specify the relief he
Standard of Review
pro se pleadings are liberally construed (Boag
v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per
curiam) and Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972)), the Court is required to dismiss an in forma
pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v.
Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v.
City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996).
An action has no arguable basis in law when a defendant is
immune from suit or when a plaintiff claims a violation of a
legal interest which patently does not exist.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable
factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to
the level of the irrational or “wholly
incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,
32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.
determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the Court must construe a complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual
allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint
contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The plaintiff's
obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Id. Although a complaint need not contain detailed
factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level
on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint
are true.” Id. The Court is “not bound
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
286 (1986). The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009), further explains the
“plausibility” requirement, stating that “a
claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore,
“the plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement, ' but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a Defendant acted
unlawfully.” Id. This determination is a
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing
Court to draw on its judicial experience and common
initial matter, the Northern District of Ohio is not the
proper venue for this action. A civil action may be brought
only in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides,
if all defendants reside in the state in which the court is
located, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,
or (3) if there is no district in which an action may
otherwise be brought as provided by this section, any
judicial district in which any Defendant is subject to the
Court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the action
brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). This case has no apparent
connection to the Northern District of Ohio. All of the
parties appear to work and possibly reside in the state of
Georgia. There is no suggestion that events took place in the
NDOH giving rise to this action. It appears that, if the case
alleged a viable cause of action, the Northern District of
Georgia would be the proper venue for it.
that thread, section 1406(a) of Title 28 of the United States
Code provides that an improperly venued action shall be
dismissed unless it is “in the interest of
justice” that it be transferred to a district or
division in which it could have been brought. In this case,
the complaint is composed entirely of clippings from other
documents. It contains no discernible allegations or legal
cause of action. Principles requiring generous construction
of pro se pleadings are not without limits. See
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277
(4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either
direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal
notice pleading requirements. See Schied v. Fanny Farmer
Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir.
courts are not required to conjure up questions never
squarely presented to them or to construct full blown claims
from sentence fragments. Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278.
To do so would “require ...[the courts] to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, ... [and] would...transform the district court
from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Id. at
1278. Even liberally construed, Plaintiff's complaint
does not sufficiently state a claim or claims upon which
Plaintiff intends to base his action. It, therefore, would
not be in the interest of justice to transfer this matter.
Instead, dismissal is proper.
this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e).
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3),
that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good