United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
Magistrate Judge Jolson
OPINION & ORDER
ALGENON L. MARBLEY, Magistrate Judge
matter is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's
Order and Report and Recommendation, recommending that the
Court dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. (ECF No. 3).
Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No.
5). Upon independent review by the Court, and for the reasons
set forth below, Plaintiff's objections are hereby
OVERRULED and the Court
ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation. The complaint is hereby
filed a complaint on January 23, 2017. (ECF No. 1-1). In her
complaint, Plaintiff names one hundred defendants, including
judges, prosecutors, and the former president of the United
States. (Id.). The complaint appears to allege
violations of almost all of the first ten amendments to the
United States Constitution (all but the Third Amendment), as
well as violations of federal statutes including Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.
Additionally, numerous violations of the Ohio Revised Code
are listed in the complaint, alleging infractions such as
discrimination of public accommodation (ORC § 4112.02),
obstruction of justice (§ 2921.32), conspiracy (§
2933.01), accessory to rape (§§ 2907.02, 5924.12),
attempted murder (§ 2903.02), gross sexual imposition
(§ 2907.05), wrongful imprisonment (§ 2743.48),
defamation of character, libel and slander (§ 2739), and
menacing by stalking (§§ 2903.211, 2903.214).
Plaintiff seeks the death penalty for all defendants.
filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which the
Magistrate Judge granted. (ECF Nos. 1, 3). Because Plaintiff
was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Magistrate Judge
conducted an initial screen of the complaint. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Magistrate Judge concluded that
the complaint is frivolous and fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted and thus recommends dismissal.
(ECF No. 3). Plaintiff objected to the Report and
Recommendation on February 14, 2017. (ECF No. 5).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
party objects within the allotted time to a report and
recommendation, the Court “shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which the objection
is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party's objections “must
be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those
issues that are dispositive and contentious.”
Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995)
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted when, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true,
it does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In reviewing
the complaint, the Court is not required to accept as true
mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Generally, a complaint must contain a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In short, a
complaint's factual allegations “must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
se litigant's allegations are held to a less stringent
standard than those in pleadings drafted by attorneys.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Even so,
however, courts are unwilling to “abrogate basic
pleading essentials in pro se suits.” See Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (collecting
cases). Indeed, courts are not required to entertain a pro se
plaintiff's claim that “defies comprehension”
or allegations that amount to nothing more than
“incoherent ramblings.” Roper v. Ford Motor
Co., No. 1:09-cv-427, 2010 WL 2670827, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 6, 2010), report and recommendation adopted,
2010 WL 2670697 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2010) (internal citations
first appears to argue that the Magistrate Judge erred in
finding that the complaint must be dismissed because
Plaintiff is proceeding without payment. (ECF No. 5 at
¶¶ 5, 6). The Magistrate Judge, however, made no
such finding. Rather, the Magistrate Judge stated that
because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must
conduct an initial screen of the Complaint. (ECF No. 3 at 1).
This is a correct statement of the law. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (providing that when plaintiffs seek
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court shall dismiss
the case if it is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a
claim on which relief can be granted). Plaintiff contends
that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) does not apply to her
because she has never been to prison. (ECF No. 5 at ¶
13). Plaintiff's contention that this section of the
statute only applies to prisoners is incorrect. See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 1999, 203 (2007) (“§ 1915(e)(2) is
restricted neither to actions brought by prisoners, nor to
cases involving government defendants.”); see also
Salgado-Toribio v. Holder, 713 F.3d 1267, 1270 (10th
Cir. 2013) (“[W]e apply section 1915(e)'s
“frivolous or malicious” standard to both
prisoner and non-prisoner litigation.”).
the merits of her complaint, Plaintiff contends that the
Magistrate Judge erred in stating that the complaint was not
comprehensible and that Plaintiff need not “prove her
case in the complaint.” (ECF No. 5 at ¶¶ 7,
16). While it is certainly true that she does not have to
prove her case, Plaintiff is required to state enough facts
in her complaint “to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. To satisfy this standard, Plaintiff must “plead
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff pled no factual conduct in the complaint that tied
any of the named one hundred defendants to the alleged
misconduct. She merely lists defendants, lists statutes that
were allegedly violated, and then states that
“people” are stalking her and defaming her
character. (ECF Nos. 1-1, 3). There are no specific factual
allegations linking any of the defendants to any harm or
misconduct. Even under the liberal pleading standards
afforded to pro se litigants, this is insufficient. See
Steen v. Detroit Police Dep't, 9th Precinct, 996
F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Although a pro se complaint
must be held to a less stringent standard than that prepared
by an attorney. . . the less stringent standard does not