United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division
Michael R. Barrett United States District Judge
matter is before the Court on the magistrate judge's
October 5, 2017 report and recommendation (Doc. 14), which
converts Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(Doc. 12) into motion for summary judgment, and recommends
that the Motion be granted in part and denied in part. On
October 19, 2017, Plaintiff timely filed objections. (Doc.
15). Despite an opportunity to do so, Defendants did not file
a response. This matter is now ripe for review.
magistrate judge summarized the factual background and
procedural history of this case, which will not be restated
here, except as necessary to address Plaintiff's
objections. In sum, however, Plaintiff alleges discrimination
under Title VII and the ADEA. In recommending partial
judgment in favor of Defendants, the magistrate judge
reviewed all relevant exhibits submitted by both parties, and
concluded that the applicable statutes of limitation bar most
- but not all - of Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. 14; PageID
373). The magistrate judge concluded that, based on when the
Plaintiff filed her claims with the EEOC, “any
discriminatory acts that occurred prior to November 27, 2015
would be time-barred under Title VII and the ADEA.”
(Id.) The magistrate judge observed that
“[e]ven on its face, Plaintiff's complaint makes
clear that most of the events of which she complains occurred
not mere days, but years” prior to November
2015. (Id.) (emphasis added).
the magistrate judge issued the following recommendation to
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Defendants'
construed motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's
claims be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART. All claims relating to Plaintiffs' 1993
termination, all claims relating to the City's failure to
promote her throughout her employment, and all claims
alleging discriminatory terms and conditions of her
employment should be dismissed as time-barred except for
Plaintiff's “failure to promote” claims
alleging race and age discrimination based upon the
City's failure to promote Plaintiff to positions for
which Plaintiff submitted applications on or after November
27, 2015. Discovery shall continue to proceed only on the
specified failure-to-promote claims. Additionally, IT
IS RECOMMENDED THAT all claims against individual
Defendants Black and Kelly, and Plaintiff's hostile work
environment claims, be DISMISSED for failure
to state any claim.
asks this Court to reject the foregoing recommendation.
Court shall consider objections to a magistrate judge's
order on a non-dispositive matter and “shall modify or
set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's order
found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). When objections to a magistrate
judge's report and recommendation are received on a
dispositive matter, the assigned district judge “must
determine de novo any part of the magistrate
judge's disposition that has been properly objected
to.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). After review, the district
judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
decision; receive further evidence; or return the matter to
the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.;
see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
district judge's review of objections to a report and
recommendation should not be duplicative. Howard v.
Sec'y of H.H.S., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
“Merely restating arguments previously presented,
stating a disagreement with a magistrate judge's
suggested resolution, or simply summarizing what has been
presented before is not a specific objection that alerts the
district court to the alleged errors on the part of the
magistrate judge.” Renchen v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29910 at *3-4 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 11, 2015) (citing Howard, 932 F.2d at 508-09).
has submitted objections reiterating, in detail, the alleged
facts underlying her claims. However, she offers little in
terms of a specific objection to the magistrate
judge's computation of the statute of limitations.
Without supporting authority, Plaintiff argues that
“the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Wage Act is an amendment
under Title VII that gives credence that I may be made whole
after years of repeated discrimination in many forms.”
(Doc. 15; PageID 382). The foregoing objection arguably
concedes that the alleged discriminatory acts occurred
“years” ago. Furthermore, Plaintiff's
reliance on the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 is
misplaced. The magistrate judge already concluded - and the
undersigned agrees - that Plaintiff's reference to the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 does not save her Title
VII and ADEA claims (i.e., the only claims set forth in the
complaint). (Doc. 14; ...