United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
WALTER E. REYES, Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, MADISON CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JOHN R
. ADAMS U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
This
action is before the Court upon objections filed by
Petitioner Walter R. Reyes (“Petitioner”)
asserting error in the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”). (Doc. #30).
Petitioner makes no objection to the recommendations that his
motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. #23) and for the Entry of
Default (Doc. #27) be denied. Accordingly, the Court will
adopt the R&R as to both motions. Petitioner's Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 23) and his Motion for the Entry
of Default (Doc. # 27) are DENIED.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner
does not object to the factual background and procedural
history presented in the R&R. In the absence of
objection, the Court adopts the factual and procedural
history in the Report as written.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motions
made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are governed by the
standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).
AEDPA prescribes a narrow habeas corpus remedy only
where a State court adjudication has resulted in (1) “a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, ” or
(2) a “decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d). AEDPA further limits “clearly established
Federal law” to those principles “determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (d)(1). For the purposes of habeas
review after AEDPA, “clearly established Federal
law” refers to the express holdings of the United
States Supreme Court “as opposed to the dicta” of
that Court's decisions at “the time of the relevant
state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 365 (2000).
When
evaluating a § 2254 petition, this Court notes that
AEDPA and decisional law applying its restrictions have
clearly stated that a district court may not “apply its
own views of what the law should be” but must issue a
writ only where “clearly established federal law”
has been applied unreasonably, not merely
erroneously or incorrectly. Bailey v. Mitchell, 271
F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court reiterates:
If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was
meant to be. As amended by AEDPA, § 2254 (d) stops short
of imposing a complete bar on federal-court relitigation of
claims already rejected in state proceedings. It preserves
authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no
possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state
court's decision conflicts with [the United States
Supreme Court's] precedents. It goes no further. Section
2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a
‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems, ' not a substitute for ordinary
error correction through appeal.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)
(citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit explains:
A state court decision is ‘contrary to' clearly
established Federal law ‘if the state court arrives at
a conclusion opposite to that reached by [U.S. Supreme Court]
on a question of law, ' or ‘if the state court
confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
relevant [U.S.] Supreme Court precedent' and arrives at a
different result. A state court decision is an
‘unreasonable application of' clearly established
Federal law ‘if the state court correctly identifies
the correct governing legal rule from [U.S. Supreme
Court's] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts
of the particular state prisoner's case. An
‘unreasonable application' can also occur where
‘the state court either unreasonably extends a legal
principle from [the U.S. Supreme Court's] precedent to a
new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses
to extend that principle to a new context where it should
apply.
Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir.
2005) (internal citations omitted).
Where,
as here, a party files written objections to the report and
recommendation issued by the magistrate judge, this Court
“shall make” a de novo
“determination of those portions of the record or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). Only
those portions of a report and recommendation to which the
parties have made an objection are subject to review. Absent
an objection, this Court may adopt the magistrate's
report without review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 145 (1985). With regard
to those portions of the Report and Recommendation under
review, this Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1).
The
Magistrate Judge Act (28 U.S.C. § 636 et seq.)
“does not allow parties to raise at the district court
stage new arguments or issues that were not presented to the
magistrate.” Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d
895, 907 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Clark v.
U.S., 764 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2014) and Enyart v.
Coleman, 29 F.Supp.3d 1059 (N.D. Ohio 2014). Thus, this
Court's review is predicated on a proper objection to the
Magistrate's evaluation of the issues presented to the
Magistrate. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72 (b)(3) (“The district
judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate
judge's disposition that has been properly objected
to.”) It is incumbent upon the party seeking relief to
file objections “which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such
objections.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72 (b)(3). “An
‘objection' that does nothing more than state a
disagreement with a magistrate's suggested resolution or
simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an
‘objection' as that term is used in this
context.” Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F.Supp.2d 743,
747 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (citing U.S. v. Walters, 638
F.2d. 947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981)).
III.
...