United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
Judge, Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Shane Dale Brown, a pro se prisoner, initially
brought this action against Eric D. Holbrook and the Ohio
State Highway Patrol on February 28, 2018. (See Doc.
1-2). In its March 2, 2018 Order, the Court granted
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma
pauperis. (Doc. 2). The Court was unable to conduct an
initial screen of the Complaint at that time, however,
because Plaintiff attached two exhibits totaling more than
100 pages, rather than providing any factual allegations in
what he titled his Complaint. (Id.). Pursuant to the
Court's Order (id.), Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint on March 19, 2018, against only Defendant Holbrook.
performed an initial screen of the Amended Complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), and for the reasons that
follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court
DISMISS this action under § 1915(e)(2)
for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis
(see Docs. 1, 2), the Court must dismiss the
Complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a
complaint to set forth “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” In reviewing a complaint, the Court must
construe it in Plaintiff's favor, accept all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). On the other hand, a
complaint that consists of “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action” is insufficient.
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Although pro se complaints are to be construed
liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972), “basic pleading essentials” are still
required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th
alleges in his Amended Complaint that on August 28, 2015, he
was pulled over in a traffic stop by Officer Eric Holbrook.
(Doc. 4 at 1). During the course of that stop, Plaintiff
[he] was tased and placed in hand restraints behind my back,
while in restraints and in custody of Officer Holbrook
Plaintiff was assaulted and severely beaten up by Officer
Holbrook with multiple injuries, Officer Holbrook did
maliciously and sadistically try to hurt Plaintiff and did in
fact cause permanent damage physically, mentally, and
emotionally to Plaintiff which was the result of cruel and
unusual punishment violating Plaintiff's eighth
(Id. at 1-2). Plaintiff also alleges that following
his arrest, the Franklin County Jail refused to book
Plaintiff because of his injuries. (Id. at 2).
Plaintiff was subsequently admitted to Grant Medical
seeks $300, 000 in relief for pain and suffering and asks
that “Officer Holbrook be held responsible for his
actions on August 28, 2015.” (Id. at 2-3).
initial matter, Plaintiff appears to be alleging that
Defendant Holbrook violated his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment when Defendant
Holbrook used excessive force against him. However, because
the alleged misconduct by Defendant Holbrook occurred prior
to Plaintiff's conviction, the Eighth Amendment was not
implicated. See Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041,
1049 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that because “the alleged
misconduct occurred prior to Plaintiff's conviction, the
Eighth Amendment was not implicated”); see also
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n. 40 (1977)
(“[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with
which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has
secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due
process of law”). Interpreting Plaintiff's
complaint liberally, however, the undersigned construes
Plaintiff's claim as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive
force claim. See Todd v. City of Zanesville Police
Dep't, No. 2:05-CV-1076, 2006 WL 1027756 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 19, 2006).
statute of limitations applicable to a § 1983 action is
determined by reference to state law, while the date on which
the statute of limitations begins to run is governed by
federal law.” Wheeler v. Dayton Police
Dep't, No. 12-4029, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 26373, *3
(6th Cir. Mar. 15, 2013) (citing Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)); Eidson v. Tenn. Dep't of
Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir.
2007)). The statute of limitations for a § 1983 civil
action arising in Ohio is contained in Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2305.10, “which requires that actions for bodily
injury be filed within two years after their accrual.”
Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir.
1989). “Ordinarily, such a period begins to run when
the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that
is the basis of his action.” See Wheeler, 2013
U.S. App. LEXIS ...