United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 26). Also pending is Defendant
American Honda Motor Co., Inc.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 27). This case arises out of plaintiff's
purchase of a vehicle. For the reasons that follow, the
motions are DENIED, with the exception of defendant's
motion as it pertains to count four. Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment with respect to that count.
Naser Danan filed this lawsuit against American Honda Motor
Co., Inc., alleging that the vehicle he purchased is
defective. The facts of this case are largely undisputed.
August of 2013, plaintiff purchased a 2013 Acura
At the time of purchase the vehicle's odometer registered
380 miles. The vehicle is subject to a manufacturer's
warranty. Plaintiff purchased the vehicle for a total sales
price of $58, 783.11. Shortly after receiving the vehicle,
plaintiff noticed that various internal lighting features
would not illuminate and the heated seats would not function.
Plaintiff contacted the dealership and brought the vehicle in
for service. Defendant discovered that a blown fuse and
pinched wire were the source of the electrical problems.
September 6, 2013, plaintiff brought the vehicle to the
dealership to address intermittent rattling and ticking
noises, as well as vibrations from the vehicle's roof and
rear tail gate area. In addition, plaintiff indicated that
the head lights intermittently turned on during the day when
the headlights were set to “auto.” During the
test drive, the technicians were able to confirm the noises,
which occurred at highway speeds. The technicians made
various repairs and conducted several test drives of the
vehicle. The noises, however, continued. Ultimately, after
additional repairs, the repair records show that the nosie
following week, plaintiff returned to the dealer for a
ticking noise from the roof area. The dealer confirmed the
noise and determined that a stripped screw existed at the
license plate garnish. The vehicle was repaired and the
technician did not hear the noise after the repair.
November 1, 2013, plaintiff brought the vehicle in for a
rattle emanating from the moonroof area. In addition, certain
weatherstripping needed to be replaced. During a test drive
with the customer, the rattle could not be duplicated. The
dealer, however, replaced the weatherstripping.
following month, plaintiff returned to the dealer because of
the rattling noise. The dealer test drove the vehicle on a
number of occasions. It appears that out of five test drives,
the rattle was heard only once. No. repairs were made.
March 10, 2014, plaintiff brought the vehicle in because of
noises coming from the sunroof while driving over bumps. In
addition, the dome lights and homelink system were not
functioning. The dealer replaced a fuse and the lights and
homelink system worked. During a test drive of the vehicle,
the dealer confirmed various noises coming from the moonroof.
A new moonroof assembly was installed and, according to the
invoice, the noise ceased and was not detected upon further
two weeks later, however, the dome light and homelink system
again became inoperable. The dealer determined there was a
short in the system and performed repairs.
these repairs occurred during the first year of ownership.
During this time, the vehicle was out for service for over
forty days. The noise continues to exist today. Plaintiff
took the vehicle to a different authorized dealer at least
twice and, on both occasions, the technicians verified
plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff nonetheless drove the
vehicle for nearly 40, 000 miles during the forty-one month
period after purchase.
plaintiff filed this lawsuit in state court. Plaintiff later
dismissed that case and refiled the matter here. The
complaint contains four claims for relief. Count one is a
claim for violation of Ohio's lemon law, O.R.C. §
1345.72, and count two is a claim for violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”). Count three
is a claim for breach of warranty and count four asserts a
claim for “revocation of acceptance.” The parties
cross-move on all claims and each opposes the other's
Judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-23 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)); see also
LaPointe v. UAW, Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.
1993). The burden of showing the absence of any such genuine
issues of material facts rests with the moving party:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, ” if any,
which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)). A fact is “material only if its resolution will
affect the outcome of the lawsuit.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accordingly,
the nonmoving party must present “significant probative
evidence” to demonstrate that “there is [more
than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8
F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir.1993). The nonmoving party may not
simply rely on its pleading, but must “produce evidence
that results in a conflict of material fact to be solved by a
jury.” Cox v. Kentucky Dep't. of Transp.,
53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995).
evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may permissibly
be drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992). However, “[t]he mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
judgment should be granted if a party who bears the burden of
proof at trial does not establish an essential element of his
case. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937,
941 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322). Moreover, if the evidence is “merely
colorable” and not “significantly probative,
” the court may decide the legal issue and grant
summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50
Count one (lemon law claim)
count one, plaintiff asserts a claim for violation of O.R.C.
§1345.72, which provides in relevant part:
Duty to repair nonconforming new motor vehicles;
consumer's options when repairs unsuccessful.
(A) If a new motor vehicle does not conform to any applicable
express warranty and the consumer reports the nonconformity
to the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer
during the period of one year following the date of original
delivery or during the first eighteen thousand miles of
operation, whichever is earlier, the manufacturer...shall
make any repairs as are necessary to conform the vehicle to
such express warranty....
event the manufacturer is unable to conform the vehicle to
the warranty, the consumer may opt for a new vehicle or
return the vehicle for a refund plus incidental damages.
O.R.C. § 1345.72(B). The statute defines
“nonconformity” to mean “any defect or
condition that substantially impairs the use, value, or
safety of a motor vehicle to the consumer and does not