United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
L. LITKOVITZ, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
an inmate at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF)
in Lucasville, Ohio, brings this action against numerous SOCF
officials alleging Eighth Amendment failure to protect and
denial of medical care claims. (Docs. 7, 31). This matter is
before the Court on plaintiffs motions for a preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order (Docs. 51, 52) and
defendants' memorandum in opposition (Doc. 54).
seeks an injunction to prohibit prison officials from
harassing or retaliating against him by spraying him with
pepper spray; refusing to investigate his complaints and
grievances; failing to secure his safety during group
movements of RTU inmates; interfering with his outgoing mail;
restricting his access to the grievance system; failing to
provide medical care following the administration of pepper
spray by prison officials and injuries sustained from an
October 7, 2017 attack by a fellow inmate; delaying his
access to his CPAP machine after cell moves; charging him
co-pays for his various medical conditions; restricting his
access to recreation and the dining hall; and restricting his
access to grooming supplies. (Doc. 51, 52).
determining whether to issue a temporary restraining
order/preliminary injunction, this Court must balance the
1. Whether the party seeking the injunction has shown a
"strong" likelihood of success on the merits;
2. Whether the party seeking the injunction will suffer
irreparable harm absent the injunction;
3. Whether an injunction will cause others to suffer
substantial harm; and
4. Whether the public interest would be served by a
Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov., 305
F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Leary v.
Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000)). The four
factors are not prerequisites, but must be balanced as part
of a decision to grant or deny injunctive relief. Id.;
Leary, 228 F.3d at 736. "[A] district court is not
required to make specific findings concerning each of the
four factors used in determining a motion for preliminary
injunction if fewer factors are dispositive of the
issue." Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474,
476 (6th Cir. 2003). When a prisoner requests an order
enjoining a state prison official, the Court must
"proceed with caution and due deference to the unique
nature of the prison setting." White v. Corr. Med.
Servs., No. 1:08-cv-277, 2009 WL 529082, at *2 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 2, 2009) (citing Kendrick v. Bland, 740
F.2d 432, 438 n. 3 (6th Cir. 1984); Ward v. Dyke, 58
F.3d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 1995)). In deciding if a preliminary
injunction is warranted, the Court must "weigh carefully
the interests on both sides." Lang v. Thompson,
No. 5:10-cv-379-HRW, 2010 WL 4962933, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Nov.
30, 2010) (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922, 931 (1975)). A preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy that should only be granted if the
movant carries his burden of proving that the circumstances
clearly demand it. Leary, 228 F.3d at 739.
is not entitled to a preliminary injunction in this matter.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the
relative positions of the parties until proceedings on the
merits can be conducted. University of Texas v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); see also
Southern Milk Sales, Inc. v. Martin, 924 F.2d 98, 102
(6th Cir. 1991). Thus, "a party moving for a preliminary
injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between
the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct
asserted in the complaint." Colvin v. Caruso,
605 F.3d 282, 300 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v.
Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)).
"This is because '[t]he purpose of interim equitable
relief is to protect the movant, during the pendency of the
action, from being harmed or further harmed in the manner in
which the movant contends [he] was or will be harmed through
the illegality alleged in the complaint.'"
Colvin, 605 F.3d at 300 (quoting Omega World
Travel, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, 111 F.3d 14, 16
(4th Cir. 1997)). A court may not grant a preliminary
injunction when the issues raised in the motion are entirely
different from those raised in the complaint. See
Kaimowitz v. Orlando, 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997);
Omega World Travel, Inc., 111 F.3d at 16;
Stewart v. United States Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 193, 198-99 (2d Cir.
seeks injunctive relief unrelated to the merits of the claims
alleged in his first amended complaint. Rather, he seeks
injunctive relief based on new claims against some 50 new
defendants which are set forth in his motion for leave to
file a second amended complaint and supplemental complaint
(Doc. 48). The undersigned, by Report and Recommendation
dated November 20, 2017, recommended that plaintiffs second
motion for leave to file second amended and supplemental
complaints be denied because, inter alia, they are based on
factual allegations and defendants unrelated to the merits of
the claims in the first amended complaint. (Doc. 53). A
motion for TRO/preliminary injunctive relief is not the
proper method for plaintiff "to use in an attempt to
address other issues unrelated to his original
complaint." Hendricks v. Hazzard, No. 2:1
l-CV-399, 2013 WL 2635729, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2013)
(Report and Recommendation) (Kemp, M.J.), adopted,
2013 WL 5944082, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2013). Rather,
[t]he purpose of such relief "is simply to preserve the
status quo." United States v. Edward Rose &
Sons,384 F.3d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 2004); see
University ofTexas v. Camenisch,451 U.S. 390,
395 (1981); Tennessee Scrap Recyclers Ass 'n v.
Bredesen,556 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009). The
availability of a TRO or preliminary injunction is
inextricably intertwined with the merits of the underlying
claim. For this reason, one of the principal factors in
determining a plaintiffs entitlement to relief is the
likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits of
his underlying claims. See United States v. Contents of
Accounts,629 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2011). Hence, a
party seeking a preliminary injunction must show a
relationship between the irreparable injury claimed in the
motion and the claims pending in the complaint. See
Colvin v. Caruso,605 F.3d 282, 298 (6th Cir. 2010). A
motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction is not the means
by which a plaintiff already in court on one claim can seek
redress for all other conditions of confinement that he finds
actionable. Arrington v. Scott, [No. 12-cv-529],
2013 WL 1080298 (W.D. Mich. January 7, 2013). Strictly
interpreted, [the plaintiffs] ...