United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
OPINION AND ORDER
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
se Petitioner William Andrew Wright has filed a
“Motion for Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
” seeking relief from his federal sentence. (Doc. No.
1.) The matter is before the Court for initial screening.
See 28 U.S.C. §2243; Alexander v. Northern
Bureau of Prisons, 419 Fed.Appx. 544, 545 (6th Cir.
2011). Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts (made applicable
to Section 2241 petitions under Rule 1(b)), the Court must
dismiss the Petition “if it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief.” See also Allen v. Perini,
424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (the district
court has “a duty to screen out a habeas
corpus petition which should be dismissed for lack of
merit on its face.”).
reasons stated below, the Court finds that the Petition must
be summarily dismissed.
asserts he was sentenced before the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland on March 7, 2007, to a
term of 180 months imprisonment. His conviction was based on
a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), Possession of a
Firearm by a Convicted Felon. His sentence in part reflected
the District Court's determination that he qualified as
an Armed Career Criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),
based on prior drug convictions in the State of Maryland.
did not file a direct appeal. In July 2015, he filed a Motion
to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his Sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, asserting that his counsel was ineffective and
that his armed career criminal sentence enhancement was
invalid in light of Descamps v. United States, 133
S.Ct. 2276 (2013). The District Court denied this Motion on
June 8, 2017.
now seeks relief from his enhanced sentence under §
federal prisoner wishes to challenge the legality of his
conviction or sentence, he must do so by filing a motion for
post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123
(6th Cir. 2003). A habeas corpus petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is only “appropriate for
claims challenging the execution or manner in which the
sentence is served, ” such as claims challenging
computation of sentence credits or determining terms of
parole. United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461
(6th Cir. 2001); Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d
442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009). Section 2255 contains a
limited “savings clause, ” 28 U.S.C. §
2255(e), that allows a prisoner to bring a § 2241 claim
challenging the legality of his conviction or sentence in the
extraordinarily narrow circumstances where a prisoner can
show that the remedy afforded under § 2255 is
“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.” In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 929
(6th Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit has regularly
indicated that the narrow scope of relief under the savings
clause does not apply to sentencing claims. See Jones v.
Castillo, 489 Fed.Appx. 864, 866, 2012 WL 2947933, at *1
(6th Cir. 2012) (“[c]laims alleging
“actual innocence” of a sentencing enhancement
cannot be raised under § 2241”); see also
Reminsky v. U.S., 523 Fed.Appx. 327, 329 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“The savings clause of § 2255(e) does not apply
to sentencing claims.”).
the Sixth Circuit held that a prisoner may raise a
sentence-enhancement claim in a § 2241 petition in very
limited circumstances. See Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d
591 (6th Cir. 2016). The Hill Court
expressly defined those circumstances as
a narrow subset of § 2241 petitions: (1) prisoners who
were sentenced under the mandatory guidelines regime
pre-United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct.
738, 160 L.Ed. 621 (2005), (2) who are foreclosed from filing
a successive petition under § 2255, and (3) when a
subsequent, retroactive change in statutory interpretation by
the Supreme Court reveals that a previous conviction is not a
predicate offense for a career-offender enhancement.
Id. at 599-600.
circumstances articulated in Hill do not apply here.
Petitioner was not sentenced under the mandatory guidelines
regime pre-United States v. Booker. He was sentenced
in 2007, after Booker was decided. Further,
Petitioner has not identified a new law that the Supreme
Court has held applies retroactively to invalidate his
sentence on ...