Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Towne Auto Sales, LLC v. Tobsal Corp.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

November 14, 2017




         This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Bank of America's (“BANA”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF DKT #20) Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Defendant's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.


         According to its Second Amended Complaint (ECF DKT #15), Plaintiff Towne Auto Sales, LLC (“Towne”) is an Ohio limited liability company in the business of buying and selling pre-owned vehicles. On or about November 5, 2015, Plaintiff negotiated with Defendant Tobias Trucks for the purchase of a 1958 Corvette. As a result of this negotiation, Towne wired $27, 050 from its Chase Bank account to a BANA account believed to be that of Tobias. The listed account holder, however, was Tobsal Corporation (“Tobsal”). Towne's President, Mark Powers, called BANA's customer service line to inform a representative that he believed something fraudulent was occurring. Although he instructed the representative not to process the wire transaction, BANA processed it the following day. Tobias subsequently failed to deliver the vehicle to Towne.

         Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint also alleges that Sergejs Traskovs, the purported President of Tobsal, opened a bank account at BANA on October 23, 2015 with the assistance of Suzel Yapor, a BANA employee. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint asserts that Yapor and BANA negligently allowed Traskovs to open the account; and in doing so, violated the Bank Secrecy Act and the Patriot Act.


         A. Legal Standard

         When presented with a motion to dismiss, the Court must test the sufficiency of the complaint and determine whether “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them liberally in favor of the plaintiff, the complaint fails to allege ‘enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashmus v. Bay Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62208 (N.D. Ohio 2007), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). Claims alleged in the complaint must be “plausible, ” not merely “conceivable.” Id. Dismissal is warranted if the complaint lacks an allegation as to a necessary element of the claim raised. Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1990).

         B. Jurisdiction

         While personal jurisdiction flows from the Due Process Clause, the requirement may be waived by the actions of the defendant. Days Inns Worldwide, Inc v. Patel, 445 F.3d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant waived its ability to raise a defense for lack of jurisdiction in its Motion (ECF DKT #20) in response to the Second Amended Complaint because Defendant did not raise this defense in its previous Motion to Dismiss (ECF DKT #5). “Although . . . an amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and becomes the operative pleading in the case, the filing of an amended complaint does not automatically revive all defenses or objections that the defendant may have waived in response to the initial complaint.” Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 654 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h), a party waives the right to contest personal jurisdiction by failing to assert the defense in a responsive pleading or by making a general appearance. Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). However, a party is not entirely barred from raising such defenses in the event of an amended complaint. The Krinsk court stated that a defendant may raise defenses, which otherwise would have been barred, when the amended complaint changes the theory or scope of the case. Krinsk, 654 F.3d at 1202.

         Defendant argues that Plaintiff changed the theory of the case when it filed the Second Amended Complaint, which included allegations of a phone call made by Towne's President to a BANA representative. Defendant claims that by adding an allegation that BANA assumed a duty owed to Plaintiff based upon this conversation, Plaintiff changed its theory of liability by changing the source of Defendant's duty to Plaintiff, thus allowing a defense based upon lack of personal jurisdiction to be raised. However, despite the new allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, both the theory and the scope of the case remain the same. In Krinsk, the amended complaint changed the definition of the class, increasing its size from hundreds to potentially tens of thousands of members. Id. at 1199-1203. The court stated that this change in the potential putative class sufficiently changed the scope of litigation to allow defendant to rescind its previous waiver. Id. at 1204. BANA points out, in reply to Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition, that it has participated in this litigation for far less time than the defendant in Krinsk, where the court found no waiver. See Def.'s Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss p. 4. However, the court in Krinsk specifically relied on the expansion of the potential class (i.e., the expansion of the theory and scope of the case) as the basis for reviving defendant's affirmative defense for lack of jurisdiction. Krinsk, 654 F.3d at 1204. Here, no additional claims have been alleged. Nor have any claims been amended that would subject BANA to broader potential liability than was claimed in the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint added allegations of a telephone conversation between Towne's President and a BANA employee in support of its claim for negligence under the theory that this conversation resulted in a duty owed by BANA. The argument remains that BANA breached a duty owed to Plaintiff. Importantly, at this stage detailed factual allegations are not necessary. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Since neither the scope nor the theory of the case has changed as a result of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Defendant cannot raise a defense for lack of personal jurisdiction having waived it by failing to present the defense in a prior motion. As such, jurisdiction over Defendant BANA in this court is proper and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied as it relates to lack of jurisdiction.

         C. Negligence (Count IV)

         In Ohio, a claim for negligence requires “the existence of a duty on the part of the one sued not to subject the [one seeking recovery] to the injury complained of, a failure to observe such duty, and an injury resulting proximately therefrom.” Feldman v. Howard, 10 Ohio St. 2d 189, 193, 226 N.E.2d 564, 567 (1967). “Ohio follows the prevailing rule that a bank owes no duty to a person who is neither a customer nor an account-holder.” Driessen v. Woodforest Nat. Bank, 940 F.Supp.2d 584, 590 (S.D. Ohio 2013). In Driessen, as here, the defendant bank owed no duty to the plaintiff since there was no evidence showing any relationship between the two parties. Id. at 591. In this case, Plaintiff was a customer of Chase Bank, not of Defendant. (Pl. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 15). Defendant, therefore, owed no duty to Plaintiff, a non-customer.

         Plaintiff contends that BANA assumed a duty as a result of a telephone conversation that Plaintiff's President, Mark Powers, had with a BANA customer service representative. The breach of this assumed contractual duty, the argument goes, is the foundation for a claim for negligence. However, the Second Amended Complaint does not sufficiently state allegations which ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.