United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
RICHARD E. ENYART, Plaintiff,
RON O'BRIEN, et al., Defendants.
C. Smith, Judge
INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
a state inmate under the supervision of the Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and correction, brings this prisoner civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 &
16.) This matter is before the Court sua sponte for
an initial screen of Plaintiff's Complaint as required by
28 U.S.C. § 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to
recommend dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, or any
portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Having performed the initial screen,
for the reasons that follow, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Court
DISMISS this Plaintiff's claims against
Defendants for failure to assert any claim over which this
Court has subject matter jurisdiction.
has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of
complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief maybe
granted. 2 8 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff
must be “liberally construed” and “held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, the
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007));
see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th
Cir. 2010) (“dismissal standard articulated in
Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for
failure to state a claim” under §§
1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
federal court has limited subject matter jurisdiction.
“The basic statutory grants of federal court
subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. §
1331, which provides for ‘[f]ederal-question'
jurisdiction, and § 1332, which provides for
‘[d]iversity of citizenship' jurisdiction.”
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006).
Federal-question jurisdiction is invoked when a plaintiff
pleads a claim “arising under” the federal laws,
the Constitution, or treaties of the United States.
Id. (citation omitted). For a federal court to have
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332(a), there
must be complete diversity, which means that each plaintiff
must be a citizen of a different state than each defendant,
and the amount in controversy must exceed $75, 000.
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
to the Complaint, Defendants were involved in various
capacities with searches of Plaintiff's residence and
Plaintiff's subsequent arrest, police interrogation, and
prosectution in 2007. (ECF No. 1 at 4-.11) Plaintiff argues
that Defendants' actions violated his rights under the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution. (Id. at 12-21.) Plaintiff
seeks various declaratory judgments; nominal, compensatory,
and punitive damages against all defendants; and, an award of
costs and fees. (Id. at 24.)
A. Statute of Limitations
purports to bring his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Id. at 2.) The statute of limitations applicable to
claims arising in Ohio under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the
two-year statute of limitations found in Ohio Revised Code
§ 2305.10. Boddie v. Barstow, No. 2:14-CV-0106,
2014 WL 2611321, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 2, 2014), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:14-CV-106, 2014 WL 2608123
(S.D. Ohio June 11, 2014) (citing Browning v.
Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1989)).
the statute of limitations is normally an affirmative defense
that must be raised by defendants in an answer, if the
limitations bar appears on the face of the complaint, the
Court may apply it during the initial screening
process.” Boddie, 2014 WL 2611321, at *3
(citing Watson v. Wayne County, 90 F. App'x.
814, at *1 (6th Cir. January 26, 2004)) (“If a statute
of limitations defense clearly appears on the face of a
pleading, the district court can raise the issue sua
sponte”). This Court has applied that rule in
cases screened under § 1915A. Id. (citing
Smith v. Warren County Sherif's Dept., 2010 WL
761894 (S.D. Ohio March 2, 2010)). Accordingly, the Court
must look to the allegations in the Complaint to determine
whether the action has been filed within the applicable
it is clear that all of the conduct alleged in the Complaint
occurred prior to the applicable two-year period. The alleged
actions took place ten years ago, between August and January
2008. (ECF No. 1). The Undersigned, therefore, recommends
that the Complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim
on which relief may be granted.
Habeas Corpus Claims
purports to bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To
the extent that Plaintiff seeks an order declaring that his
state court conviction was obtained in violation of his
rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution,
however, Plaintiff must proceed by filing a petition for writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A civil rights
action is not a substitute for habeas corpus. When a prisoner
challenges the fact or duration of his confinement, his sole
federal remedy is habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 787 (1994); Skinner v. Switzer, 562
U.S. 521, 525 (2011) (“Habeas is the exclusive remedy .
. . for a prisoner who seeks immediate or speedier release
from confinement.”). A convicted criminal defendant
cannot bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a
judgment on the claim “would necessarily imply the
invalidity” of his criminal conviction and that
conviction has not been set aside. Heck, 512 U.S. at
487. Here, Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgments that his
Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated
during evidentiary searches, his arrest, ...