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State v. Eversole

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Van Wert

November 6, 2017

STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
SANDRA K. EVERSOLE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

         Appeal from Van Wert County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR-16-07-072

          Blaise Katter for Appellant.

          John Hatcher for Appellee.

          OPINION

          PRESTON, P.J.

         {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Sandra K. Eversole ("Eversole"), appeals the March 8, 2017 judgment entry of sentence of the Van Wert County Common Pleas Court. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

         {¶2} On May 14, 2016, Officer Adam F. Wehage ("Officer Wehage") of the Van Wert City Police Department initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle operated by Eversole after Officer Wehage observed Eversole commit a marked-lanes violation while travelling on Westwood Drive in Van Wert, Ohio. (Nov. 29, 2016 Tr. at 14, 17-18). Following field-sobriety tests, Eversole was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs ("OVI"). (Id. at 20-24). Officer Wehage secured Eversole with handcuffs and placed her in the rear-passenger compartment of his patrol vehicle. (Id. at 24). While Eversole was handcuffed in the rear-passenger compartment of Officer Wehage's patrol vehicle, Officer Wehage searched Eversole's vehicle "for evidence of narcotics use" because he "believed she was under the influence of drugs or narcotics." (Id.). Officer Wehage found drugs and drug paraphernalia inside Eversole's purse. (Id. at 25).

         {¶3} On July 8, 2016, the Van Wert County Grand Jury indicted Eversole on one count of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(6)(a), a fifth-degree felony, with an automobile-forfeiture specification. (Doc. No. 3).[1] Eversole appeared for arraignment on October 24, 2016 and entered a plea of not guilty. (Doc. No. 13).

         {¶4} On November 1, 2016, Eversole filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 17). Specifically, Eversole requested that the heroin found from the search of her vehicle be suppressed. (Id.). In her motion to suppress, Eversole argued that it was unreasonable for Officer Wehage to search her vehicle incident to her arrest for OVI for evidence of that offense based on Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009). (Id.).[2] In Gant, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that "[p]olice may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." Gant at syllabus. The trial court held a hearing on Eversole's motion to suppress evidence on November 29, 2016. (Nov. 29, 2016 Tr. at 12); (Doc. No. 30). The State filed its memorandum in opposition to Eversole's motion to suppress evidence on December 12, 2016. (Doc. No. 27). On December 22, 2016, Eversole filed her response to the State's memorandum in opposition to her motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 28). The trial court denied Eversole's motion to suppress evidence on January 10, 2017. (Doc. No. 30).

         {¶5} On January 25, 2017, Eversole withdrew her plea of not guilty and entered a no-contest plea. (Doc. Nos. 33, 34). In exchange for her change of plea, the State agreed to dismiss the automobile-forfeiture specification.[3] (Doc. No. 33). On January 27, 2017, the trial court accepted Eversole's no-contest plea and found her guilty. (Doc. No. 34).

         {¶6} On March 8, 2017, the trial court sentenced Eversole to five years of community control. (Doc. No. 37).

         {¶7} Eversole filed her notice of appeal on April 5, 2017. (Doc. No. 51). She raises one assignment of error for our review.

         Assignment of Error

         The Trial Court Erred by Overruling the Motion to Suppress.

         {¶8} In her assignment of error, Eversole argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the heroin as evidence. Eversole argues that the search of her vehicle resulting in discovery of the heroin was conducted without a warrant and not pursuant to any exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. Relying on Gant, 556 U.S. 332, Eversole makes two arguments on appeal. First, she argues that the trial court erred by concluding "that the search incident to arrest warrant exception applied to a stated policy of searching every vehicle of every OVI arrest, for evidence of additional crimes without any objective connection or nexus to the vehicle." (Appellant's Brief at 3). Second, she argues that Officer Wehage lacked a reason to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest-OVI-would be found in her vehicle. For the reasons below, we conclude that Officer Wehage's search of Eversole's vehicle-which led to the discovery of the heroin inside her purse-was not lawfully conducted under the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.

         {¶9} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, "an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence." Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court's conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).

         {¶10} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14, generally prohibits warrantless searches and seizures, and any evidence that is obtained during an unlawful search or seizure will be excluded from being used against the defendant. State v. Steinbrunner, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-11-27, 2012-Ohio-2358, ¶ 12, citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961). The Fourth Amendment does not explicitly provide "that violations of its provisions against unlawful searches and seizures will result in the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of such violation, but the United States Supreme Court has held that the exclusion of evidence is an essential part of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Jenkins, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-10-10, 2010-Ohio-5943, ¶ 9, citing Mapp at 649 and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914).

         {¶11} Warrantless searches "'are per se unreasonable, ' 'subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Gant, 556 U.S. at 338, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967). "Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest." Id. at 338, citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914). "The search-incident-to-arrest exception has two rationales: protecting arresting officers and safeguarding evidence that the arrestee might conceal or destroy." State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 182, citing Gant at 339. See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969) (noting that searches incident to arrest are reasonable "in order to remove any weapons [the arrestee] might seek to use" and "in order to prevent [the] concealment or destruction of evidence").

         {¶12} "The United States Supreme Court defined the scope of a search incident to arrest in Chimel and stated that an officer making a lawful custodial arrest may search 'the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.'" State v. Caulfield, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25573, 2013-Ohio-3029, ¶ 27, quoting Chimel at 763. "Later, in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (1981), the United States Supreme Court explained that once a police officer 'has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.'" Id., quoting Belton at 460.

         {¶13} In Gant, the United States Supreme Court revisited Belton and clarified the scope of a lawful search incident to arrest. See Gant at 342-343. In Gant, the Court concluded that "[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 351. Accord State v. Grubb, 186 Ohio App.3d 744, 2010-Ohio-1265, ¶ 18 (3d Dist.).

         {¶14} "At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness." Steinbrunner, 2012-Ohio-2358, at ¶ 12, citing City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), at paragraph two of the syllabus, State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and City of Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999).

         {¶15} Because Eversole was handcuffed and detained in Officer Wehage's patrol vehicle, the issue in this case is whether Officer Wehage could reasonably have believed that evidence of the crime of arrest might be found in Eversole's vehicle. Compare State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶ 17 ("Here, there is no question that Leak was arrested, secured, and not within reaching distance of the car prior to the search of the car. The question then becomes whether it was reasonable to believe that the car contained evidence of Leak's offense of arrest-domestic violence."); Thomas v. Plummer, 489 Fed.Appx. 116, 121 (6th Cir.2012); United States v. Reagan, 713 F.Supp.2d 724, 727 (E.D.Tenn.2010) ("In this case, it is uncontested that Ranger Garner's search occurred after the Defendant was arrested and secured in the back of a patrol car. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Defendant was not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment of her vehicle at the time of Ranger Garner's search. Thus, the only issue for the Court's resolution is whether it was reasonable for Ranger Garner to believe that the Defendant's vehicle contained evidence of the offense for which she was arrested, DUI.").

         {¶16} The United States Supreme Court did not provide an independent explanation of the meaning of the phrase "reason to believe" or explain when it is reasonable for a law enforcement officer to believe that the passenger compartment of a vehicle might contain evidence of the crime for which the vehicle's occupant was arrested, which has created a host of uncertainties. See Gant at 356, 364 (Alito, J., dissenting); Reagan at 727-728 ("The Supreme Court has not expressly clarified the meaning of the phrase 'reasonable to believe' as it is used in Gant, nor has it expounded on when it is reasonable for a law enforcement officer to believe that the passenger compartment of a vehicle contains evidence of the crime for which the vehicle's occupant was arrested. * * * The Supreme Court's reticence has led to confusion among the lower federal courts and various state courts."). See also Megginson v. United States, 556 U.S. 1230, 129 S.Ct. 1982 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting from decision to grant, vacate, and remand) ("This case thus appears to present an important question regarding the meaning and specificity of the reasonable suspicion requirement in Gant. Because of the ambiguity of the new Gant test and the frequency of roadside arrests, I would grant certiorari in this case to provide much needed clarification."). Indeed, "Gant itself gives little guidance" in its "relatively scant exposition":

"In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, " the Court explained, "there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence. But in others * * * the offense of arrest [a drug crime for instance] will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein."

Thomas at 121, quoting Gant at 344.

         {¶17} As a result of that ambiguity, courts have struggled to quantify the suspicion standard required to permit searches incident to lawful arrests under Gants evidence-of-the-crime-of-arrest search authorization. Two primary approaches to Gant's reason-to-believe language have developed-the "categorical" approach and the "reasonableness" approach. See id. at 121-122. See also Reagan at 729; People v. Evans, 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 746-747, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 323 (2011) ("Outside the context of minor traffic offenses, which Gant held would not provide an evidentiary basis for a search, courts have generally adopted one of two approaches to the question. Some courts have concluded or implied that whether it is reasonable to believe offense-related evidence might be found in a vehicle is determined solely by reference to the nature of the offense of arrest, rather than by reference to the particularized facts of the case. Others have required some level of particularized suspicion, based at least in part on the facts of the specific case.").

         {¶18} Describing the categorical approach, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "Some courts hold that an officer could reasonably believe that a vehicle contained evidence of the crime of arrest if, and only if, 'the offense of arrest of an occupant of a vehicle is, by its nature, for a crime that might yield physical evidence.'" (Emphasis added.) Thomas at 121, quoting Brown v. State, 24 So.3d 671, 681 (Fla.App.2009) and citing People v. Nottoli, 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 553, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 (2011), State v. Cantrell, 149 Idaho 247, 254, 233 P.3d 178 (2010) ("Cantrell was arrested for DUI, and the DUI supplied the basis for the search."), citing Brown, and United States v. Oliva, S.D.Tex. C.R. No. C-09-341, 2009 WL 1918458, *6 (July 1, 2009). See also Reagan at 729, citing Brown at 679 ("'we hold that "reasonable belief, " as used in Gant, is solely determined from the nature of the offense of arrest'"), Cantrell at 183-185 ("relying []on Brown and holding that a search incident to a DUI arrest was lawful under Gant 'because the offense of the arrest [, DUI, ] will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein, and because a DUI is an offense for which police could expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment"), Cain v. Arkansas, 2010 Ark.App. 30, 373 S.W.3d 392, 396 (2010) ("reasoning that a search incident to a DUI arrest was lawful under Gant because 'an open container could have been found in appellant's vehicle'"), Cain at 399 (Brown, J., dissenting) ("'the majority sends the message'" that officers can search a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest for DUI 'without anything more prompting such a search'"), and Oliva at *6 ("differentiating between a case where a defendant is arrested for a 'routine traffic violation' and a case where a defendant is arrested for driving while intoxicated, and holding that in the latter case 'it would be reasonable for officers to search the vehicle for evidence of driving while intoxicated, including open or empty containers'").

         {¶19} In adopting the categorical approach, the court in Brown "reasoned that the [United States] Supreme Court intended to give its imprimatur to a system of classifying criminal offenses into two distinct groups: those that 'by [their] nature * * * might yield physical evidence, ' and those 'for which there is no physical evidence.'" Reagan at 731, quoting Brown at 678, 681-682. Gant provided the [court in Brown] with one example of an offense in the former group, and six specific examples of offenses in the latter group."[4] Id. "It is clear that the [court in Brown] envisioned a dichotomy of criminal offenses." Id. at 730. "The notion that crimes can be categorized in this manner comes from the [court in Brown's] understanding of two passages from Gant-passages which themselves were modeled on Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Thornton." Id., citing Brown at 678 ("Our conclusion on this issue finds ample support in the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia in Thornton.").

         {¶20} Regarding the reasonableness approach, the Sixth Circuit noted, "Other courts have eschewed this categorical approach, reasoning instead that an officer may search a vehicle 'when it is reasonable to believe, based upon common sense factors and the totality of the circumstances, that evidence of the offense of the arrest is inside.'" Thomas at 121, quoting Reagan at 728 and citing People v. Chamberlain, 229 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Colo.2010) ("The nature of the offense of arrest is clearly intended to have significance, and in some cases it may virtually preclude the existence of real or documentary evidence, but a broad rule automatically authorizing searches incident to arrest for all other offenses cannot be reconciled with the actual holding of Gant.") and Evans, 200 Cal.App.4th at 747-752 (adopting the Chamberlain rationale). See also Taylor v. State, 224 Md.App. 476, 490, 121 A.3d 167 (2015) ("Whether a belief is reasonable depends upon the totality of the circumstances, rather than a categorical rule.").

         {¶21} Recognizing potential application difficulties, the court in Reagan disagreed with adopting the categorical approach adopted in Brown for three reasons:

First, any attempt to categorize every criminal offense as being either one that might yield physical evidence or one for which there is no physical evidence runs into interpretive problems. It is relatively easy to decide that certain criminal offenses, like the six minor traffic violations * * * are offenses for which there is no physical evidence. But it is more difficult to decide whether a criminal offense such as telephone harassment "by [its] nature * * * might yield physical evidence." Reasonable people could disagree about exactly what can be considered "physical evidence, " and about whether there "might" be any physical evidence of telephone harassment.
Second, even if it were possible to simply classify criminal offenses using the Brown dichotomy, the only method for determining which offenses fit in each class would be a series of decisions rendered by various courts throughout the country. This piecemeal approach to classifying offenses could lead to jurisprudential inconsistencies. For example, a court in one state may determine that a certain crime per se might yield physical evidence, while a court in another state may decide that the very same crime is, per se, a crime for which there is no physical evidence. Moreover, because there are myriad criminal offenses, such piecemeal classification could create uncertainty among law enforcement officers. Further complicating this problem is the fact that many common criminal offenses have different elements or are defined with different terminology across different jurisdictions.
The third, and most significant, problem with the rule of Brown is that its application to a particular case might produce unreasonable or unintended results. Brown held that incident to the lawful arrest of the occupant of a vehicle, law enforcement officers may search the passenger compartment of that vehicle and any containers therein when the offense of arrest is, by its very nature, an offense that might yield physical evidence. This rule could actually allow police to search a vehicle passenger compartment incident to an arrest when it is wholly unreasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest is inside, but the nature of the offense per se makes a search permissible.

Reagan at 732, quoting Brown at 681.

         {¶22} Indeed, Courts following the reasonableness approach have done so because the categorical approach would create "a non-case-specific test [that] would suffer from objections similar to those that Gant condemned in the broad reading of Belton." Chamberlain at 1057. As support, those jurisdictions point to "[t]he [United States Supreme] Court's use of phrases [in Gant] like 'reasonable to believe' and 'reasonable basis to believe' [as] further indication that it intends some degree of articulable suspicion, a standard which it has previously acknowledged in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as meriting official intrusion." Id

         {¶23} However, the challenge underlying the reasonableness approaches lies with the Court's failure to explain the quantum of suspicion required. See, e.g., Taylor, 224 Md.App. at 488-489 (discussing the quantum of suspicion standards applied to justify searches under Gants reason-to-believe rule-a preponderance of the evidence, probable cause, and the reasonable suspicion for a stop-and-frisk search under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)); 3 Wayne R LaFave, Search And Seizure, Section 71(d) (5th Ed2016) See also State v. Price, 6th Dist Sandusky No S-11-037, 2013-Ohio-130, ¶ 32 (Yarbrough, J, concurring) (discussing Gant 's reason-to-believe suspicion standard); Reagan at 728 (discussing the standards applied to Gant 's reason-to-believe rule). The majority of the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have concluded that Gant 's reasonable- to-believe standard requires less than probable cause, "'because otherwise Gant's evidentiary rationale would merely duplicate the "automobile exception, " which the Court specifically identified as a distinct exception to the warrant requirement.'" Taylor, 224 Md.App. at 489, quoting United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 25 (D.C. Cir.2010), citing Gant at 347. See also Evans at 748-749 ("While [the reasonable-to-believe] language is often used synonymously with probable cause, in light of the automobile exception, which already provides an exception to the warrant requirement whenever police have probable cause to believe an automobile contains evidence of a crime, a requirement of probable cause in this context would render the entire second prong of the Gant search-incident-to-arrest exception superfluous."). "'Rather, the "reasonable to believe" standard probably is akin to the "reasonable suspicion" standard required to justify a Terry search.'" Taylor, 224 Md.App. at 489, quoting Vinton at 25, citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921 (1972) ("noting that a Terry search is permissible if the officer has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous"). See Price at ¶ 32 (noting that the "standard appears closer to 'reasonable suspicion' than to probable cause); Reagan at 728 (construing Gant's reason-to-believe standard as the functional equivalent of the reasonable-belief standard), citing United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir.2006); Evans at 749 ("because the majority [in Gant] at several points requires only a reasonable belief that evidence 'might' be found, it seems more likely that the Court intended a lesser degree of suspicion commensurate with that sufficient for limited intrusions, like investigatory stops"), citing Chamberlain at 1057 and 3 LaFave at Section 7.1(d). See also Megginson, 556 U.S. at 1230 (Alito, J. dissenting) (referring to Gant's reason-to-believe exception as "the reasonable suspicion requirement").

         {¶24} Indeed, courts following the reasonableness approach have construed Gant's reason-to-believe standard under the "reasonable suspicion" standard required to justify a search under Terry. See Evans at 749, citing Chamberlain at 1057 and Vinton at 25 ("Rather, the 'reasonable to believe' standard probably is akin to the 'reasonable suspicion' standard required to justify a Terry search."), citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921 (1972) ("noting that a Terry search is permissible if the officer 'has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous'" (Emphasis added)); Taylor, 224 Md.App. at 489-490; 3 LaFave at Section 7.1(d). See also Reagan at 728. "Accordingly, the officer's assessment of the likelihood that there will be relevant evidence inside the car must be based on more than "a mere hunch, " but "falls considerably short of [needing to] satisfy[ ] a preponderance of the evidence standard." Vinton at 25, quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002). See also 3 LaFave at Section 7.1(d). As a result, courts following the reasonableness approach apply a number of considerations in determining whether law enforcement had reason to believe evidence of the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. See Taylor, 224 Md.App. at 490 (applying factors, including "(1) a police officer's training and experience; (2) the lack of an innocent explanation for a driver's seemingly illicit behavior; and (3) the nature of the crime of arrest" to determine the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest); Reagan at 733, fn.7 ("Many different facts may provide a law enforcement officer with reason to believe that evidence of DUI is located inside the passenger compartment of a vehicle. Examples include observations of the driver drinking while driving, observations of an open container of alcohol in plain view inside the passenger compartment, statements made by the occupants of the vehicle indicating that an open container is in the passenger compartment, the smell of alcohol emanating from within the passenger compartment, or indications that the driver was traveling from a location such as a recreational area or campground where alcohol is not available unless it is transported in by private vehicle.").

         {¶25} The outcome of this case primarily depends on which of the two approaches to Gant 's reason-to-believe language we follow, and secondarily depends on how we classify the offense of OVI. This case presents this court with an issue of first impression as to whether OVI is the type of offense that will, by its nature, provide law enforcement a reason to believe they will find evidence of the crime in a vehicle or whether it is the type of offense where a particularized consideration of the circumstances surrounding the offense is necessary. Clearly, there is a divergence in federal and state case law deciding which approach to apply, especially with respect to OVI offenses. Compare Thomas, 489 Fed.Appx. at 121 ("Courts following Brown have consistently held that an officer who arrests a driver for operating under the influence has a reasonable belief that there will be evidence of operating under the influence in the car."), citing Cantrell, 233 P.3d at 185 ("Cantrell was arrested for DUI, and the DUI supplied the basis for the search.") and Oliva, 2009 WL 1918458, at *6 ("holding that, because [the] officer arrested defendant for driving while intoxicated, [the] search of vehicle was permissible"), Cain, 373 S.W.3d at 397 (concluding that "an open container of alcohol could have been found in appellant's vehicle, making the officer's search permissible under Gant"), and Evans at 750 (concluding that "when a driver is arrested for driving under the influence, or being under the influence, it will generally be reasonable for an officer to believe evidence related to that crime might be found in the vehicle") with Reagan at 733 ("The Court finds that it is not reasonable to believe that evidence of DUI is inside the ...


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