United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
SOLOMON OLIVER, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Se Plaintiff Richard Tisdale filed this action against
the United States Department of Justice and the United States
Bureau of Prisons. In the Complaint, Tisdale challenges his
2005 federal conviction in this District Court on one count
of conspiracy in connection with identity documents and four
counts of fraud in connection with identity documents. He
asks this Court “to intervene and address the possible
irreparable harm that's being done by the adversary's
(sic).” (ECF No. 1 at 4). Tisdale also filed a Motion
for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2) and an Ex Parte
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 3). He
asks this Court to enjoin the Defendants from further
executing the sentence and restitution imposed on him. For
the reasons stated below, the Motions are denied, and this
action is dismissed.
December 15, 2004, the federal grand jury in Cleveland, Ohio
returned a nine count Indictment against Tisdale, his brother
John Tisdale and Andrea Dent. Tisdale was charged in Count
One with a conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with
identification documents, to transport stolen goods in
interstate commerce and to commit money laundering. He also
was charged in four additional counts of the Indictment with
fraud in connection with identity documents. Tisdale and the
other Defendants stole computers, software and related
merchandise from various retail stores and subsequently sold
the merchandise to a third party conspirator at a discounted
price. The co-conspirator, in turn, sold the stolen
merchandise to the public. The Defendants were further
charged with stealing the identities of innocent victims to
rent storage units and vehicles that were used to store the
stolen merchandise and transport the Defendants to and from
their target stores, and to open bank accounts into which
proceeds from their thefts were deposited. Tisdale was found
guilty on all counts on August 15, 2005, and was sentenced to
180 months in prison.
Complaint contains few facts, making it difficult to decipher
his legal claims. It appears, however, that he is challenging
his 2005 federal conviction. He objects to a search that
occurred on October 14, 2003, and claims the Government
tortuously interfered with his access to Ohio's judicial
process. He contends this case originated in Indiana and
federal law enforcement officers obtained federal
jurisdiction by backdating information found in his bank
records. Finally, Tisdale claims cases filed under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2712 “do not go to the jury to be analyzed by
those who are well versed in the technical aspects of law
enforcement.” (ECF No. 1 at 4). He contends the
description of the car in which he was traveling at the time
of his arrest was incorrectly entered into the LEADS
database. He asserts the Patriot Act “mandates
meticulous compliance with the adversarial back and forth
dialogue necessary to address the integrity of the judicial
process and protect the plaintiff's constitutional right
to be free from unlawful and false information fraudulently
being disseminated through all aspects of access to the
judicial systems in the United States.” (ECF No. 1 at
4). He states the judiciary has “the power to intervene
and address the possible irreparable harm that's being
done by the adversary's (sic).” (ECF No. 1 at 4).
district court is expressly authorized to dismiss any civil
action filed by a prisoner seeking relief from a governmental
entity, as soon as possible after docketing, if the court
concludes that the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or if the plaintiff seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A; Siller v. Dean, No.
99-5323, 2000 WL 145167, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2000);
see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)
(citing numerous Supreme Court cases for the proposition that
attenuated or unsubstantial claims divest the district court
of jurisdiction); In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d
290, 300 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that federal question
jurisdiction is divested by unsubstantial claims).
of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted when it lacks “plausibility in the
Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading must contain a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl.
Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The Plaintiff is not required to
include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more
than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet
this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a
Complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998).
initial matter, Tisdale has not identified a plausible legal
cause of action which entitles him to relief and none is
apparent on the face of the Complaint. He mentions the
Patriot Act, and cites to 18 U.S.C. § 2712. That statute
section permits the Secretary of State, by regulation, to
impose controls on serving in or with the security forces of
a designated foreign government, and providing training or
other technical services that has a direct military, law
enforcement, or intelligence application, to or for the
security forces of a designated foreign government. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2712(a)and (b). Tisdale does not provide sufficient
information to suggest how this statute has any bearing on
this case or his criminal case. Furthermore, no private cause
of action exists to enforce the Patriot Act. Taylor v.
United States, No. 3:14-CV-P287-S, 2014 WL 4244301, at
*2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2014); Sanders v. Michigan First
Credit Union Tellers, No. 10-CV-12517, 2010 WL 3168636,
at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 10, 2010); Gueye v. Thomas M.
Cooley Law Sch., No. 1:06-CV-00571, 2008 WL 618640, at
*7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 29, 2008); Ibn-Duriya v. Curry,
No. CIV A 306-CV-473-S, 2007 WL 1191715, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr.
addition, both the Defendants are agencies of the United
States Government. The United States, as a sovereign, cannot
be sued without its prior consent, and the terms of its
consent define the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.
McGinness v. U.S., 90 F.3d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1996).
A waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed,
unequivocally expressed, and cannot be implied. U.S. v.
King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); Soriano v. U.S.,
352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957). Plaintiff does not identify a cause
of action for which the United States has waived sovereign
immunity. He mentions Fifth Amendment and Fourth Amendment
violations; however, these claims generally are brought in a
Bivens action. Bivens provides a limited
cause of action against individual officers acting under
color of federal law alleged to have acted
unconstitutionally. Correctional Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001). The United States has
not consented to suit under Bivens. Id;
see Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,
even if Tisdale had identified a cause of action for which
the United States has waived sovereign immunity, he cannot
obtain relief from his conviction or sentence in a civil
rights action. For this purpose, his sole remedy is habeas
corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500
Tisdale's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2)
and an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order
(ECF No. 3) are denied, and this action is dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §1915A. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § ...